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Charter schools are a type of market-based education reform typically implemented in low-
income communities suffering from failing public schools. Charter school advocates claim that 
schools governed by the market, rather than the government, will improve via parental choice 
and competition. They advocate the creation of an educational marketplace, where private 
institutions can open and manage schools with minimal government regulation. Parents will have 
the freedom to “shop” the education marketplace for the school of their choice. School funding 
will follow students so that school funding relies on the number of students attracted. Schools, 
then, will compete for funding, leading to an overall increase in the quality of education. This 
system, they argue, will increase accountability, efficiency, and innovation because schools that 
fail to improve will no longer attract consumers and go out of business. The debate surrounding 
market-based education reforms like charter schools engages the larger question of whether 
centralized public management or markets are a better way of organizing K-12 education. There 
are two dimensions of this question worth exploring. The first is empirical: does the introduction 
of market-based reforms produce the results touted by charter school advocates? The second is 
normative: do market-based reforms provide adequate educational opportunities for all students, 
regardless of race and socioeconomic status?  
 
In many impoverished communities, education markets have not lived up to their ideals. Many 
disadvantaged students do not have access to adequate educational opportunities despite the 
implementation of market-oriented reforms. Detroit, MI is a special case in point. Nevertheless, 
there is great disagreement over whether education markets should not be used in education 
provision and governance.  Proponents of market-based education reforms point to the failure of 
democratic governance in its responsibility to provide quality schools to low-income, urban 
communities. On the other hand, opponents often point to the importance of voice and collective 
governance of schools. As a result, much of the debate in the philosophical literature is centered 
on the juxtaposition of markets and democracy and their respective merits and vices.  
 
I argue that the framing of this discussion is not constructive and loses sight of an important 
question: which institutions will successfully create an education system that can produce 
adequate and accessible educational opportunities for all? Using idealizations of markets and 
democracy fails to fully explain what has and might go wrong in actual education markets. 
Instead, we ought to look at education markets in context and study the structural features that 
contribute to the makeup, functioning, and results of the market. Detroit’s education market 
demonstrates that school choice and charter schools operating in segregated and disadvantaged 
contexts are no “panacea.” Instead, Detroit’s education market is characterized by frequent 
school openings and closings, high student mobility and teacher turnover, and overall low-
performance. I argue that many of the features and outcomes of Detroit’s market systematically 
leave Detroit’s students behind, especially the most vulnerable, and make for a noxious and 








As someone who grew up in a working-class family and as a first-generation college 
student, it is appealing to think of education as the “great equalizer.” But this ideal, sketched in 
the minds of American schoolchildren starting in first or second grade, is false and hides some of 
the ugliest aspects of American society. Moving from Wayne County schools to Livingston 
County in second grade revealed slight – but significant – differences to me at a very young age. 
Yet, I still did not know of the conditions in which teachers struggle to educate hungry, tired, 
abused, traumatized, and systemically disadvantaged students. In the summer of 2012, I learned 
that some schools in the Bronx didn’t have textbooks or chairs, that classes were taught in 
classrooms with leaky ceilings and molding walls. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is not 
uncommon in high-poverty schools, in both urban and rural settings. To think that children can 
learn in this environment and that grit alone can overcome these conditions is absurd. I was 
lucky enough to receive a quality K-12 education that adequately prepared me to succeed in 
college. Education can open doors to new possibilities. Yet, basing policies on the ideal that 
schools or markets have the power to overcome all of society’s problems is setting up students – 
and the rest of us – to fail.  
 
First and foremost, I owe a great deal to my family, who taught me the value of hard 
work. My mom and dad served as excellent examples of perseverance through difficult times and 
struggles. For their constant love and support, I owe many thanks to my great-grandparents and 
grandparents. My aunt and uncle had a positive impact on me and were a big part of my decision 
to go to college. At one point in time, college wasn’t a part of my worldview and I owe it to them 
for planting the idea in my head and supporting me along the way.  
 
To my best friend and partner, Alex, who has been a constant support throughout this 
process. Thank you for putting up with many conversations about education markets and dealing 
with my tunnel vision this past semester. I am grateful for your perspective, feedback, and 
support throughout this process.  
 
Many professors I’ve worked with and discussed my ideas with have served as superb 
mentors. I am overwhelmed with gratitude for the support, constructive criticism, and 
mentorship they have provided. Many thanks to: Professor Elizabeth Anderson, Professor Meena 
Krishnamurthy, Professor Steven Skerlos, Professor Maris Vinovskis, Professor Peter Hammer, 
Professor Thomas Pedroni, Professor John Grey, and Tanner Library librarian, Molly Mahony.  
 
 I owe many thanks to my advisor, Professor Elizabeth Anderson, who welcomed me to 
speak with her regarding education inequity and education markets early last summer. Her 
succinct and helpful feedback on many chapters helped me refine my ideas and arguments. 
Professor Anderson’s constant support and mentorship since day one and throughout the entire 
researching and writing process was monumental. While taking Introduction to Political 
Economy, Professor Meena Krishnamurthy welcomed me to office hours to discuss not only the 
topics relevant to the course but also my thesis topic and how it fits into debates within political 
economy. Professor Krishnamurthy placed great value on student insight and thinking beyond 
the course material; I believe this helped me refine my interests and find alternative methods of 
thinking.  
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The original idea for the thesis can be dated back to this past summer while working on a 
research project with Professor Steven Skerlos. One of the most difficult stages of the thesis 
process was figuring out where to begin. Professor Skerlos helped me a great deal with finding 
my starting point by continuously asking me to further refine my questions. In addition, he 
helped me negotiate my questions more quantitatively.  
 
A great deal of the fifth and sixth chapters was inspired by the work of Professor Peter 
Hammer of Wayne State University. Professor Hammer also took the time to discuss my thesis 
ideas and answer questions related to his work school funding and competition. Professor 
Thomas Pedroni of Wayne State University also took the time to discuss education in Detroit 
with me, and provide insightful feedback on my ideas. Professor Pedroni is quite the example of 
fighting the good fight for Detroit’s students; his uncovering of the false claims used to justify 
the closing of Oakman Elementary is just one example of this.  
 
I had the privilege of taking a course on the history of education policy with Professor 
Maris Vinovskis. His background in education policy and experience in federal education 
provided insights and plenty of critical questions for my thesis. I would also like to thank the 
Tanner Librarian, Molly Mahony, for her continuous support and staffing my favorite place to 
study. Molly has been resourceful and always able to find an answer to my questions.  
 
Lastly, I would like to thank Professor John Grey. His introductory course on ethics – a 
course in which I did not enthusiastically enroll as a freshman looking to fulfill some humanities 
credits – convinced me to study philosophy. His three-hundred word essays on some of the most 
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CHAPTER I: Understanding the Role of Charter Schools and their Place in Market-Based 
Reforms 
 
What are charter schools and what do they have to do with markets? 
 
Put simply, a charter school can be defined as a public school chartered by an authorizer 
that is independent from the traditional, centrally-managed public school system.1 A charter 
states the “conditions under which the school will operate and the goals it must accomplish to 
remain in operation.”2 Charter schools can be understood as a type of bargain or agreement: in 
exchange for greater autonomy over governance, instruction and curriculum, they must accept 
greater accountability for results than traditional public schools.3 
 
The market-based charter school argument contains two parts.4 First, charter proponents 
claim that schools will improve if given greater autonomy – freedom from burdensome 
bureaucratic rules and regulations imposed on traditional public schools – in exchange for 
accountability.5 Second, financing schools based on per-pupil funding and giving parents choice 
in schools will create competition between both charter schools and traditional public schools, 
forcing schools to improve or go out of business; this vision aims to mirror the some of the 
conditions under which markets operate in providing consumer goods.6 Importantly, however, 
charter schools are not merely a new type of school and thus will be not viewed in this way.7 
While charter school laws vary by state, the charter school policies of interest are those that seek 
to imitate the way markets provide goods through system-wide change. For this reason, many 
scholars view charter schools as a type of “market-based” or “market-oriented” policy. These 
charter school policies mark a significant departure from the way schools are traditionally 
governed, funded, and organized.8 In theory and policy, this is often attempted by a combination 
of: parental choice, deregulation, new accountability standards, and, in some cases, profit-
incentives.9  
 
                                                     
1 Gary Miron and Christopher Nelson, What’s Public About Charter Schools? Lessons Learned About 
Choice and Accountability (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2002): 3. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
Accountability is a vague and contested concept in educational theory and policy. There are two types of 
accountability relevant to the charter school concept; these will be explained shortly. 
4 James M. Goenner, “The Origination of Michigan’s Charter School Policy: An Historical Analysis” 
(PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2011): 39, 
https://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd%3A872/datastream/OBJ/view. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 32-33.  
7 James N. Goenner draws an important distinction between viewing charter schools as a new type of 
school and viewing charter schools as part of a larger set of “market-based policies.” 
8 Miron and Nelson, What’s Public About Charter Schools? 19. 
9 I borrow from the scholarship of Goenner, Miron and Nelson, Adamson, Cook-Harvey, and Darling 
Hammond to explain concepts fundamental to the argument in favor of charter schools and the resulting 
policies.  
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Most importantly, the argument for implementing charter schools engages the larger 
question of whether centralized public management or markets are a better way to organize K-12 
education. Integral to this question is determining whether there are certain types of goods and 
services that ought to be distributed by central public management and markets. More 
specifically, are there certain types of goods that shouldn’t be distributed by markets? Are 
education markets any different than markets for apples or coats? Proponents of market-based 
education provision argue that markets are a better way of providing education and rely on free 
market principles in justifying this position. Nevertheless, using markets or “quasi-markets” to 
provide education entails reorganizing provision in significant ways. Such reforms have occurred 
in the United States, New Zealand, Britain, and Chile, although the policies differ across regions 
and cities.  
 
Market-based charter school policies require “structural” changes, which change the 
organization of education provision and the conditions under which schools operate.10 
Traditionally, a school board oversees and manages the schools located within its district and its 
members are democratically elected by those residing in the district. School boards usually 
manage funds, make decisions regarding the schools, and ensure compliance with state and 
federal laws within the schools. The introduction of charter schools, by contrast, seeks to 
decentralize and disperse authority to individual schools. As Gary Miron describes, 
“restructuring emphasizes devolution of authority to local units of governance.” In essence, 
charter schools are an attempt to shift and disperse the control and governance of schools to the 
lowest level – to each school.11  
 
Choice, Deregulation, Accountability, and Competition 
 
There are five structural changes involved in creating conditions under which charter 
schools can successfully operate according to the charter school argument: parental choice, 
deregulation (school-level autonomy), a new system of accountability, increasing inter-school 
competition, and creating profit-incentives.12 These five conditions mark a departure from the 
way in which schools are traditionally governed, controlled, and funded. Moreover, in some 
states the introduction of charter school laws has been accompanied by system-wide school 
reform, altering the entire school system.13 The five main structural changes are described in 
what follows. 
 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Charter schools are governed by school boards, although these are not the same school boards that have 
traditionally operated at the district-level. In Michigan, board members are not elected by residents. 
Instead, they are appointed by the authorizer (the body granting the charter). Gary Miron regards the 
appointed school board as one way in which charter schools typify private – rather than public – 
institutions.   
12 Here, I borrow from both James N. Goenner’s work on the originations Michigan’s charter law and 
Gary Miron’s evaluation of the law to identify the main system-wide changes enacted in Michigan’s 
charter school law. 
13 New Orleans, LA and Detroit, MI are illustrative examples. While Detroit’s education market will be 
the focus, New Orleans will be used as a comparison. New Orleans is a 100% charter system with some 




Parents should be given choice in the school their student attends. The school students 
attend should not be determined or bound by their residential district. Traditionally, students 
have been assigned to specific schools based on their residence by a school district. Instead, 
school choice allows students to attend any school, regardless of location. Of course, there are 
limitations on choice, depending on the law. Giving parents choice means that schools will no 





Greater deregulation of schools will give schools greater autonomy from bureaucratic 
rules and regulations, usually those imposed by a central school district.14 The use of 
bureaucracy is often underspecified and many times charter advocates point school 
administration as the root of the evil without specific evidence of the rules and regulations that 
are burdensome.15 Nevertheless, this autonomy, it is argued, will allow teachers and school-level 
administrators have greater authority and flexibility in developing the school, curriculum and 
methods. In theory, the model empowers teachers and principals to use their professional 
expertise to better educate and meet the unique needs of their students; as such, “it envisions a 
situation in which school personnel design the school and its curriculum.”16 Deregulation will 
also allow for the independent management of schools instead management by a single school 
board that oversees multiple schools. In other words, the governance of the schools is located at 
the lowest level – at each school – instead of at the district-level. The call for greater 
deregulation operates under the assumption that government-managed schools are grossly 
inefficient and ineffective due to burdensome and inhibitive rules.17  
 
New Accountability Standards 
 
Charter schools will be held to new standards of accountability. While controversies 
remain over the different types of accountability best for schools, the charter school model 
leverages two types. At minimum, charter schools are supposed to be held to the goals and 
standards set forth in their charter (i.e., contract) issued by their authorizer.18 Since charter 
schools are given greater autonomy, it is expected that they adhere to the goals stated in their 
charter; otherwise, the authorizer has the power to revoke the charter.19 The market-based theory 
of charters holds that parents will hold schools accountable in having the choice to leave a 
school if they are dissatisfied.20 Parental choice will be strengthened by per-pupil funding; the 
funding of all schools will depend on the number of students enrolled. Thus, if a school fails to 
satisfy parents or produce satisfactory outcomes, consumers (i.e., parents) can “vote with their 
                                                     
14 Goenner, “The Origination of Michigan’s Charter School Policy,” 41. 
15 In Chapter II, Chubb and Moe’s qualms against “bureaucracy” are explained in more detail.  
16 Miron and Nelson, What’s Public About Charter Schools? 29.   
17 Goenner, “The Origination of Michigan’s Charter School Policy: An Historical Analysis.” 
18 Ibid., 40. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
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feet” and deprive the school of their student’s funds.21 This too, it is argued, will make schools 




Proponents claim that charter schools are a way of introducing competition between 
schools – both traditional public schools and charter schools – and creating a competitive 
education marketplace.23 Key to creating competition between schools is allowing funding to 
follow students or, in other words, make school funding dependent on the number of students 
enrolled (i.e., “per-pupil funding”). With enrollment and funding no longer guaranteed, schools 
will be forced to improve; those that fail to attract and retain students will go out of business, 




While profit incentives are not a necessary condition for implementing charter schools as 
a market-based policy, some have argued that introducing profit incentives in the education 
market will lead to better outcomes.25  It is argued that a profit incentive will force schools to run 
more efficiently since they will be incentivized to produce better results with fewer resources.26 
Some even go as far to argue that the creation of an “industry” of for-profit educational 
management organizations would provide students “equal or better educational opportunities at a 




By employing these five structural changes – parental choice, deregulation, a new system of 
accountability, inter-school competition, and profit incentives – proponents argue that charter 
schools will:  
I. Become centers of innovation for effective teaching practices. 
II. Increase student outcomes (performance as measured by standardized tests, parental 
satisfaction) 
III. Use funds more efficiently and encourage other schools – including traditional public 
schools – to use funds efficiently or else suffer in the competitive education 
marketplace.28 
 
These different outcomes – increased innovation, performance, and efficiency – each deserve 
greater explanation and will discussed and critiqued in greater detail when examining Detroit’s 
education market in Chapter V. 
                                                     
21 Miron and Nelson, What’s Public About Charter Schools? 11.  
22 Ibid., 44-45. 
23Goenner, “The Origination of Michigan’s Charter School Policy," 43. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 41. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 121. 
28 Ibid., 44. 
 7 
Non-market-based charter schools 
 
History reveals that the original vision of what we call “charter schools” was not 
connected to markets in any way. The idea of charter schools first appeared when Ray Budde 
published Education By Charter: Restructuring School Districts in 1988.29 His work was given 
publicity when Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), 
presented his idea of charter schools as autonomous, teacher-led schools.30 However, his idea for 
charter schools did not involve the type of market-based school provision prevalent today.31  
 
Originally, Budde proposed: “teams of teachers could be ‘chartered’ directly by a school 
board for a period of three to five years. No one – not the superintendent or the principal or any 
central office supervisors – would stand between the school board and the teachers.” Budde’s 
proposal involved chartering programs and departments, rather than entire schools.32 And while 
Budde’s proposal involved restructuring, Budde argued for allowing teachers to receive charters 
directly from the school board to implement “site-based management.”33 Site-based management 
aims to “transform schools into communities where the appropriate people participate 
constructively in major decisions that affect them.”34 Budde’s charter program sought to give 
teachers more authority in their schools and classrooms. Notice that Budde’s proposal does not 
require the same restructuring as market-based charter schools. However, through policy, charter 
schools became associated with markets and, in some cases, worked alongside system-wide 
reforms to create a school system designed to resemble markets. 
 
A Brief Overview of Theories and Policies 
 
In both theory and policy, the argument for charter schools predominantly rests on 
important aspects of some free market principles. Charter schools are not the first attempt at 
applying free market principles to way education is provided, governed and managed. In 
Freedom and Capitalism, originally published in 1962, Milton Friedman argued against 
government-administered schools and argued that the government’s involvement should be 
primarily limited to providing funds for schooling.35,36 He proposed a voucher system, whereby 
the role government is limited to providing the funds for schooling and schools are provided and 
administered by private institutions.37 Parents, he claimed, would be given vouchers from the 
                                                     
29 Ibid., 37. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ray Budde, “The Evolution of the Charter Concept,” The Phi Delta Kappan 78, no. 1 (1996): 72–73, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20405708. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ted Kolderie, “Ray Budde and the Origins of the ‘Charter Concept,’” Education Evolving, 2005, 2, 
https://www.educationevolving.org/content/ray-budde-and-origins-of-charter-concept. 




35 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982): 85-86.  
36 Friedman’s argument for vouchers will be explained in Chapter II. 
37 Ibid., 77-81. 
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government to use on educational expenses.38  In 1990, John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe 
published Politics, Markets and America’s Schools and argued for removing the authority of the 
state to provide schools and vesting it in an education marketplace, where schools would be run 
by private organizations authorized to received public money in the form of “scholarships.”39 
Jeffrey Henig argues that Chubb and Moe’s “scholarship” plan is intended to serve the same 
function as vouchers while avoiding the negative connotations involved with vouchers.40 Using 
the private school market as evidence of high-performing, efficient schools, they argued that 
markets could be used to improve public schooling.41 Chubb and Moe argued that three key 
market principles could be applied to education in creating an education marketplace: 
decentralization of authority, competition between schools, and parental choice.42 In fact, these 
three principles are reflected in the charter school argument and some charter school laws today.  
 
James N. Goenner draws an important distinction between the charter schools or 
programs proposed by Budde and how they have appeared in policy.43 The schools proposed by 
Budde were a new type of school, whereas many lawmakers and free market thinkers pushed 
charter schools as a way to introduce system-wide change through choice and competition.44 
While Budde’s idea emphasized the importance of teacher professionalism, autonomy, and 
innovation, the charter school laws in many states – especially in Michigan – are accompanied 
by system-wide reforms that alter the way education is provided; they aim to create a 
competitive environment in which schools may compete against one another and parents are 
given choices between various schools. Michigan’s charter school law, the case in point for this 
study, was crafted with the intention of creating a “competitive educational marketplace.”45 
Furthermore, charter schools have appeared in policy as an alternative to voucher programs since 
voucher programs have been met with political opposition in many states.46 
 
Many business leaders and free market advocates involved in charter school reforms 
argue that public education could be improved by competition. In traditional markets, the quality 
of products and services is improved by competitive forces, and so they argue the same logic can 
be applied to improve public education.47 However, it’s not exactly clear what an education 




                                                     
Friedman advocated for a minimum guaranteed income via a negative income tax to ensure the poor can 
participate in the market; the poor cannot participate in the market without income to spend. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 222 
40 Jeffrey R. Henig, Rethinking School Choice: The Limits of the Market Metaphor, 1st ed. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994): 89. 
41 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 27. 
42 Ibid., 67. 
43 Goenner, “The Origination of Michigan’s Charter School Policy,” 32. 
44 Ibid., 32. 
45 Ibid., 80. 
46 Ibid., 31. 
47 Ibid., 74.  
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What is an education market? 
 
Markets: A Tool for Allocating Resources 
 
First and foremost, it is important to understand markets and how they might be used to 
provide education. According to Debra Satz, markets “are institutions in which exchanges take 
place between parties who voluntarily undertake them.”48 Satz rejects notions of markets limited 
to “action of buying and selling” or a “series of individual transactions” because they fail to 
capture the background property rules in place and social, cultural and legal institutions on which 
markets depend.49 In other words, the structure of markets is shaped by and depends on other 
elements such as: property rights, rules for making contracts, the enforcement of contracts, the 
flow of information, and the restriction on monopolies.50 Markets are helpful tools for producing 
and distributing goods and resources, and they coordinate the behavior of individuals via price 
signals, which makes for the efficient allocation of resources (ideally, at least).  
 
Education Markets: Decentralizing the Allocation of Resources 
 
The market-based model previously described leverages five structural changes: parental 
choice, deregulation, a new system of accountability, inter-school competition, and profit 
incentives. These changes aim to convert centrally managed school systems into a decentralized 
network of schools chartered to receive public money from the state. In a city-wide market there 
is a finite number of students, each carrying per-pupil funds with them to their school of choice. 
So, schools must compete for limited resources (i.e., students). If schools fail to attract enough 
students, they face closure due to the loss of revenue. On the supply-side of the education 
market, proponents argue for deregulating the provision and leaving it up to actors other than the 
state, such as teachers, business leaders, principals, etc., to start schools by receiving a charter 
from the state or an authorizer. As for demand, proponents advocate allowing multiple suppliers 
to supply schools, rather than relying on the state as the only supplier.51 Families, then, can 
choose among multiple options based on their preferences. As mentioned, market-based charter 
school policies seek to imitate the way markets provide goods, although they are often referred to 
as “quasi-markets” since the government still provides the funds for these public services and 
imposes greater regulation on provision; this, however, is no reason to disregard substantial 
system-wide changes brought about by market-based policies.52  
 
In essence, the education market is another way of allocating limited resources among 
multiple actors. Proponents of market-based charter school policies tend to think that the 
uncoordinated actions of multiple schools systems and parents can achieve better results than the 
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coordinated actions of a centrally-managed school system.53 Market advocates claim that the 
market can bring about a quality education for all. Chubb and Moe have great faith in the ability 
of markets to do so: “[c]hoice is a self-contained reform with its own rationale and justification. 
It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers 
have been seeking to engineer in myriad other others . . . It is a revolutionary reform that 
introduces a new system of public education.”54  
 
 
Preliminary Critiques and the (unstated) assumptions behind market-based models 
 
The Advantages of the Free Market and the Empirical Assumptions Behind Them 
 
Forcing schools to compete against each other is a central tenet of market-based models. 
Proponents argue that schools need competition to improve their performance and efficiency, 
although what is meant by efficiency in education is often underspecified.55 In doing so, 
proponents point to the ideal theory of the free market “when extolling the possibilities and 
benefits of market forces in education.”56 Yet, even the free market – which is an ideal theory – 
involves many assumptions and preconditions to successfully function as theorized. In arguing 
that school systems need to be competitive like markets for other commodities, proponents often 
leave out the assumptions behind the free market theory and how they might be modified when 
applied to education.  
 
In traditional markets, prices reflect supply and demand. The education markets of 
concern, however, do not have a price mechanism – for good reason, as many low-income 
families would not be able to afford certain schools if prices were involved – which may 
ultimately affect how the supply of schools and the demand (i.e., number of students) relate.57  
That is, the absence of a price mechanism might affect the way in which educate markets 
allocate finite funding.  
 
First, proponents argue that introducing competition between schools for students and 
revenue will increase performance and the efficiency with which the service is provided.58 
Assumptions behind perfect competition are often unmentioned. There are four assumptions 
behind perfect competition in markets: 
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55 For a discussion of market efficiency see Chapter II. See Chapters IV and V for a discussion of the 
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I. There is a large number of buyers and sellers, who act independently of one another. 
II. There is no information asymmetry. Buyers and sellers are aware of the prices at which 
others buy and sell a given product. 
III. There are no transaction costs. Buyers can easily switch to sellers with lower prices 
without any costs.  
IV. There are no significant barriers to entry or exit. A supplier can easily create or leave a 
business.59 
 
Assumption I: There is a large number of buyers and sellers 
 
Creating competition in education may not be workable in rural areas with a dispersed 
population, simply because there are not enough consumers (i.e., parents); with a limited number 
of students (and limited per-pupil funding), only a very small number of schools could 
adequately educate students.60 It is unclear how education markets could be viable in places 
where there are small numbers of students to educate and receive their per-pupil funding. Plus, 
the limited funding available might not encourage schools to open in rural areas, although this 
might be mitigated by providing transportation to urban areas.   
 
Assumption II: There is no information asymmetry 
 
Eliminating (or at least reducing) information asymmetry between parents and schools 
might not be possible without some reliable external body to assess the schools. Further, it 
requires that parents are informed, have the skills and cultural capital necessary to navigate the 
market, and have accurate information about the quality of schools in the marketplace.61 Beyond 
skills and desires, it also assumes that working class parents have time to engage in information 
gathering. Disagreements surrounding quality and outcomes further complicate the matter. Some 
proponents have argued for establishing some type of information center where parents can see a 
school-by-school report to make the most informed decision.62 In policy, these information 
centers have not always been established in conjunction with charter school policies or supported 
by charter school proponents. Yet, even a report can only include measured characteristics and 
cannot fully capture many unmeasured dimensions of school quality, especially regarding school 
climate and the quality of curriculum and instruction.  
 
Assumption III: There are no transaction costs 
 
Perfect competition assumes that there are no transaction costs for the consumer when 
switching sellers. First and foremost, parents must have effective exit options; that is, they must 
be able to safely and reliably transport their child to another school. If there are no effective exit 
options for parents, switching between schools may not be an option. And, moving residences to 
be closer to a school might be incredibly costly and, thus, violate this assumption – ironically, 
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school choice is advocated as a solution to this very problem. Nevertheless, research indicates 
that mobility is on average harmful to students.63 Multiple studies from the National 
Longitudinal Study (NELS) demonstrate that students struggle to adjust to new schools 
psychologically, socially, and academically.64 Mobile students – those who move schools – 
demonstrate lower performance on state achievement tests, are less likely to be involved in 
extracurricular activities.65 For high-schoolers, mobility can have devastating effects: “students 
who changed high schools even once are less than half as likely as stable students to graduate 
from high school, even controlling for other factors that influence high school completion.”66  
 
Market proponents might argue that these negative consequences could be overcome by 
moving to a better school. Research done conducted by Eric Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steven 
G. Rivkin  on Tiebout type moves to secure a better school concluded that student turnover 
imposes a negative externality on both mobile and stable students.67 High student turnover can 
negatively influence “orderly teaching and curriculum development.”68 Further, they found that 
these negative consequences are greater for low-income and minority students, who experience 
higher average mobility rates and typically attend schools with high turnover.69 So, even when 
students move to a higher quality school, there may be negative consequences for other students. 
The transaction costs of switching schools are often unaccounted for in market-based education 
models, even though the model encourages and relies on student mobility to create competition 
and a marketplace of effective schools. Yet, the market model assumes that students will always 
move to higher-quality schools, which may not be the case.  
 
In addition, perfect competition assumes that the practice of closing schools improves the 
market overall and outweighs the negative outcomes involved with closing a school. The market 
(i.e., dispersed education providers) must ensure that closed schools are replaced with accessible, 
quality options. If a student relies on a nearby school that suddenly closes, perfect competition 
assumes that the transaction costs involved with moving schools is zero, or minimal. Yet, if no 
schools open near her home and her only option is an hour-long bus ride across the city, the 
transaction costs are incredibly high. Furthermore, when a school closes, student mobility 
increases as all the students must find another option. In addition, what cannot be measured is the 
value that a community school may have to its neighborhood. In poor communities, 
neighborhood schools often provide many services beyond school hours, including but not 
limited to: playgrounds, after school child care, breakfast and lunch, crossing guards, public 
health services (i.e., school nurses), voting stations, public meeting spaces, auditoriums, teen 
after-school programs, athletic coaches, and mentors. When a school closes, neighborhoods and 
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communities may lose many of these services, and for impoverished communities, these services 
are not easily replaced.  
 
Assumption V: There are no significant barriers to entry or exit 
 
This assumption relates to “how easily a producer or supplier can create a business 
(enter) or leave their business (exit).”70 It seems very commonsensical to assume that creating a 
quality school takes a lot of time, research, and effort. Allowing anyone to start their own school, 
regardless of prior experience in education, might lead to disastrous outcomes. Yet, those in 
favor of minimal regulation advocate that anyone could start their own school. As Friedman 
argued in a 1973 New York Times article, “voluntary organizations – ranging from vegetarians to 
Boy Scouts to the Y.M.C.A. – could set up schools and try to [attract] customers. And, new sorts 
of private schools would arise to tap the vast new market – perhaps Mom-and-Pop schools like 
Mom-and-Pop grocery stores, perhaps also highly capitalized chain schools, like 
supermarkets.”71 While the idea might be to allow new actors in education, the necessity of 
professional expertise in education should not be ignored. Charter schools are an attempt to give 
schools more autonomy, encourage teacher professionalism, and allow for diversity in teaching 
methods since there are many restrictions to professional freedom in traditional public schools. 
Yet, it is nonsensical to assume that these can be achieved by opening education provision to 
anyone. Here, education may be analogized with health care; without entry barriers, anyone 
could serve as medical “professionals,” creating serious risks for the uninformed and vulnerable. 
Creating significant barriers to ensure professionalism and expertise in schools should not be 
avoided for the sake of competition.72  
 
Additional Complications: The Consumer 
 
As noted by Stephen J. Ball in his critique of education markets, “unlike most other 
markets, who the client is matters, quality and reputation are related in good part to the clientele 
themselves, not solely to the service.”73 Some schools may avoid students with disabilities who 
are more difficult and costly to educate. If certain populations drag down efficiency, it is only 
economically rational for schools to seek the most cost-effective students. Market proponents 
have reacted to this criticism, arguing that schools may be incentivized to educate these students 
because they often carry extra per-pupil funding, although this amount rarely covers the full 
costs.74 Nevertheless, whether schools have been competing for or avoiding these students is an 
empirical question and will be discussed in Chapter V. 
 
Idealizing the benefits of markets also involves accepting the assumptions behind them. 
Yet, these assumptions are often unaccounted for in theory and policy. In traditional markets, 
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satisfying the conditions and assumptions behind perfect competition has benefits, namely: 
innovation and efficiency.  
 
Examining an Education Market: Detroit as a Unique Case Study 
 
State Failure: The Poor Performance of High-Poverty Schools 
 
The emergence of charter schools as a market-based solution, while ideologically aligned 
with neoliberalism and libertarians, did not arise in a vacuum. In 1983, the National Commission 
on Excellence in Education published a report titled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform, a critical examination of America’s schools that aroused interest in 
education reforms and inspired many reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s.75 The report argued 
that America’s schools were falling behind other nations on both national and international 
scales, giving the impression that America’s schools were “mediocre.”76 While critics of the 
report have labeled the report as misleading, the prevalent inequalities in education between rich 
and poor students in the 1990s and even today are evident and obvious. Savage Inequalities, a 
first-hand examination of schools conducted from 1988-90 by Jonathan Kozol, recounts the 
massive inequalities between the schools for rich and poor students. As Kozol documents, the 
quality of education received by students across the U.S. depends on their district, race, and 
class. 
 
It is no wonder that so many lawmakers, parents, and educational leaders were frustrated 
with the education system. Governor John Engler of Michigan shared this frustration and turned 
to the market for a solution.77 He labeled Michigan’s education system as a “public education 
monopoly” echoing earlier advocates of market-based education provision.78 Engler, among 
others, saw two main issues with the education system: the vast funding disparities between 
school districts and student assignments to schools based on where they lived.79 Under this 
“monopoly,” students in low-income areas had no way to escape poor quality schools, unless 
they moved to a district with better schools, which was not an feasible option for many low-
income families.80 In response to the state’s “monopoly of mediocrity” over the schools (i.e., the 
state), Engler “saw the charter idea as a way to create the competitive environment while also 
empower parent parents, students, and educators with more choices.”81  
 
The Proposed “Solution”: Markets, Choice, and Charter Schools 
 
In 1994 Michigan became the ninth state to enact a charter school law.82 In Detroit, a 
low-income, urban community with a struggling school district, charter schools have been 
introduced as a way of improving education for all students via choice and competition. Since 
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the enactment of the law, charter schools have rapidly expanded, especially in Detroit.83 In fact, 
for the 2014-2015 school year Detroit was ranked second nationally in its enrollment share of 
public school students.84 Yet, the overall educational marketplace in Detroit includes many low-
performing schools, including the traditional public schools (Detroit Public Schools) and charter 
schools. A recent New York Times article in June 2016 described the entire educational 
marketplace as competitive, but chaotic, where there are many choices but all of which are low-
quality. In like manner, Scott Romney, a lawyer and board member of a civic group in Detroit, 
charged that “[t]he point [of charter schools] was to raise all schools. Instead, we’ve had a total 
and complete collapse of education in this city.”85  
 
Detroit holds the second largest charter school enrollment share in the nation – behind 
New Orleans, a nearly-100% charter school system – and operates under Michigan’s largely 
permissive charter school law.86 While there has been notable growth in other impoverished 
communities in Michigan, including Flint, Pontiac, Lansing, and Grand Rapids, charter schools 
have grown most expansively in Detroit.87  
 
Placing Markets in Context: Detroit 
 
As with any type of market, context matters. This is especially the case in Detroit. Out of 
forty-seven cities with populations of one million or more in the U.S., Detroit was ranked as “the 
most segregated” in 1990 and remains so to this day.88 In 1992, unemployment was over 15 
percent, two times the national average at the time. As of 2015, the unemployment rate is much 
higher than the national average (5.3 percent) at 12.4 percent.89 Many of Detroit’s students live 
in poverty; more than 59 percent of children were reported to live in poverty in 2012.90 In 
addition to segregation, high unemployment, and child poverty, Detroit has lost over half of its 
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population between 1950 and 2000.91 Population decline continues to this day. From 2002 to 
2013 the school-age population in Detroit declined by approximately 200,000.92 Yet, despite the 
decline in students, more and more charter schools have entered the market, creating immensely 
competitive conditions. Schools are in cut-throat competition over Detroit’s students and face the 
threat of closure if they fail to attract enough students.  
 
The provision and governance of education in Detroit exemplifies many aspects of the 
education markets theorized by free market proponents. Yet, according to free market theorists, 
competition and decentralization are features – not flaws – of education markets. The extreme 
competition in Detroit, however, has a different story to tell. Governor Engler predicted that 
“with charter schools, I predict nothing less than a renaissance of public education in 
Michigan.”93 Yet, whether this has occurred in Detroit – the city where charters have had the 
greatest impact – is up for question. Has the “invisible hand” of the educational marketplace 
cured the (alleged) ills of Detroit’s centrally-managed school system? Or, is Detroit a case where 
the loosely regulated and decentralized provision of schools has led to an unsustainable and 
noxious education market?  
 
A Normative Framework for Evaluating Detroit’s Education Market 
 
Setting aside the ways in which education may be organized – whether by markets or 
centralized, democratic control – what makes an education system just or unjust? In general, 
there are two different responses. One is a standard of adequacy, which holds that the state must 
ensure all students have adequate educational opportunities. The other is a standard of equality, 
which holds that the state must ensure students are given equal educational opportunities. 
Following the work of Deborah Satz and Elizabeth Anderson, I adopt the adequacy standard and 
take a democratic equality perspective. In particular, I use Anderson’s adequacy standard and 
Satz’ criteria for evaluating markets to examine the unethical aspects of education markets.  
 
A Standard of Democratic Equality 
 
A standard of democratic equality demands that everyone in civil society can relate and 
function as equals.94 Democracy requires that citizens are on equal standing so they may govern 
collectively.95 However, as Satz points out, a certain level of goods is a necessary precondition 
for “counting as a member” or for full inclusion.96 These goods may include: education, health 
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care, opportunities, rights, liberties, and physical security.97 A citizen lacking these goods is “not 
only ill-equipped to navigate her own life and values but also faces substantial impediments to 
participation in the economy and participating in public debates about social choices.”98  
 
In the U.S., education is undoubtedly linked with one’s position and opportunities in 
societies and, thus, plays a large role in the ways in which citizens may relate to one another. 
Essential to a just K-12 education system in a democratic society is that students can enter 
society and interact with each other as equals. When inferior educational opportunities are 
primarily distributed to students of color and low socioeconomic status – a phenomenon that has 
plagued African Americans in the U.S. since the 18th century – the K-12 system is not equitably 
providing goods that are necessary for these students to relate to others as equals. Anderson sets 
a high standard for a just K-12 education system. She argues that a just K-12 education system 
must: 
Prepare students from all sectors of society, and especially those disadvantaged 
along any dimensions, with sufficient skills to be able to succeed in higher 
education and thereby join the elite. This yields a sufficientarian or adequacy 
standard for just provision of opportunities for education: every student with the 
potential and interest should receive a K-12 education sufficient to enable him or 
her to succeed.99 
 
Anderson’s standard requires that the most disadvantaged students be afforded ample 
educational opportunities to join the elites, or those occupying positions of “responsibility and 
leadership” such as managers, consultants, professionals, politicians, and policymakers. The 
reason for this is that democracy requires the democratic elite to have “systematic responsiveness 
to all” which cannot be achieved without membership from all sectors of society.100 If those 
governing or making policy are ignorant of other groups in society (due to segregation or group 
stereotypes), they are likely to put others at a disadvantage.101 For this reason, social integration 
of the elite across lines of social inequality is necessary.  
 
How Can Education Markets Undermine Democratic Equality and Educational Justice? 
 
Most important is assessing which system – democratic control or markets – can better 
achieve this standard of adequacy to meet requirements of educational justice. It may be the case 
that markets are able to achieve this standard; markets are great tools for producing and 
distributing goods and resources, and they may increase the efficiency of this process. At the 
same time, however, markets may not be suitable for distributing all goods. There are important 
reasons for questioning which markets are morally problematic and why. Intuitively, it seems 
that markets for child labor or bonded labor are problematic and ought to be banned or 
sufficiently regulated.102 But what rationale can distinguish between noxious markets and non-
noxious markets? One view is that we ought to limit or ban markets based on the nature of the 
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goods being traded.103 Other arguments involve regulating or banning markets based on the 
unequal distributional outcomes or the negative externalities a market may produce. Drawing off 
the insights of market failure, distributional inequality, and the importance of certain goods, she 
argues that noxious, or morally problematic, markets “undermine the conditions that people need 
if they are to relate as equals.”104 Satz uses the following criteria to assess what makes a market 
noxious; the first two parameters involve the consequences of markets and the second two 
involve the sources of the market or the condition of the market agents:105 
 
i. Extremely harmful outcomes for the participants or third parties involved. Involves 
markets that produce destitution, harm to the basic welfare or agency interests of the 
individual. 
ii. Extremely harmful outcomes for society. Involves markets that promote “servility and 
dependence, undermine democratic governance, and undermine other regarding 
motivations.” 
iii. Weak agency or asymmetric knowledge. Involves agents with “inadequate 
information about the nature and/or consequences of the market” or if others enter the 
market on one’s behalf.” 
iv. Vulnerability. Involves markets that exploit vulnerabilities of the agents involved. 
Also includes “markets in a desperately needed good with limited suppliers; markets 
with origins in poverty and destitution; markets whose participants have very unequal 
needs for the goods being exchanged.” 
 
Any market that scores high along one of these criteria or several of them together may be 
considered noxious. Accordingly, markets in education must be evaluated along these 
dimensions. Important to the case of education markets is that they involve children, who are 
dependent on the decisions made by their parents, and may involve parents who are 
impoverished or poorly-educated themselves. Children, especially, have weak agency since they 
are limited in their “ability to participate in deciding matters that bear” on their overall good.106 
 
Detroit’s Education Market 
 
In Detroit, a place of racial and economic segregation and widespread disadvantage, it is 
morally imperative that the K-12 education system – regardless of its organization – serve all 
students. Further, it must serve all students to the level at which students are afforded sufficient 
opportunities to attend and succeed in higher education. The way in which an education system 
is structured – whether through markets, centralized state control, or centralized democratic 
control – has serious implications for the provision of adequate education opportunities. 
Furthermore, it also affects the way people relate to one another in a democratic society.107 If 
poor students are given vastly inadequate educational opportunities, they will not be able to 
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compete with others on equal terms; in other words, an unfair playing field early-on may work to 
disadvantage students and bar them from equal social status. Thus, Detroit’s education market – 
a unique way of structuring and organizing education – must be evaluated. My method is 
inspired by three pieces of literature that analyze institutions as they exist in the world (e.g., 
markets) to identify the governing rules, social and historic context, and outcomes, and 
determine the unethical and dysfunctional aspects of such institutions. Specifically, I draw from: 
Elinor Ostrom’s institutional analysis of common pool resources; Frank Adamson, Channa 
Cook-Harvey, and Linda Darling-Hammond’s analysis of New Orleans’ educational 
marketplace; and Debra Satz’ framework for noxious markets. In evaluating Detroit’s education 
market, I analyze two dimensions: (i) the structure, or “rules,” of the education market and (ii) 
the outcomes of the education market. In addition, I point out where Satz’ standards provide 
important insights about the outcomes, sources, and agents of the market.   
 
In Chapter IV, the social and legal institutions in which Detroit’s education market 
operates are discussed, as well as the impact these rules may have on the way the education 
markets to serve all students. There are six important structural features that contribute to the 
make-up and functioning of the market: (i) parental choice; (ii) zero-sum competitive incentives; 
(iii) built in profit-incentives for management companies and authorizers; (iv) high deregulation; 
(v) a lack of accountability and oversight; (vi) and fragmentation of education provision and 
governance. Then, in Chapter V, the outcomes of the education market are discussed. Over the 
past twenty years, Detroit’s education market has faced four critical issues: (i) the sheer number 
of school openings and closings; (ii) the high number of for-profit educational management 
organizations (EMOs) operating Detroit’s charter schools; (iii) the instability in classrooms due 
to high student mobility and teacher turnover; (iv) and the low-performance of all Detroit’s 
schools in the market. Given the structure and outcomes of Detroit’s education market, critical 
problems facing the fragmented education market and how they create substantial barriers for 
Detroit’s students are discussed. The structure of the market has failed to provide equitable and 
accessible educational opportunities, making the education market a dysfunctional and unjust 
way to organize K-12 education, especially in a segregated and impoverished community
 20 
CHAPTER II: Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Education 
 
An Overview: Justifying the Use of Markets in Education 
 
Proponents of market-based education reforms often point to the failure of democratic 
governance in providing quality schools to low-income, urban communities. They argue that 
democratic governance and bureaucracy are the very causes of low-performing schools. They 
propose a market structure justified by a libertarian sense of justice. The neoliberal argument, on 
the other hand, holds that markets are simply more efficient; through competition and parental 
choice, markets can provide quality, diverse, and innovative schools more efficiently than 
government provision. 
 
 The case for market-based education provision is justified by two arguments. The first is 
what I will label the libertarian argument, which focuses on negative rights and the role of a just 
state.1 The second is what I will refer to as the neoliberal argument, which focuses on the 
market’s ability – and the state’s inability – to efficiently provide goods. However, these two 
arguments are very closely related. In fact, Kathleen Abowitz and Robert Karaba argue that the 
libertarian argument has served as the “moral cornerstone” of neoliberal education policies.2 In 
the case of charter schools, this seems to be the case; the individual rights argument of 
libertarianism can (and often is used to) support the argument for school choice and markets in 
education provision. While these arguments are closely related and overlap in many ways, I will 
treat them separately because they rely on different premises.  
 
 Furthermore, Abowitz and Karaba contrast two theories of justice, namely, “libertarian 
justice” and “democratic justice” and how these theories have shaped charter school policies. 
According to Abowitz and Karaba, libertarian justice is based on the notion of negative freedom, 
while democratic justice is based on the notion of positive freedom. Here, it is useful to 
distinguish between two types of freedom.3 Negative freedom is the “absence of obstacles, 
barriers or constraints” external to an agent.4 In other words, an agent is free if there are no 
constraints stopping the agent from doing what they desire to do. According to political 
philosophies based on negative freedom, negative rights entitle individuals to “non-interference” 
from other individuals and the state.5 In contrast, positive freedom is “the possibility of acting – 
or the fact of acting – in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental 
                                                     
1 I credit Kathleen Abowitz and Robert Karaba for their discussion on the difference between neoliberal 
and libertarian arguments for market-based education (Kathleen Knight Abowitz and Robert Karaba, 
“Charter Schooling and Democratic Justice,” Educational Policy 24, no. 3 (2010): 534–58, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0895904809335109?journalCode=epxa. 
2 Ibid., 538. 
3 To distinguish between positive and negative freedom, I use Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive 
and negative liberty. 
4 Ian Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. 
Zalta, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
5 Leif Wenar, “Rights,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. 
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purposes.”6 Positive freedom, then, is the “presence of control on the part of the agent.”7 It can 
require agents to be in control or have “self-determination.” Political philosophies based on 
positive freedom tend to require provision of goods or services by the government, although the 
extent and type of goods and services varies.8 In sum, negative freedom can be thought to require 
the absence of constraints, whereas positive freedom can be thought to require the presence of 
self-control or self-determination.9 Discussion will focus on negative freedom since the relevant 
libertarian arguments are based on negative freedom. 
 
 The key distinction between the libertarian and neoliberal argument is the libertarian 
focus on just political arrangements – those arrangements that maximize negative freedom and 
respect negative rights.10 As Abowitz and Karaba note, the neoliberal argument focuses on 
market efficiency, but “[f]or libertarians, market models are not simply more efficient; they are 
the social design most likely to produce a free life for individual human beings.”11 Milton 
Friedman’s (1982) arguments present the most relevant libertarian justification for markets in 
education provision, resting on the argument that free market provision of education maximizes 
individuals’ negative freedom. John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe’s (1990) argument present a 
case against state provision of education, followed by an argument for market-based provision. 
Nevertheless, note that these authors are not limited to the arguments I have designated them. 
Each author presents aspects of both arguments; Friedman does claim that markets are more 
efficient than central planning and Chubb and Moe allude to why democratic control of schools 
might infringe on negative rights. Nevertheless, Friedman’s argument clearly typifies libertarian 
notions of justice, while Chubb and Moe’s argument primarily relies on empirical observations 
about the efficiency of markets. I use the libertarian and neoliberal distinction in order to clearly 
define the premises supporting two different justifications. These justifications can work together 
to make a case for markets in education, but they do not necessarily depend on one another. 
 
The Libertarian Argument: A Rights-Based Justification 
 
 The libertarian argument, represented by Milton Friedman, concludes that the state is not 
justified in providing schools; he argues that the state’s “monopoly” on schools is unjust because 
the state’s role ought to be limited to imposing a minimum standard of schooling and providing 
funds for schools. Thus, the state is not justified in administering and providing schools.12 
Friedman’s assertion is supported by a conception of a limited government, merely in place to 
preserve law and order, enforce contracts, and foster competitive markets.13  
 
                                                     
6 Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty.” 
7 Ibid. 
8 Wenar, “Rights.” 
9 Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty.” 
10 Abowitz and Karaba draw this distinction between libertarian justice and neoliberalism in their 
discussion on the differences between democratic justice and libertarian justice (see “Charter Schooling 
and Democratic Justice”). 
11 Abowitz and Karaba, “Charter Schooling and Democratic Justice,” 539. 
12 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 77. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
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 The justification for the libertarian argument rests on economic freedom, which is a type 
of negative freedom.14 Recall that negative freedom requires the absence of coercion by 
externalities. Friedman understands the market “as a direct component of freedom”; that is, 
participation in the economic structure without interference is a necessary component of the 
freedom of individuals. 15 So, competitive capitalism, which allows individuals to partake in 
voluntary exchange and satisfy their preferences through market institutions, is most conducive 
to negative freedom.16 The state does not have the power to organize economic activity; doing 
so, would be a coercive infringement upon the negative rights of individuals.17 Subsequently, 
negative freedom in the case of education is the absence of coercion in choosing the schools 
one’s children will attend.18 In a school system where the state supplies schools and assigns 
pupils to schools based on district location, parents are denied the right to choose their child’s 
school. Moreover, when the government provides education, parents have little control over how 
tax money is spent, denying them the freedom to achieve the goods they want.19 In contrast, in a 
market-based system, parents are able to exercise greater control over the education their child 
receives by choosing a school; in this manner, parents can act as individuals parking in voluntary 
exchange in a free market with minimal government interference.20 
 
 Another reason why Friedman thinks the market is more conducive to the freedom of 
individuals is that parents can directly satisfy their preference in the educational marketplace. 
Whereas, in a state-supplied school system governed by democratic politics, parents must win 
over the interests of the majority and change the rules for everyone.21 These “cumbrous political 
channels” fail to grant parents the choice they are entitled to.22 Along similar lines, Chubb and 
Moe argue that democracy is “essentially coercive.”23 A central tenet of democratic politics is 
that those who win school board seats and superintendent appointments use their authority to 
make policies that bind all citizens.24 Those who do not win must accept and follow the policies 
passed by those elected; this, Chubb and Moe argue, is a coercive feature of democracy because 
“the winners get to use public authority to impose their policies on the losers.”25 While they do 
not found this claim on a negative rights theory like Friedman, the claimed coerciveness of 
democracy suggests that democratic control of schools is incompatible with negative rights and, 
thus, unjust.   
 
                                                     
14 Abowitz and Karaba, “Charter Schooling and Democratic Justice,” 542. 
15 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 18-19. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 21. 
18 Abowitz and Karaba, “Charter Schooling and Democratic Justice,” 542. 
19 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 81-82. 
20 Most markets do not exist without regulations or rules imposed by the government. Here, I do not 
suggest that Friedman argues for a completely unregulated market. Instead, focus is on whether the 
government coerces students to attend a school based on where they reside. Friedman claims that denying 
parents choice in their child’s school is coercive. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 79. 
23 John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (Washington, D.C.: The 




The Neoliberal Argument: The Efficiency Justification 
 
 In Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (1990), Chubb and Moe contrast two 
different institutions governing schools: public schools, governed by direct democratic control, 
and private schools, governed by market institutions. They argue that democratic institutions by 
which public schools are governed – direct democratic control – are incapable of efficiently 
creating high quality and effective schools. That is, the “fundamental properties of democratic 
control” are the very sources of the ineffective performance of schools.26 Further, they assert that 
markets are more efficient in delivering private—and, in this case, public—goods. The argument 
against democratic control will be outlined in detail, followed by the argument in favor of 
markets. 
 
 The institutions of democratic control Chubb and Moe point to are the school board, the 
superintendent and the district office.27 The school board and superintendent are democratically 
elected – with the exception that the superintendent may be appointed in some cases. The district 
office is the bureaucracy created to implement the policies of the board and the superintendent.28 
In contrast, market institutions govern private schools. Essentially, parents, in having the 
freedom to choose among schools in the private sector, exercise more “control” over the 
schools.29 If dissatisfied with a school, parents do not have to go through democratic political 
channels. Instead, parents can choose a school that satisfies their preferences.  
 
 Chubb and Moe’s argument against democratic control of schools holds that direct 
democratic control is—in principle—incapable of creating high quality schools. The argument is 
briefly outlined as follows: 
P1) Effective schools are autonomous and are not burdened by bureaucracy. 
P2) The institutions that govern schools have dramatic consequences on the 
organization and performance of schools. 
P3) Institutions of democratic control necessarily require bureaucracy because 
those holding public authority (politicians, school boards, superintendents) 
must ensure compliance with established policies and face uncertainty 
over whether their policies will remain in the future. 
P4) Bureaucracy is incompatible with both effective organization and the 
autonomy of schools and teachers. 
C) Therefore, democratic control of schools is unable to create effective 
schools. 
 
In their study of private and public schools, Chubb and Moe found that effective schools have 
the following characteristics: strong leadership, clear and ambitious goals, strong academic 
programs, teacher professionalism, and staff harmony.30 They also found that schools that were 
                                                     
26 John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, “America’s Public Schools: Choice Is a Panacea,” The Brookings 
Review 8, no. 3 (1990): 7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20080159?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
27 Ibid., 5.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 27. 
30 Ibid., 187. 
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more autonomous and less burdened by bureaucracy (i.e., private schools) were better 
performing and more effective.31  
 
 Chubb and Moe claim that schools are the “products of their institutional settings.”32 In 
other words, the institutions that govern and control schools have dramatic consequences on the 
organization and the performance, or outcomes, of schools.33 Quite boldly, they assert that there 
are causal connections between the institutional settings and the organization and outcomes of 
schools.34 Here, the two institutional settings Chubb and Moe are concerned with are democratic 
control and markets.  
 
 The institutions of democratic control, according to Chubb and Moe, necessarily require 
bureaucratic bodies for two reasons. First, public authorities are “driven to bureaucratize” 
schools because of the political uncertainty involved in democratic politics.35 The uncertainty 
involved in gaining and holding onto public offices causes public authorities to create 
bureaucratic structures built to protect their policies.36 These bureaucratic structures reduce the 
autonomy of the schools.37 Second, democratic control involves bureaucracy because those 
creating the policies need a way to ensure compliance with policies.38 Bureaucracy, then, 
imposes “goals, structures, and requirements” on schools, giving teachers and principals little 
discretion in educating students; the rules of bureaucracy and the accompanying monitoring of 
progress towards established goals are destructive of school-level autonomy and disable teachers 
and professionals from exercising expertise and professional judgment.39,40 In contrast, effective 
schools are autonomous; teachers and principals are able to design their own organizations, 
programs, and methods.41 
 
 Chubb and Moe’s argument in favor of market-based education provision is also based 
on the institutional settings. They argue that the institutional setting of private schools (i.e., 
markets) explain the effective organization of the schools and their performance; this is due to 
the fact that markets are more efficient in delivering goods.42 Friedman also argues that the 
market is more efficient than government provision in delivering goods; competitive enterprise is 
more likely to efficiently meet the demands of consumers.43 Subsequently, they advocate for 
removing the state’s authority to provide schools and allowing private institutions – run by 
teachers, principals, community members, and business leaders – to supply schools.44 
 
                                                     
31 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 7. 
32 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 67. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 185. 
35 Ibid., 42. 
36 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 46. 
39 Ibid., 187. 
40 Ibid., 26.  
41 Ibid., 29. 
42 Ibid., 27. 
43 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 79. 
44 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 11. 
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 Specifically, Chubb and Moe advocate the creation of an educational marketplace based 
on three key market principles: decentralization, competition, and choice.45 Decentralizing the 
authority on how schools will be supplied and managed will increase the autonomy of schools; 
principals and teachers can decide what and how to teach without burdensome regulation and 
rules from bureaucratic bodies.46 In this manner, market provision promotes the autonomy of 
schools and devolves power to teachers and principals—a vital feature of effective schools, 
according to Chubb and Moe.47 Competition comes into play by enabling schools to compete for 
students and the government-provided “scholarships” that follow them, leading to an increase in 
quality, innovation and diversity of schools. Friedman makes a similar assertion, namely that 
introducing competition into education would promote a variety of schools and give schools 
more flexibility.48 Competition is thought to stimulate development, improvement and variety as 
businesses compete for capital.49 Schools will be incentivized to “please their clients” (or 
parents) because parents will be given choice in the school to which they send their child.50 
Choice in schools fundamentally alters the very structure of education because parents are given 
power to shape the market by entering and leaving schools. Chubb and Moe argue that giving 
parents choice in a market structure allows them to play a “more central and influential role” 
because they can achieve the desired school without relying on institutions of democratic 
control.51 
 
 So, it is thought, when parents act as consumers in an educational marketplace, they will 
seek the school that best satisfies their preference.52 If they are not satisfied with their school, 
they have the freedom to leave that school, depriving it of funds. As a result of decentralization, 
competition, and choice, well-run, efficient schools will remain in business and poorly-run, 
inefficient schools will close. This competition, enabled by giving parents choice in schools, 
incentivizes schools to become more efficient, otherwise they face the threat of going out of 
business. Competition and choice are interdependent. This is due to the fact that school 
improvement depends on the mechanism of “exit,” a term coined by Albert Hirschman. Exit is 
one of three responses to dissatisfaction with an institution, organization, or business. So, it is 
thought, when parents act as consumers in an educational marketplace, they will seek the school 
that best satisfies their preference.53 If they are not satisfied with their school, they have the 
freedom to exit that school, depriving it of funding. As a result of decentralization, competition, 
and choice, well-run or efficient schools will remain in business and poorly run or inefficient 
schools will close. This competition, enabled by giving parents choice in schools, incentivizes 




                                                     
45 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 67. 
46 Ibid., 29. 
47 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 5-6. 
48 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 81. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 27-33. 
51 Ibid. 23-33. 
52 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 6. 
53 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 81. 
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Unpacking the Assumptions Behind Market-Based Education Provision 
 
 Both justifications for market provision – the libertarian and the neoliberal argument – 
involve some background assumptions about the purpose of schools and how the success of the 
school is measured. There are three relevant assumptions worth noting.  
 
The Purpose of Schools 
 
First, market provision, in general, assumes that parental satisfaction is: (1) an indication 
of success; and, (2) should be the primary purpose of schools. As Chubb and Moe note, 
“pleas[ing] their clients” (i.e., parents) is the “primary concern of schools.”54 Parental 
satisfaction, then, is a measure of “success” which wholly depends on what parents value in 
schooling; some parents may value the instillation of republican virtues, preparation for college, 
bilingual education, vocational training, religious education, or even racial segregation, to name 
a few. Along this line of thought, if some parents value racially segregated schooling – and those 
parents are satisfied with their racially segregated schools – then the school is “successful” on 
these terms. Furthermore, claiming that parental satisfaction is the primary purpose of schools 
and constructing a model to achieve that end is not a claim to be taken lightly. In fact, educators, 
taxpayer policymakers, philosophers, and school reformers vastly disagree over the purpose of 
schools. In a poll conducted in 2000, parents and taxpayers ranked the purposes of schools in 
order of importance: 
1. To prepare students to become responsible citizens 
2. To help people become economically self-sufficient 
3. To ensure a basic level of quality among schools 
4. To promote cultural unity among all Americans 
5. To improve social conditions for people 
6. To enhance people’s happiness and enrich their lives 
7. To dispel inequities in education among certain schools and groups55 
 
Notice that these purposes are not exclusive; a school may adopt multiple purposes. Yet, Chubb 
and Moe advocate narrowing down the purpose of schools to pleasing parents, which may not 
align with any of these purposes. Some have argued that the disagreement over the purposes of 
schools is a reason to support charter schools. Leonard Waks argues that non-profit charter 
schools have a public character because they allow different communities to start their own 
schools, allowing for the creation of diverse learning environments where broad public discourse 
and intergroup interaction can take place.56 In one sense, charter school policies might allow 
schools to offer specialized services tailored towards certain communities with specific needs. 
Yet, will charter schools with profits in mind seek to serve the same purposes? Is the profit 
incentive necessary for fostering diversity and innovation within education? The reality is that 
prior to the expansion of charter school policies, many school districts offered alternative school 
options inside the regular public-school system. For instance, in 1991 – three years prior to the 
                                                     
54 Chubb and Moe, “America’s Public Schools,” 6. 
55 Larry Cuban, The Blackboard and the Bottom Line: Why Schools Can’t Be Businesses (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 150. 
56 Leonard J. Waks, “Dewey’s Theory Of The Democratic Public And The Public Character Of Charter 
Schools,” Educational Theory 60, no. 6 (2010): 665–81, doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.2010.00383.x. 
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introduction of charter schools – the Detroit Public School (DPS) system established an all-male 
afro-centric education program in three schools.57 In 1993, the Academy of the Americas, a DPS 
school, opened, offering a dual language immersion program for Detroit’s Spanish-speaking 
community.58  
 
Schools and Groceries, Similar Enough? 
 
Second, the argument for market provision of schools assumes that schools are 
essentially similar to businesses and will thrive in a competitive and decentralized environment 
just like any other business. For instance, Friedman’s 1973 New York Times article “Selling 
Schools Like Selling Groceries” likened inefficient government-owned grocery stores to 
government-run schools.59 In effect, he argued that if schools were provided the way in which 
groceries are provided (i.e., by private retailers), schools would become effective and efficient. 
While Friedman briefly acknowledged that “schooling is not groceries,” he claimed that “the 
many and important differences do not invalidate the comparison.”60 Friedman does not outline 
the ways in which education might be different and why the comparison is still valid. Larry 
Cuban sheds some doubt on Friedman’s claim.  
 
Cuban argues that there are three important differences between schools and businesses: 
the multiple purposes of tax-supported schools, democratic deliberations in decision-making, and 
the criteria for determining success.61 First, schools serve different purposes than businesses. As 
aforementioned, schools serve predominantly public purposes to improve the collective good by 
cultivating common moral values, encouraging civic engagement, and reducing social, 
economic, and political inequality.62 In contrast, businesses tend to serve multiple purposes with 
the ultimate goal of increasing “‘bottom line’ outcomes” such as revenues, profits, and dividends 
to investors.63 These outcomes predominantly serve private interests.  
 
Second, schools and businesses have different means of decision making. On the one 
hand, traditional public schools must have elected school boards that deliberate and make 
decisions publicly; they are also under public scrutiny.64 On the other hand, businesses are often 
under corporate governance, where the decision making takes place “behind closed doors” 
without public input.65 One might think that public involvement in decision-making over schools 
matters simply because it is taxpayers who will be funding schools. Allowing corporate 
governance in schools effectively removes taxpayer voice in such decision-making, while 
                                                     
57 “Robeson/Malcolm X Academy,” Detroit Public Schools, accessed February 12, 2017, 
http://detroitk12.org/schools/robesonmalcolmx/. 
58 “School of the Week: Academy of the Americas,” Detroit Public Schools, 2013, 
http://detroitk12.org/content/2013/06/03/school-of-the-week-academy-of-the-americas/ 
59 Milton Friedman, “Selling Schools Like Selling Groceries,” New York Times, September 23, 1973, 
http://nyti.ms/1MNWbJr. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Cuban, The Blackboard and the Bottom Line, 150-55. 
62 Ibid., 150-51. 
63 Ibid., 151. 
64 Ibid., 153. 
65 Ibid., 153. 
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allowing for exit.66 Moreover, should schools only be accountable to shareholders who have a 
financial stake in the school? The whole idea of public education is that it’s taxpayer-funded and 
accountable to all.  
 
Third, schools and businesses do not use the same criteria for evaluating success. 
Businesses use net profits to evaluate success, but what about schools? Some reformers have 
advocated the use of standardized testing to evaluate the success of schools.67 There are two 
problems with measuring success with test scores. As Cuban points out, “using test scores to 
measure the product of schooling misleads parents and taxpayers into believing that there is a 
common ‘bottom line’ when no such line even exists.”68 Using standardized tests as a primary 
measure of schools presumes that the test measures the most important features of schooling, 
which faces the danger of narrowing the curriculum and failing to achieve the many different 
purposes of schooling. Second, if the test gets very specific, schools and their teachers won’t 
have discretion about what to teach; this could violate the autonomy charter school proponents 
seek in schools. This issue also relates to who is crafting the test. The group in charge of creating 
a standardized test holds power over the skills and knowledge to be assessed and taught.  
 
As outlined, schools are different from businesses in ways that might affect how an 
education market might function and the resulting outcomes. For this reason, it should not be 
assumed that the differences between schools and businesses do not matter when touting the 
benefits of market provision. Cuban’s reasons for why schools are not businesses do not shut the 
door on arguments for market-based education reforms. Nonetheless, they shed doubt on and 
raise questions about the viability of an education market and how markets might be structured 
to mitigate these problems.  
 
The Role and Responsibilities of Parents 
 
Third, market provision enlarges the role of parents by giving them primary 
responsibility for securing a good school in the educational marketplace and holding schools 
accountable. This rests on the empirical assumption that parents are informed consumers in such 
a market and in a good position to judge what school is best for their child. Holding this position, 
however, entails that the parents – not the school or the state – are to blame for the insufficient 
education of their child because they are responsible for securing a sufficient education even if 
the market fails to provide accessible quality options.  
 
Critiquing Market-Based Education Arguments 
 
From State to Markets: Bureaucracy as the Source of the Problem? 
 
In social theory, bureaucracy is a multi-level top-down administrative governance of any 
organization, including private and public. Chubb and Moe see the institutions of democratic 
control as “inherently conducive to bureaucracy.”69 With regard to the public education system 
                                                     
66 Exit and voice will be further discussed in Chapter III. 
67 Ibid., 154. 
68 Ibid., 154-55. 
69 Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools, 47. 
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in the U.S., Chubb and Moe define educational bureaucracies as: the “rules governing 
organizational incentives, rules governing what teachers do, and rules governing how basic 
educational decisions must get made and who gets to make them.”70 The problem, they argue, is 
that decision-making of school-level leaders (principals) is limited by the rules imposed by 
higher levels of government.71 Politicians, interest groups, and bureaucrats are fighting for 
influence and to impose “higher-order values” through rules and bureaucratic structures.72 There 
are two sources of these rules: protections for civil service officials and teachers’ unions. First, 
public officials enact protections such as tenure laws and certification requirements to “insulate 
teachers from political influence”.73 Second, teachers’ unions’ demands for higher pay, fringe 
benefits, and vacations and the resulting in formal rules that restrict the discretion of principals. 
In contrast, in a market setting “‘market forces’ give the owners of schools strong incentives not 
to organize bureaucratically but to grant their schools substantial autonomy instead.”74  
 
Yet, the features that Chubb and Moe critique are not inherent to bureaucracy; 
bureaucracies may be organized in a number of different ways by: the number of administrative 
levels; the levels at which power is concentrated; and the level of uniformity of top-level 
decisions. It could be the case that the private school bureaucracies are more effectively 
organized, but they still involve a type of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, too, may not be all that bad. 
In fact, bureaucracy may ensure that important aspects of education are coordinated; for instance, 
bureaucracy may ensure that disabled students have access to unique educational services, low-
income students are fed breakfast and lunch at school, and transportation is provided. In addition, 
many of the top school systems world-wide are government-controlled – not under the control of 
competitive markets – including: Finland, Singapore, Canada, Japan, and Korea.75 For instance, 
Finland’s government-administered public education system gives teachers a great deal of 
autonomy and little interference by central education administration. In fact, within the 
government-managed education system, Finland managed to decentralize educational 
administration and increase school autonomy without markets.76 Whether these models can be 
applied to education in the U.S. is up for question since the socioeconomic background 






                                                     
70 Ibid., 49. 
71 Ibid., 48. 
72 Ibid., 47 
73 Ibid., 48. 
74 Ibid., 51. 
75 This is according to the results of the 2015 Program For International Student Assessment (PISA). 
Deidre McPhillips, “The Best Students in the World,” US News and World Report, December 6, 2016, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-12-06/2015-pisa-scores-are-no-surprise. 
76 Pasi Sahlberg, Finnish Lessons 2.0: What Can the World Learn From Educational Change in Finland?, 
2nd ed. (New York: Teachers College Press, 2014). 
77 For instance, Finland’s gini co-efficient is much lower than that of the U.S. In addition, Finland uses 
the Nordic welfare model as a social safety net and has been successful in recent years in reducing its 




The neoliberal justification for the use of markets in education provision holds that 
markets are more efficient in delivering goods and, thus, the market can be used to increase the 
efficiency with which public education is provided.78 Put simply, the market is an efficient way 
of providing “educational services that satisfy parents and students.”79 But what, exactly, does 
efficiency mean in the context of education? Is efficiency simply the ratio between “input and 
output, efforts and results, expenditure and income, or cost and resulting benefit”?80 An efficient 
education system may be one that costs as little as possible while maximizing some bottom line, 
such as parental satisfaction (indicated by enrollment), or standardized test scores.  
 
The efficiency argument leads one to think that these inputs and outputs can be easily 
quantified into dollars and numbers, but hides two important assumptions. First, it assumes we 
agree on “what outcomes are worth pursuing.”81 What is the bottom-line of efficient education 
provision? Unfortunately, there is great disagreement by education researchers over what the 
bottom line should be and whether it even exists; not many people agree on what constitutes a 
“good” education.82 Second, as Deborah Satz argues, every bottom-line or measure of efficiency 
involves ethical assumptions.83 As a result, the neoliberal justification cannot separate itself from 
some moral assumptions. While there may be many bottom-lines, I highlight two predominant 
ones among charter school advocates.  
 
An efficient education system might be one that maximizes standardized test scores with 
minimal monetary input. The worries over this approach have already been discussed; the worry 
is that focus on standardized tests narrows education to a test and, thus, misses out on some 
important features of education and learning. Or, as Chubb and Moe and Friedman ardently 
argued, efficient education provision uses parental satisfaction as its measure of success. The line 
of thought here is that schools won’t be wasteful in their use of funding because they must 
satisfy their customers or risk losing the funding. Here, parental satisfaction is essentially a 
Pareto optimal measure of preference satisfaction, which holds that people are better off “the 
more their own (consistent) preferences are satisfied.”84 Satz points out two problems with this 
approach: not all preferences are equally worthy of satisfaction, and some preferences may 
involve harming others. Parents valuing racial segregation are apt to hurt other students when 
satisfying their preference in the education market. Schools that focus on students with the least 
expensive learning needs (i.e., high income students without disabilities) in the quest to 
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maximize learning outputs with limited resources may harm disadvantaged students.85 The same 
goes for using parental satisfaction as a measure; schools may focus resources on students whose 
parents are likely to complain or exit the school if dissatisfied.86  
 
 Regardless of the bottom-line used in assessing efficiency, we must think about the 
values that may be undercut if efficiency is pursued without regard for social justice and how 
people relate to each other.87 If performance is based on parental satisfaction in a racist society, 
this may severely undercut the ways in which students relate to one other and force 
disadvantaged students to endure long and persisting racism. Or, if increasing performance on 
standardized tests as cheaply as possible, we may end up with a highly-reductivist approach to 
education, where computerized software does the teaching – probably one of the cheapest ways 
to educate students. Yet, students will miss out on critical social and emotional skills that should 
be taught in schools, such as how to cooperate with others, work as a team, present their ideas to 
others, and respect others. These students, in turn, may enter society without the skills necessary 
to relate as equals with others in society, a necessary feature of any democracy
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CHAPTER III: Democratic Critiques of Market-Based Education Reforms 
 
Proponents of market-based education reforms converge on the following claim: the 
provision and governance of schools should be left to the market. As discussed in Chapter II, 
there are two justifications for this claim. The libertarian argument holds that government 
provision of schools is a denial of negative freedom and the market is a more just mechanism for 
the provision and governance of schools. The neoliberal argument holds that the market is a 
more efficient way of providing and governing schools.  
 
There are three main criticisms of market-based reforms in education. First, some 
opponents argue that education markets can exacerbate inequality and are, therefore, unjust. 
Second, some argue that market-based reforms are not appropriate for education because they 
mistake education for the kind of good it is and treat it as a commodity or sales transaction; in 
other words, the nature and purposes of markets and education are inconsistent. Third, opponents 
claim that the market-based reforms are unjust because they undermine the collective and 
democratic decision-making institutions that properly govern education. The first and second 
criticism will not be discussed, although there is substantial evidence supporting the claim that 
markets perpetuate existing socioeconomic inequalities in the provision of educational 
opportunities. The third criticism will be discussed at length and critiqued. Lastly, I argue that 
this this criticism does not adequately explain what’s really wrong or unjust with the use of 
markets in education.   
 
Markets versus Democracy: Exit versus Voice? 
 
Exit, Voice, and Schools 
 
One of the main criticisms of market-based education reforms is that the governance of 
education is left to an aggregate of consumer choices rather than subject to collective 
deliberation. In Albert Hirschman’s terms, the problem is that exit replaces voice in the provision 
and governance of education. Exit and voice are two responses to decline in organizations. Voice 
is defined as:  
any attempt to change, rather than escape from an objectionable state of affairs, 
whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in 
charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change 
in management or through various types of actions and protest.1 
 
Voice involves expressing and articulating grievances in order to enact the change one seeks. In 
contrast, exit is much more neat and impersonal.2 To exit is simply to leave the organization. As 
Hirschman describes, the “success and failure of the organization are communicated . . . by a set 
of statistics.”3 A business may look at its sales numbers to see whether it is losing or gaining 
customers. Exit by a substantial number of customers communicates that customers are not 
satisfied with the product they are receiving.  
                                                     
1 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 30.  




In the case of schools, market-based proponents argue for allowing all parents – not just 
those who can afford to move residence – to exit schools they find unsatisfactory. The poorly-run 
schools, then, will be incentivized to improve, or else lose funding and face fiscal strain or even 
closure; these schools will discover the poor quality of their educational services through 
declining enrollment numbers and, thus, declining revenue. As discussed in Chapter I, many 
people were frustrated with the education system and, subsequently, argued that the system was 
unresponsive to voice and would be better incentivized to respond if threatened with exit. A 
system where funding effectively follows students creates a market where schools must compete 
for students in order to remain in business. Proponents argue that the resulting market will be full 
of diverse and quality options for all students.  
 
Voice and Collective Decision-Making over Exit 
 
Many opponents of market-based reforms have argued that relying on exit instead of 
voice changes the way society makes allocative decisions over public goods. This change, they 
argue, is problematic because decisions regarding public goods should be “monitored, revisable, 
and accountable to the public.”4 As many argue, the public should have voice in decisions 
regarding public education via elected school boards and general state and federal elections.  
 
In a market-based education system, it is up to individual parents and schools to improve 
the quality of education for all students; schools are left to provide quality options and parents 
are left to choose the best ones. Geoff Whitty claims that the uncoordinated decisions of 
consumers or “[a]tomized decision making” could have devastating effects for an already-highly 
stratified society: “transferring responsibility for decision making from the public to private 
sphere can actually reduce the scope for collective action to improve the quality of education for 
all.”5 The transfer of responsibility from the collective community to autonomous private 
suppliers and consumers, he argues, ignores the fact that education is a “public responsibility” 
that requires collective – not individual – action.6 By the same token, Mary Healy describes the 
education market’s reliance on exit for improvement as a zero-sum game where parents must 
seek a good school at the expense of others.7 This zero-sum game, she argues, does not improve 
the school and students who are left behind.8 Students may be trapped in struggling schools if 
they lose funding due to enrollment declines. In an environment of cutthroat competition, 
schools may not cooperate with each other and share effective practices; this will only hurt 
students who may not have secured a spot at one of the best schools.9 Furthermore, she argues, it 
erodes the civic loyalty necessary for citizens to relate as equals.10 
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Similarly, Jeffrey Henig argues that market-based education reforms remove public 
forums where democratic decision making takes place. This is a problem, he argues, because 
education is a public good that involves far-reaching societal consequences, or externalities. 
Effectively, these arguments focus on how the market places the provision and governance of 
education beyond “public deliberation.”11 Recall that Chubb and Moe and Friedman argued for 
this type of dispersion among school providers and parents; they saw it as a positive aspect of the 
market-based model. Further, they viewed public deliberation, bureaucracy, and politics as a 
burden upon education and the very cause of low-performing schools. Yet, Whitty and others are 
concerned that splitting resource allocation among many individual parents and schools 
diminishes the ability for the community at large to solve problems in education.  
 
Reflections on the Current Debate: Does it Miss the Mark? 
 
These arguments focus on the importance of voice – specifically, public or collective 
deliberation – in the decision-making process regarding public education and reject reliance on 
the use of exit to communicate dissatisfaction with schools. Accordingly, the discussion often 
centers around whether markets or centralized, democratic control constitute a more effective or 
just arrangement in the provision and governance of education. Many scholars have framed the 
problem as one between markets and democracy – namely, Chubb and Moe, Stewart Ranson, 
and James Tooley – and argue strictly within a framework of exit versus voice. Yet, is the appeal 
to voice over exit successful in describing why markets shouldn’t be in education? One of the 
main objections to this argument is that markets are democratic and consumer voice can play an 
important role in the governance of education. This objection will be discussed and critiqued. 
Then, it will be explained why the markets versus democracy framework is not constructive. 
Note, however, that this framework is not invalid per se, but it might not provide insight to the 
actual ways in which real education markets may function or suffer from dysfunction.  
 
The Neoliberal Response: Markets are Democratic 
 
Consider the objection that markets are, in fact, democratic. In response to Ranson’s 
criticism of the market’s reliance on consumer exit for improvements in quality, James Tooley 
points out that consumers have two options in education markets: exit and voice.12 Parents may 
either leave the school or complain to the management of the school.13 This way, parents can 
deliberate and have voice in the school system. Historically, many democratically governed 
school systems have failed to listen to the voice of the most disadvantaged, who were unable to 
exit dysfunctional school systems due to economic constraints.14 Historically, some local school 
districts – institutions of collective governance – have not been accountable to their students and 
parents. Tooley argues that the market-based system gives parents even greater power over their 
situation with the ability to exit schools; this avenue is no longer restricted to the privileged or 
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influential because all citizens will have the choice to exit.15 Tooley goes farther to argue that 
“[m]arkets are much more like responsive democracies” because they “demand that people are 
convinced of the value of the ideas on offer.”16 As consumers in education markets, schools in 
the market must successfully sell their education services to parents; if enough parents are not 
convinced and exit the school, then the school faces possible closure. According to Tooley, 
markets are more democratic in this sense. Echoing the arguments of Chubb and Moe, Tooley 
suggests that there are no winners and losers in an education market.17 In democratically 
controlled schools, the majority imposes policies on the minority. Plus, Tooley adds, many 
democracies are ridden with “media manipulation, privilege, rent-seeking, log-rolling, luck 
expediency, charisma, ignorance and behind-the-scenes corruption.”18 In contrast, in education 
markets, each individual seeks the school that suits their preferences. Essentially, each consumer 
can become a winner, so long as suitable options are available and they make the “right” 
decision in the educational marketplace.    
 
While Tooley’s use of the word “democracy” is not the most precise way of describing 
consumer choice, he is right to point out that parents have both voice and exit in an education 
market. Parents may complain to the school and threaten the school administration with the loss 
of funds. Nevertheless, Tooley is incorrect because he conflates two notions of voice. One notion 
of voice is simply having a channel of input, or a way to express complaints to decision-making 
authorities, but without any means to hold these authorities accountable; that is, there are no 
channels by which they can be removed from power. Another notion of voice is an input that 
plays an official role in collective decision-making or accountability (e.g., voting). Tooley’s 
objection concerns the use of voice at a different level of organization: the individual school 
level. Since funding is effectively tied to student enrollment in an education market, the power of 
parental voice might be even stronger at the school level than in a centralized system where 
parents cannot easily exit.19 By contrast, Healy, Henig, and Whitty are more concerned about 
voice at system-wide level regarding governance and provision – matters that deal with the ways 
in which scarce educational resources might be allocated and used. As Whitty explains, the 
problem with the use of markets is that voice – as in, collective governance – is eliminated. 
Using voice at a school-level is not equivalent to democratic, or collective, governance. As for 
the worry about rule by the majority, Chubb and Moe are ignoring compromises and minority 
accommodations that are commonplace in democratic decision-making.  
 
 In an education market, there are no school boards, central district offices, or state 
departments to use collective voice regarding these matters.20 With decision making 
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decentralized and dispersed, decisions are not “monitored, revisable, and accountable to the 
public at large.”21 Instead, only individual parents – not the public at large – can hold individual 
schools accountable if they are consumers in the education market.  
 
Democracy (Voice) in Charter Schools? 
 
Similarly, others have argued that charter schools have a potential to be democratic in 
ways that traditional public schools have not been historically. In other words, some argue that 
charter schools can be democratic and include citizen voice. This voice, however, is primarily 
executed at the individual school level and not in the ways proponents of system-wide 
democratic control advocate.  
 
Michael Mintrom argues that market organizations – specifically, charter schools – have 
a democratic potential and can serve as sites of “inclusive decision making” and deliberative 
democracy.”22 Mintrom claims that market forces and citizen voice do not have to be exclusive; 
instead, via charter schools the market and voice can be “mutually reinforcing.” Because schools 
are placed in a competitive environment, they have greater incentives to involve parents in 
decision making and listen to citizen voice.23 In “Market Organizations and Deliberative 
Democracy: Choice and Voice in Public Service Delivery,” Mintrom reports the results of his 
examination of charter schools in Michigan. He concludes that it is empirically plausible for 
charter schools to serve “as sites for the development of deliberative democracy.” He found that 
the policymaking within charter schools are more inclusive than traditional public schools; 
teachers and parents were consulted in charter schools more often than traditional public schools 
(TPSs).24 Voice at the school level, however, is not guaranteed and depends on whether the 
leaders of the schools create opportunities for deliberative democracy.25 Although this may be 
true, he admits that charter schools that “did not appear to be run in ways especially different 
from traditional public schools.”26 In addition Mintrom notes that the large scale of many of the 
education management organizations (EMOs) managing multiple schools can isolate the 
decision-makers from parent voice and local problems.27 In addition, EMOs conflict with the 
original notion of autonomous, community based, or teacher-led schools key to the charter 
school concept. Nevertheless, market-oriented charter school advocates have not objected to 
large-scale organizations. In fact, Friedman advocated for the creation of “highly capitalized 
chain schools like supermarkets.”28 
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Mintrom’s view is an account of deliberative democracy at the individual school-level, 
where voice may be stronger in some schools in a market-based education system. Fostering 
inclusive decision-making at the school-level is important and a noble ideal, yet it remains 
doubtful as to whether this deliberative democracy can survive in a chaotic education market – if 
an education market is unsustainable and schools are fighting over students (and funding), can 
the deliberative democracy posited by Mintrom come to fruition? It is plausible that schools will 
have greater incentives to include parents when making decisions.  At the same time, it is also 
plausible that the rise of for-profit management companies that manage multiple schools will 
discourage deliberative democracy in order to cut costs.  
 
Kathleen Abowitz and Robert Karaba share a similar view but are in vast disagreement 
with Mintrom and free market advocates who argue for a market-based education system 
through charter school policies. Abowitz and Karaba hold that charter schools have democratic 
potential but reject charter school policies based on a libertarian sense of justice. As discussed in 
Chapter I, markets and charter schools became associated through policy and were seen by some 
as a less-radical move towards vouchers and full privatization. Arguments for charters often fall 
back on the purported efficiency of markets (the neoliberal argument) or on a negative-rights 
based justification (the libertarian argument). Often times the libertarian argument is used as the 
“moral cornerstone” of neoliberalism.29  
 
Abowitz and Karaba argue that charter schools cannot reach their democratic potential if 
based on a libertarian sense of justice. In order for charter schools to reach their democratic 
potential, the policy must be based on what Abowitz and Karaba call the “democratic conception 
of justice.”30 The democratic conception of justice is based on a positive freedom, which they 
define as the “affirmative ability to actively take advantage of one’s own agency in pursuing life 
goals and ambitions.”31 Democratic justice demands participatory parity or the full inclusion of 
all citizens.32 Democratic justice, they argue, can only be achieved when resources are 
distributed equally and the specific injustices suffered by different socioeconomic groups are 
recognized.  
 
Charter school policies based on libertarian justice and maximizing the negative rights of 
individuals will not address already-present material and social inequities, which fails to address 
problems of redistribution. For instance, many policies are constructed so that it’s difficult for 
local community groups to start their own charters. Instead, entrepreneurs with ample resources 
or connections to powerful donors can start charter schools while many grassroots movements do 
not have the resources to do so, especially in impoverished urban areas.33 Additionally, charter 
school policies that provide negative liberties – a choice of schools, or exit – inadequately 
address recognition. Recognition “focuses on injustices that are rooted in cultural non-
recognition, domination, and disrespect, suffered by certain socioeconomic groups.”34 
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Making schools more democratic can enable “students and their families to become 
citizens who can and do participate in public spaces and deliberation around their educational 
futures.”35 Charter schools open a new opportunity space where parents, teachers, and students 
are granted greater flexibility and autonomy that increases the participatory parity of all 
citizens.36 In other words, charter schools based on democratic justice may serve as an 
opportunity for disadvantaged groups to “enact their own educational, political and moral 
visions.”37  
 
 Abowitz and Karaba’s vision for democratic charter schools demonstrates why the 
market is not necessary for the autonomy and community involvement sought by charter school 
opponents. Chubb and Moe and other charter proponents aimed to create schools that have 
autonomy and flexibility in governance so they are able to meet the unique needs of the students 
they educate. Yet, the market is not a necessary condition for the creation of autonomous and 
community-based schools. Additionally, Abowitz and Karaba’s argument illustrates that there 
are other models that may be effective in realizing the democratic goal of schools. The options 
are not merely limited to a full-fledged, unregulated education market and a highly centralized, 
bureaucratic system controlled by school boards.  
 
A False (and Unhelpful) Dilemma 
 
Most of the discussion centers on the merits and vices of markets and democracy, with a 
special emphasis on whether voice or exit is more important. Like most issues framed in 
dichotomies, this discussion becomes unhelpful and fails to be constructive. As Elinor Ostrom 
argues, “institutions are rarely either private or public – ‘the market’ or the state.’” In fact, many 
of the common pool resources she evaluates are mixtures of private and public features. It is for 
this reason that Ostrom rejects policy prescriptions based on metaphors or theories involving 
“oversimplified, idealized institutions.”38 As she notes, often times, these prescriptions, whether 
in favor of centralized management or privatization, fail to reveal how these institutions should 
be formed and managed.  
 
When the discussion is framed between two seemingly dichotomous solutions what might 
get lost is a simple, but important, question: what works? Which institutions will successfully 
create an education system that can provide accessible and quality education for all students, 
regardless of socioeconomic status? Using idealizations of exit and voice fail to explain what has 
and might go wrong in actual education markets. After all, the ideal of the free market is just 
that, an ideal. As Barnard Harcourt explains: 
It is time, well past time, to sever our contemporary assessment of economic 
organization from the rhetoric of the free market, natural order, and market 
efficiency . . . At the end of the day, the notion of a ‘free market’ is a fiction. 
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There is simply no such thing as a nonregulated market – a market that operates 
without legal, social, and professional regulation39 
 
 The same standard must be applied to institutions of democratic governance. Voice is an 
important and noble ideal, but the institutions governed by collective voice have not always 
succeeded. While democratic institutions will not be specifically analyzed in this thesis, the point 
is that both institutions – markets and democracy – must be assessed on the ground in the 
contexts in which they operate. In his assessment of quasi-market failure, David Lowery notes 
that “market failure does not imply nonmarket success” and vice versa: “nonmarket failure does 
not imply quasi-market success.”40 In the U.S., there are many failing school systems based on 
centralized public management. There are also failing school systems based on charters in a 
market environment. Neither markets nor democratic control, exit nor voice are guaranteed to 
provide education in a just or equitable manner. Instead, how these institutions function must be 
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CHAPTER IV: Michigan’s Charter School Law 
 
As a market-based policy, charter schools seek to change the ways schools are 
traditionally governed, funded, and organized.1 In theory and policy, creating an education 
market is often attempted by a combination of structural changes, including: parental choice, 
deregulation, new accountability standards, competition, and profit-incentives.2 Policies, 
however, vary across education markets. As Deborah Satz reminds us, the structure and function 
of markets depends on the social, cultural, and legal institutions in place.3 For this reason, 
different lessons may be derived from the way specific markets are structured and the resulting 
outcomes. The first part of this chapter will focus on the “rules” of Detroit’s education market by 
examining Michigan’s charter school law and the accompanying changes in school finance.4 The 
following question will be answered: in what ways does Michigan’s charter school law and 
Proposal A reflect the aforementioned structural changes involved in creating an education 
market?  
 
The “Rules”: Michigan’s Charter School Law, Proposal A, and The Role of EMOs 
 
With the passage of Michigan’s charter school law and changes in school aid via 
Proposal A in 1994, Governor John Engler pursued his “vision for a competitive educational 
marketplace.”5 According to James N. Goenner’s account of the origins of Michigan’s charter 
school law, Engler “saw the charter idea as a way to create the competitive environment while 
also empowering parents, students and educators with more choices.”6 Key to Engler’s vision 
was the idea that competitive markets could improve education, especially in disadvantaged 
communities dominated by poorly-performing public schools.7  
 
The adoption of Proposal A in March 1994 drastically changed the way schools are 
funded in Michigan and worked hand-in-hand with schools of choice and charter school 
legislation towards the creation of a market in education.8  Proposal A replaced the property tax – 
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previously the primary source of school funding – with the state sales tax and established a 
minimum per pupil foundation allowance.9 After its passage, each district’s revenue depended on 
the number of pupils enrolled.10  
 
Michigan’s charter school statute, Public Act 362 of 1993, was signed into law in January 
1994 by John Engler.11 The law termed charter schools as public school academies (PSAs). A 
Public School Academy is defined as a “state-supported public school under the state 
constitution, operating under a charter contract issued by a public authorizing body.”12 The 
following are included as authorizing bodies under the statute: state public universities, 
community colleges, K-12 local education agencies (traditional school districts), intermediate 
school districts (ISD), or “[t]wo or more of these public agencies exercising power, privilege, or 
authority jointly pursuant to an interlocal agreement.”13 Authorizers are responsible for 
overseeing charter schools and have the power to revoke the charter if: the school fails to 
demonstrate improved academic achievement or meet goals set in the contract; fails to comply 
with applicable laws; fails to maintain public sector accounting principles or sound fiscal 
stewardship.14 In addition, as fiscal agents for PSAs, authorizing bodies may retain up to three 
percent of the state school aid payment.15 PSAs are governed by school boards. The school board 





Proposal A also enacted “schools of choice,” enabling students to attend another district’s 
schools, even if he or she does not reside in the district.17 In tandem with the introduction of 
charter schools and adoption of schools of choice, per-pupil funding was intended to “make 
schools more responsive to student needs and parent expectations” since parents can threaten 
schools with exit.18 Competing for students on the basis of parental satisfaction is one of the 
critical ways to create competition between schools since a significant portion of school funding 
is dependent on the number of pupils enrolled.  
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Yet, not all districts in Michigan participate in schools of choice, creating a statewide 
market with restricted choices in some areas. Under the current schools of choice program, local 
districts have the power to decide whether to allow students from other districts in the same 
intermediate school district (ISD).19 Despite the incentive of the extra per-pupil funding that may 
be gained, some high-performing districts are able to opt-out of school choice. The Mackinac 
Center for Public Policy reports that “many of the districts that have barred or severely limited 
schools of choice, including the Grosse Pointe, Birmingham, Bloomfield Hills, Rochester and 
Freeland districts, are near academically struggling districts – the Detroit, Pontiac and Saginaw 
districts, respectively.”20 Grosse Pointe schools – a white, wealthy district only six miles east of 
downtown Detroit – has opted out of schools of choice since the legislation was passed.21 Grosse 
Pointe has vigorously fought against participating in schools of choice, going as far as paying 
private investigators about $8,000 a year to ensure students who do not live outside the district 
attend their schools.22  This goes to show that the monetary incentives of bringing in extra per-
pupil funding does not always overcome barriers of race and class and, in the case of Grosse 





 Charter school proponents argue that creating a competitive educational marketplace – 
where schools compete for students and the funding that follows them – will force schools to 
improve. It is theorized that low-performing schools will be pushed out of the market and high-
performing, efficiently-run schools will remain in business. Proposal A played a crucial role in 
imitating the competitiveness of markets in school funding because the amount of state revenue 
received by each district is a product of the state “per-pupil foundation allowance” and the 
number of pupils enrolled.23 Accordingly, both PSA and TPS districts must compete to enroll a 
sufficient number of students to remain in operation.24 A report on the distribution of state aid 
under Proposal A by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan found that “[i]n the short-run, 
the marginal costs of losing a student are far greater than the average cost of educating the 
student. This can place a strain on local budgets because annual enrollment losses generally 
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cannot be translated in immediate cost reductions that match the per-pupil funding loss”25 Peter 
J. Hammer argues that this funding formula creates “winner-takes-all incentives” because school 
districts losing students are penalized to a greater extent than districts gaining students.26 In turn, 
this creates a “fixed-cost-trap” for districts with declining revenues (due to enrollment decline) 
where the “reduction in operating revenue (the entire value of the foundation allowance 
associated with that student) is greater than the district’s ability to reduce its fixed costs.”27 In 
other words, districts facing significant enrollment decline are heavily impacted by Proposal A, 
creating an immensely competitive market in some areas. 
 
Yet, competition is more complex than student enrollment and funding. Analysis of the 
effects of competition is incomplete without understanding the historical and social context in 
which competition occurs. In his assessment of the governance, finance, and competition in 
Detroit’s schools, Hammer notes “there is nothing magical about competition.”28 Instead, the 
results of competition are contingent upon “the historical context in which competition takes 
place, the status of the complementary social institutions supporting the market and the 
incentives that drive the system.”29 Thus, these are the factors that must be accounted for when 
analyzing the results of competition in Detroit and formulating future policies to address the 
market’s shortcomings. Engler’s charter school policy, alongside Proposal A, was successful in 
creating a highly competitive market and creating a plethora of choices, although the impacts of 




While PSAs are organized as “nonprofit corporations” under the Michigan Nonprofit 
Corporation Act, there are no restrictions on contracting with for-profit education management 
organizations (EMOs) to operate the entire school.30 Recall that some charter advocates argued 
for the creation of an industry of for-profit management companies to incentivize schools to 
produce better results with fewer resources. A report profiling for-profit and non-profit EMOs 
for the 2011-2012 school year found that 79 percent of Michigan’s charter schools were run by 
for-profit EMOs, making Michigan the state with the largest proportion of for-profit EMOs in 
the nation.31 It’s safe to say that the for-profit charter school industry has boomed in Michigan. 
The high percentage of for-profit EMOs may be a function of a financial barrier created by the 
charter law. At the time the law was passed, charter schools had to lease or acquire and renovate 
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buildings using their operating revenue.32 Typically, EMOs have access to private equity to 
cover these costs, while these costs pose a financial barrier for many independent and local 
groups.33 Additionally, there are no limits imposed on the number of schools EMOs can manage 
which, in turn, allows them to “pursue cost reductions – and ultimately profits – through opening 
large numbers of schools.”34 In 2015, Bruce Baker and Gary Miron examined the ways in which 
“charter school policy functions to promote privatization and profiteering.”35 Some of their 
findings included: a significant share of public expenditure is being extracted for personal or 
business financial gain; the transfer of public assets to private individuals and organizations; 
education organizations charging “lucrative management fees and rent extraction.”36 
 
The high presence of EMOs in Michigan’s charter school sector raises questions about 
whether charters are adhering to original notions of “site-based management” essential to the 
charter concept.37 Many EMOs own the instructional models and used in charter schools and 
employ the teachers, who are not employees of the charter school, but private employees of the 
EMO.38  For instance, one of Michigan’s largest EMOs, National Heritage Academies, owns 
most of the school buildings and its contents – desks, computers, books, and supplies. This 
“private property” owned by NHA may have been bought with taxpayer money.39 NHA takes 95 
percent of the school state aid payment as its “fee,” keeping the remainder as profit.40 As Jennifer 
Dixon of the Detroit Free Press points out, this practice raises serious concerns about the 
independence of charter school boards – if unhappy with NHA’s services, the school may have 
very little leverage to remove them because doing so could result in losing the school’s property 
and assets.41  
 
While charter school boards are legally required to maintain independence from EMOs 
and are responsible for overseeing their school’s finances, one charter school board was 
“functionally dependent on the management company to sustain the [school].”42 In some 
instances, information regarding school budgets was withheld from board members and board 
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members have been threatened with removal by authorizer for challenging the EMO.43 Thus, it 
appears that for-profit EMOs are able to assume almost-full control of charter schools. Michael 
F. Addonizio and C. Philip Kearney criticize the charter movement in Michigan, which is 
dominated by EMOs instead of the autonomous “teacher-led centers of innovation envisioned by 
the intellectual founders of the charter movement.”44 Further, they argue, the dominance of 
EMO-run schools with their “prepackaged curricula, policies, and procedures” does not align 
with the charter ideal of autonomous schools “free[d] from the bureaucratic burdens of 
traditional schools.”45 On the one hand, some charter school advocates pushed for the creation of 
a for-profit industry educational management organizations motivated by profits. But, on the 
other hand, the original idea for charter schools had nothing to do with markets or profit-
seeking.46 Instead, many advocates envisioned autonomous, community-based, teacher-led 




 One way in which charter schools in Michigan are less autonomous than envisioned by 
charter school advocates is that PSAs are subject to all the laws and rules applicable to traditional 
public schools (TPSs), except for unionization laws.47 PSAs must assess their students annually 
and administer state assessments.48 In this regard, Michigan’s statute gives charter schools less 
flexibility and autonomy in terms of academic standards than the schools proposed by some 
charter advocates.49 Yet, without testing of some sort, it would prove difficult to test the 
purported effectiveness of newly-formed charter schools. Nonetheless, charter schools are 
offered a great amount of fiscal autonomy.50 By law, charter schools are regarded as their own 
school districts and, thus, bear the same responsibilities as other local education authorities.51 
They may purchase and own buildings and properties and are exempt from taxation on their 
earnings.52 Michigan’s law is extremely permissive in that the State of Michigan offers no 
guidelines for screening charter school applicants, thereby allowing anyone to apply and open a 
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Accountability and Oversight 
 
As discussed in Chapter I, there are two different ways charter schools can be held 
accountable for student performance and school quality. At minimum, charters are supposed to 
be held to the goals and standards set forth in their charter (i.e., contract) issued by their 
authorizer.54 Since charter schools are given greater autonomy – and, in Michigan, a high degree 
of deregulation – it is expected that they adhere to these goals and standards; this is what Gary 
Miron and Christopher Nelson call the “autonomy-accountability bargain.”55 Another way by 
which charters are to be held accountable is via parental choice and per-pupil funding. The 
market based-theory of charters holds that parents will hold schools accountable because they 
have the choice to leave and will take their student’s per-pupil funding with them if they do.56 
 
Many have charged that Michigan’s charter school law includes no mechanisms for 
proper oversight and accountability.57 Evidence suggests there is a major failure in oversight by 
authorizers, the bodies legally responsible for the overseeing the performance, fiscal stewardship, 
and legal compliance of the charter schools they authorize. While authorizers play a big role in 
Michigan’s charter system, the law lacks minimum standards for authorizers as well as 
procedures for closure in the case the schools they authorize start failing academically.58  If 
authorizers fail to hold their schools accountable, neither the governor nor the superintendent can 
revoke a low-performing authorizer’s authority to grant charters.59 While the law allows the state 
superintendent to stop an authorizer from opening new schools, the authorizer’s authority for 
existing schools remains, and existing schools may open new “campuses.”60 As a result, when it 
comes to school closings, traditional public school districts and PSAs face very different 
standards. While the state has exercised great power in closing schools and taking over entire 
school districts, it lacks this authority over charter school authorizers, despite reports indicating 
low-performance and fraud.61  
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Transparency in public institutions is an important part of oversight and accountability. 
There is mounting evidence that for-profit EMOs managing charters have not been financially 
transparent. Early studies done by Miron and Nelson, found that when newspapers across the 
state of Michigan used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request information on how 
public dollars were spent in charter schools and traditional schools, 53 percent of charter schools 
refused to provide the information or provided only partial information.62 He adds that many 
private EMOs argued they did not have to disclose information on how the money was being 
spent.63 In an article published in August 2016, similar concerns were voiced; Jennifer Dixon of 
the Detroit Free Press reported that “a record number of charter schools run by for-profit 
companies that rake in taxpayer money and refuse to detail how they spend it [claim that they’re] 
private and not subject to disclosure laws.”64 Dixon claims that the lack of financial transparency 
by for-profit EMOs is problematic because EMOs that run most or all of charter schools receive 
most of the public money the schools receive. Further, she adds, looking at the broad categories 
for how money is spent by EMOs does not indicate how money is spent on executive salaries 
and compensation or vendor payments. 
 
This failure in proper oversight has led to self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and fraud in 
charter schools and raises serious doubts about how charter schools are accountable to the public. 
While having a relationship with or ownership interest in the school’s EMO is barred by law, 
there is a loophole that allows EMOs to hire friends of board members and school founders.65 A 
federal audit from the Office of Inspector General in the U.S. Department of Education 
concluded that “these cozy relationships are creating potential conflicts of interest, transaction 
between related parties that could result in self-dealing, and insufficient segregation of duties 
between the schools and their management companies.”66 Yet, the state provides no penalties for 
authorizers that fail to ensure appointed board members are independent of the EMO providing 
services for the schools.67 The lack of transparency and accountability raises serious questions as 
to whether charter schools run entirely by private, for-profit EMOs are public institutions since 
they are not subject to adequate public oversight. Gary Miron, a professor of educational 
leadership, research, and technology, charges that charter schools in Michigan have become “a 
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The Market in Detroit 
 
Michigan’s charter school policy alongside Proposal A aimed to bring competition into 
public school systems, especially those with low-performing schools. Charter schools have 
expanded most rapidly in Detroit. Twenty years later, there is no shortage of competition. The 
education market is often described as “hypercompetitive,” as a place where charter schools and 
the traditional public schools, Detroit Public Schools (DPS), are being “cannibalized” in 
competition for students (and funding).69 Paradoxically, competition in public spaces is not a 
new phenomenon in Detroit.70 According to Hammer, over the past sixty years, competition in 
public spaces has furthered existing economic and racial inequality in Southeast Michigan.71 
Hence, the present and historical context of racial and economic segregation in Detroit must be 
understood when analyzing the effects of a highly-competitive education market. 
 
Detroit’s Historical Context 
 
Today, Detroit is both one of the most racially and economically segregated regions in 
the nation. Hammer contends that the combination of racial and economic segregation is no 
accident.72 Alongside deindustrialization, there is a long history of discrimination in housing and 
employment. With deindustrialization and the end of assembly-line based work Detroit lost 
90,000 jobs between 1954 and 1960.73 Since the 1950s, Detroit’s tax and population bases have 
declined.74 During this time, the city experienced mass White-migration out of the city while 
many African Americans were unable to migrate out of the city due to discriminatory housing 
practices.75  
 
The traditional public school system, Detroit Public Schools (DPS), did not remain 
unscathed by these changes in the local economy and racial demographic.76 According to a 
history of DPS governance by Leanne Kang, the financial management of DPS was heavily 
affected by the fiscal crises of the city beginning in the post-World War II period. From 1950 to 
2000, DPS has faced financial crises and academic decline.77 Amid these crises: 
the notion grew that a corrupt and inept school board was responsible for DPS’s 
fiscal crisis continued to grow among the public. Yet, the reality was that the 
school board was managing the finances of one of the largest urban districts in the 
U.S. under relatively unstable conditions including rapid population decline and 
                                                     
69 Robin Lake, Ashley Jochim, and Michael DeArmond, “Fixing Detroit’s Broken School System: 
Improve Accountability and Oversight for District and Charter Schools,” Education Next, 2015, 22, 
http://educationnext.org/fixing-detroits-broken-school-system/. 
Zernike, “A Sea of Charter Schools in Detroit Leaves Students Adrift.” 
70 Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools,” 113. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 119. 
73 Leanne Kang, “The Dismantling of an Urban School System," 100. 
74 Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools,” 119 
75 Kang, “The Dismantling of an Urban School System,” 100.  
76 Ibid., 102. 
77 Ibid., 104. 
 49 
the unpredictability of state aid given the rise and fall of the economy78  
 
Today, the performance of both Detroit Public Schools and Detroit charter schools is well 
below students statewide and nationwide.79 Detroit is still very segregated: in 2010 Detroit’s 
child population was 81.9 percent African American, 9.7 percent Hispanic, and 4.4 percent 
White.80 In addition, many children live in poverty: in 2011 57.3 percent of children lived below 
the poverty line.81 It’s evident and obvious that Detroit’s students receive an inferior education to 
students nationwide and statewide. To this day, education in Detroit remains separate and 
unequal.   
 
The Actors: Who’s in Charge? 
 
Recall that market-based education advocates call for a complete reorganization and 
restructuring in order to decentralize the ways schools are provided, governed, and funded. As 
described in Chapter II, Friedman as well as Chubb and Moe ardently supported removing a 
central, democratically-elected body to oversee the management of schools. Instead, they argued 
that vesting this authority in a marketplace of schools – in which decision-making is dispersed 
among individual school suppliers and parents – would solve the ills of America’s schools; as 
Chubb and Moe famously claimed: “choice is a panacea.”82 In essence, the education market is 
another way of allocating limited resources, namely school funding, among multiple school 
providers and relying on the actions of uncoordinated schools to work out issues of enrollment, 
transportation, and school openings and closings.  
 
In Detroit, many of these structural changes have been achieved via Michigan’s charter 
school policy, Proposal A, and the subsequent influx of charter schools. Yet, Detroit’s market is 
extremely complex, which is why the different actors – or school suppliers – must be examined. 
What is clear, nonetheless, is that the decision-making and allocation of students and schools is 
incredibly fragmented.83 In fact, there are twelve different school “systems” providing and 
governing schools in Detroit.84 As of 2014, these systems include: the state controlled Education 
Achievement Authority (EAA), the Wayne Regional Education Service Agency (RESA), Detroit 
Public Schools (DPS), eight state-supported universities, and a community college.85 Figure 1 
shows the different actors involved in education in Detroit and the types of schools they oversee; 
this includes traditional public schools (i.e., district schools) and PSAs. As aforementioned, 
public universities and community colleges, Intermediate School Districts (ISDs), and Local 
Education Agencies (LEAs, i.e., school districts) may charter PSAs.  
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Figure 1: “Twelve School Systems: Detroit’s Fragmented Educational Landscape”86 
 
 
Public School Academies in Detroit 
 
There are twelve different authorizers overseeing Detroit’s PSAs. Some of these 
authorizers are located very far from Detroit. Indeed, Northern Michigan University and Bay 
Mills Community College, are located almost 450 miles away from Detroit. PSAs have seen 
steady growth in enrollment from 2002 to 2013. Figure 2 shows the market share of different 
school providers, including DPS, the EAA, PSAs in Detroit, PSAs outside of Detroit, and 
students attending other traditional public schools (TPSs) through inter-district choice. Market 
share is the percent of Detroit’s student population enrolled at a certain education provider. 
Enrollment in charter schools has increased by almost 20,000 students from 2002 to 2013, a 21.5 
percent increase in market share.  
 
The Market Outside Detroit 
 
In addition to PSAs outside of Detroit, Detroit’s students may attend schools in districts 
outside of Detroit through inter-district choice.87 Analysis of Detroit’s education market will 
primarily focus on the actors inside Detroit – DPS, PSAs, and the EAA – although, as shown in 
Figure 2, a significant portion of Detroit’s students attend TPSs and PSAs outside of the city. 
Over time, the market share of public schools outside of Detroit increases from 7.44 percent 
(14,627 students) in 2002 to 22.06 percent (26,396 students) in 2014. This suggests many Detroit 
resident students are leaving Detroit’s education market for choices outside the city – although, 
these schools may not be accessible to all students, especially those without a car.  
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The Traditional Public Schools: Detroit Public Schools 
 
Traditional Public Schools (TPSs) are usually governed by a superintendent and a 
democratically-elected school board who make decisions regarding provision and funding of 
schools.88 Detroit Public Schools (DPS), however, cannot be considered representative of local, 
democratic control of schools. Instead, the state government has heavily interfered with 
education in Detroit in the last seventeen years. The period of analysis, 2002 to 2014 overlaps 
with important state-induced reforms in Detroit that occurred between 1999 and 2014. In her 
history of DPS, Leanne Kang identifies five reforms that contributed to the destruction of 
traditional governance and local control, charter schools being one of them: Proposal A (1994), 
Michigan’s charter school law (1994), mayoral takeover (1999-2005), emergency management 
(2009), and the Education Achievement Authority.89 
 
From 1999-2005, Governor Engler took control of DPS. During this period, DPS’s fiscal 
crisis worsened; with thousands of students leaving the district, $225 million was lost in state 
funding.90 In 2005, the democratically elected school board returned, but only for four years. In 
2009, Governor Jennifer Granholm declared a financial emergency in Detroit and installed the 
first emergency financial manager of DPS.91 In 2011, the emergency manager was given full 
academic authority over the district with the signing of Public Act 4 by Governor Rick Snyder.92  
Over the period of interest, democratic control of schools – the alleged culprit of school failure, 
according to Chubb and Moe – did not exist in Detroit, for the most part. 
 
The Education Achievement Authority (EAA) 
 
 In 2011, Detroit’s emergency manager created the Education Achievement Authority 
(EAA) and transferred fifteen DPS schools into this “recovery district.”93 The EAA was a state-
controlled school district and not subject to public control.94 As Hammer describes, the EAA is 
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The Challenge: Increase Enrollment Despite Population Decline 
 
 Conditions in Detroit add another element of complexity to the decentralized school 
system. As depicted in Figure 1, the number of students living in Detroit significantly decreases 
over time; this also means that the amount of per-pupil aid that can be dispersed among schools 
also decreases. Subsequently, all school providers are competing for a smaller and smaller 
student population over time. This is part of a larger trend in Detroit’s population decline. About 
300,000 people left Detroit between 2000 and 2014.96 Amidst the declining birth rates, out-
migration from the city and state, and increased school competition, all schools face significant 
challenges operating in this environment.97
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CHAPTER V: Examining the Evidence: The Results of Marketization in Detroit 
 
Lessons From New Orleans’ Educational Marketplace 
 
Market-based education policies have been enacted both in the U.S. and internationally.  
The United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Chile, to name a few, have experimented with market-
based education reforms. In the U.S., some states have experimented with voucher programs, 
allowing students to use vouchers to attend private schools. More recently, the charter school 
movement has taken root in some states across the United States; in fact, charter schools educate 
more than 2.9 million students nationwide.1 New Orleans, LA holds the highest enrollment share 
of charter school students in the nation, with Detroit second in line. Other cities with high 
enrollment shares include Flint, MI, the District of Columbia, and Kansas City.2 Charter school 
laws, however, vary state by state and, consequently, have produced different results. Here, I 
highlight some of the results from New Orleans’ experiment with charter schools. 
 
In the United States, charter schools, alongside other market-oriented reforms, have been 
implemented in struggling urban school districts. New Orleans ranked first in the nation in 
highest charter school enrollment share for 2014-15.3 In their study of New Orleans’ charter 
experiment, Frank Adamson et al. describe the education system as a “nearly 100% charter, 
market-based system of schools where school autonomy, parent choice, and high-stakes 
accountability coincide.”4 Louisiana’s system is more structured than Detroit’s, but remains 
highly complex insofar as there are multiple superintendents, boards of education, and 
approaches to school policies, resulting in forty-four separate governing bodies.5 There are two 
different districts: one is the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB), which oversees thirteen 
charter schools and five district-run schools; the other is the Recovery School District (RSD), a 
state-run district, which oversees fifty-seven charter schools.6 The RSD was created to control 
failing schools and served as the model for Michigan’s Education Achievement Authority (EAA) 
– a state-run district that took over fifteen DPS schools.7 Schools in New Orleans are subject to 
an intense accountability system based on school performance.8 The state Department of 
Education gives all schools an annual School Performance Score and a grade (A-F) to provide 
information about school quality. This score is used to “evaluate, rank, reward, and sanction the 
public schools.”9 Louisiana’s method of dealing with “failing” schools is to close them.  
                                                     
1 “A Growing Movement: America’s Largest Charter School Communities, Tenth Annual Edition,” 
(Washington D.C.: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015), 2, 
http://www.publiccharters.org/publications/enrollment-share-10/. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Frank Adamson, Channa Cook-Harvey, and Linda Darling-Hammond, “Whose Choice? Student 
Experiences and Outcomes in the New Orleans School Marketplace” (Stanford, CA, 2015): 54, 
https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/scope-report-student-experiences-new-
orleans.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 1-3. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Leanne Kang, “The Dismantling of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1980-2014” (PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, 2015), 134, http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/113328. 
8 Adamson, Cook-Harvey, and Darling-Hammond, “Whose Choice?” 35-37. 
9 Ibid., 35. 
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Ironically enough, the OPSB, which remains under the governance of a publicly elected 
school board, is one of the highest performing districts in the state.10 In contrast, RSD, which is 
controlled by the state and composed of fifty-seven charter schools, is one of the lowest-
performing districts in the state. Stratification by race, class, and educational advantage across 
schools increased, with many at-risk students excluded from the most desirable schools.11 Tier 1 
schools – those ranked as the best in the city and the entire state – are primarily composed of 
white and Asian students. In fact, while 89 percent of white students and 73 percent of Asian 
students attend Tier 1 schools, only 23.5 percent of African American students have access to 
these schools.12 This trend also tracks low income students who qualify for reduced lunches – 
with only 21.5 percent attending Tier 1 schools.13 In their analysis, Adamson et al. identify a key 
feature of New Orleans’ education market contributing to these disparate outcomes: selective 
enrollment policies that sustain these hierarchical inequities. As a result, many special education 
students, at-risk students, and African American students have been left behind by the market. In 
addition, the RSD lacks the capacity for oversight to ensure students are being fairly treated by 
charter schools in the education marketplace.14 
 
It’s fair to say the experiment in New Orleans has proven disastrous for disadvantaged 
students in RSD, as Adamson et al. document. Fortunately, Michigan’s charter schools are 
prohibited from explicitly engaging in selective enrollment practices, although in Detroit – a 
place of widespread disadvantage and isolated segregation – the same hierarchical features may 
not exist on as large a scale as New Orleans. Unfortunately, Detroit and New Orleans share many 
important features, namely: a large number of school closings, high disruption, little oversight of 
charter school practices, the presence of a state-run school district with the power to take over 
schools, and high number of governing bodies in the marketplace. 
 
Examining Three Features of Detroit’s Education Market 
 
Ultimately, the most important question is whether Detroit’s fragmented, market-like 
structure of schools has provided equitable and accessible education for all students, regardless 
of their education provider. As discussed in Chapter I, education markets are a new way of 
allocating resources to provide educational opportunities. In chapter IV, the “rules” by which 
resources are allocated for the provision of education were described; notably, the structure of 
Detroit’s education market involves: parental choice, zero-sum competitive incentives for 
schools, built-in profit-incentives for management companies, high deregulation, a lack of 
oversight and accountability, and fragmentation of the decision-making process regarding school 
provision. Have these features worked to equitably distribute education, a good necessary for 
full-inclusion in a democratic society?  
 
Key to answering this question is avoiding the debate of whether charter schools or 
public schools are better for students. All education suppliers in and around Detroit – TPSs, DPS, 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 43. 
11 Ibid., 46-47. 
12 Ibid., 9. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 55. 
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PSAs, and the EAA – were placed into a competitive marketized environment. When a student 
exercises choice, she is effectively depriving the school left behind of funding; for this reason, 
the students who are left behind must be accounted for to evaluate the overall structure of 
opportunities in the market. If the education market works to disadvantage Detroit’s students, 
especially compared to students statewide, then it fails to provide sufficient educational 




Now that the “rules” of Detroit’s education market have been discussed, the outcomes 
produced by Michigan’s charter school law and Proposal A in Detroit will be discussed. Recall 
that proponents of market-based education policies argued that charter schools would: become 
centers of innovation; improve student outcomes (measured by standardized tests and/or parental 
satisfaction); and force all schools in the market – included TPSs – to use funds more efficiently. 
Has Detroit’s education market – one of intense competition and plentiful profit incentives – 
achieved these outcomes?  
 
 In order to tackle this question, three key features of Detroit’s education market will be 
discussed. Detroit’s education market is characterized by a constantly changing school supply 
due to school openings and closings, a high for-profit EMO industry presence, and high exit by 
both students and teachers. Special attention will be focused on how these features have been 
conducive to producing the results touted by charter school advocates. Research focusing on the 
last decade and a half – roughly 2002 to 2016 – will be discussed. In addition, the performance 
of Detroit’s students will be assessed using grade four reading proficiencies on the Michigan 
Educational Assessment Program (MEAP). Fortunately, the charter school market is not new; 
charter schools have expanded in Detroit over the past twenty years, allowing the market to 
mature.   
 
Barriers to Informed Choice 
 
The market theory dictates that competition is necessary for improvement. Allowing new 
schools to enter the market will force all schools to compete for their students. Assuming parents 
exit the “bad” schools and enroll their children in “good” schools, the “good” schools will stay in 
business, while the “bad” schools will close. Schools with high enrollment (i.e., more customers 
and per-pupil funding), are deemed successful. But, has this really happened in Detroit? Are the 
“bad” schools being weeded out by parental choice and the intense competition created by 
Proposal A? In reality, the dynamics in education markets are not this simple. Parents have 
heterogeneous – not homogenous – preferences and may take different school qualities and 
factors into account when deciding which school to attend.16 Given recent reforms the state 
places greater emphasis on test scores, but parents may not only seek schools with the highest 
test scores. Parents may make decisions based on a wide variety of criteria, including but not 
limited to: certain values, specific special education services, location, and performance or 
                                                     
15 This does not entail that educational opportunities must be provided equally.  
16 Peter J. Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools: Governance, Finance and Competition,” 
Journal of Law in Society 12, no. 1 (2011): 145, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jls13&collection=journals&id=113. 
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ranking on standardized state tests. In addition, what really matters is that parents perceive 
schools to be good or bad. If parents perceive deterioration it is likely they will exit.17 Regardless 
of the criteria used by parents in exercising choice, this idea also hinges on informed choice and 
the availability of effective exit options. If parents cannot access preferred schools, “choice” is 
meaningless. These barriers to informed choice may be reflected in the significantly high 
mobility of Detroit’s students compared to students statewide.18 Since parents cannot detect 
school quality without enrolling their children, the cost of acquiring accurate information is high; 
if the school is not suitable for their child – due to bullying, school environment, discipline 
policies, etc. – the student loses months of education just to obtain this information; anecdotal 
evidence in the media demonstrates this is the reality for many parents.19  
 
Given the highly decentralized and complex nature of Detroit’s education market, parents 
must navigate twelve uncoordinated school systems independently responsible for overseeing 
about fifty different school districts.20 Between DPS, PSAs, and the EAA parents have plenty of 
options to choose from – what needs investigation is the quality of choices available. Choice for 
the sake of choice is useless if the accessible choices are poor-quality. Recall that a key 
assumption behind using competition for improvement is that parents have effective exit options; 
parents must be able to safely and reliably transport their child to another school.  
 
 In January 2014, the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE) found that many 
Detroit parents have immense difficulty navigating the education marketplace and exercising 
choice for the following reasons: a lack of information, confusing paperwork, and transportation 
gaps.21 Location is an important factor in Detroit – a large city of 140 square miles with no 
reliable public transportation and where 26 percent of residents do not own a car.22 Moreover, 
some routes may be dangerous for children and teens to travel by foot, especially if passing by 
areas with high levels of crime and blight.23 Since PSAs are not required to provide 
transportation, schools located far from students’ homes makes commuting burdensome or 
unfeasible for families. In fact, more than one third of Detroit PSAs do not provide transportation 
to students.24 This factor may automatically sort PSA populations since almost a quarter or 
                                                     
17 Ibid., 141. 
18 Liyang Mao and Landauer-Menchik, “Mobility in Detroit’s Charter Schools,” Michigan State 
University (2014), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/Student_Mobility_in_PSAs_January_21_2014_44576 77.pdf. 
19 Zernike, “A Sea of Charter Schools in Detroit Leaves Students Adrift.” 
Erin Einhorn, “The Extreme Sacrifice Detroit Parents Make to Access Better Schools,” The Atlantic, 
April 11, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/04/the-extreme-sacrifice-detroit-
parents-make-to-access-better-schools/477585/. 
Lake, Jochim, and DeArmond, “Fixing Detroit’s Broken School System: Improve Accountability and 
Oversight for District and Charter Schools.” 
20 In the 2013-14, there were fifty-four different school districts educating grade four students. While the 
exact number may vary by grade, the fact that many school districts operate in Detroit remains. 
21 Robin Lake, Ashley Jochim, and Michael DeArmond, “Fixing Detroit’s Broken School System,” 
Education Next, (Winter 2015), 22-23, http://educationnext.org/fixing-detroits-broken-school-system/. 
22 Lester Graham, “Detroiters in Poverty Face Nearly Insurmountable Obstacles,” Bridge Magazine, June 
2016. 
23 Kristi Tanner, “How Far Do Kids Travel to Detroit’s Schools?,” Detroit Free Press, May 2015. 
24 Graham, “Detroiters in Poverty Face Nearly Insurmountable Obstacles.” 
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residents do not own a car. These factors have made it increasingly difficult for parents to find a 
good school for their children, especially for parents with little education and those who have 
children with special education needs.25 The actual exit options available to Detroiters will be 
further discussed later.    
 




Fluctuation in the supply of schools is theorized to improve the education market overall. 
The number of schools opening and closing in Detroit has been in constant flux since the charter 
school law was passed in 1994. Indeed, a total of 281 schools have closed between DPS and 
PSAs since 1994.26 Figure 3 shows the fluctuation in school openings and closings over a span of 
almost twenty years. In almost every year the number of DPS school closings outnumber PSA 
closings. DPS’s enrollment loses and subsequent loss of each student’s per-pupil funding has led 
to many school closures. In 2010, DPS reported that “[d]espite the closure of over 100 schools 
since 2004, there remain over 50,000 excess seats throughout the district.”27,28  These school 
closings suggest that DPS has struggled to downsize amidst population decline and loss of 
market share to other education providers in the market.  
 
Figure 3. School Closings in Detroit’s Education Market29 
 
Competition is theorized to create fiscal pressures for schools with low enrollment. In 
DPS, intense competition and enrollment decline has forced the district to downsize due via 
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27 Office of the Emergency Financial Manager, “Master Facilities Plan 2010-2015” (Detroit Public 
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school closings, building closures, and program consolidations. Yet, the dynamics within DPS 
from 1999 to 2015 complicate the way in which DPS has competed with charters due to heavy 
state control. For instance, under the control of Emergency Manager Roy Roberts one school – 
Oakman Elementary – was closed even though its enrollment capacity was at 99.3 percent.30  
Wayne State Professor Thomas C. Pedroni discovered that the district was using unsubstantiated 
claims to justify closing the school, using incorrect building capacities and unproven claims 
about the facility condition.31 Oakman Elementary served 300 pre-K to grade five children, 40 
percent of whom had special needs.32 The school provided services to special education students 
such as physical therapy, smaller class sizes, accessible entryways, and a wheelchair accessible 
playground.33 Despite public outcry, the school was closed anyway and some parents struggled 
to find a suitable replacement.34 In Oakman’s case, high enrollment, parental satisfaction, and 
democratic push-back played little-to-no role in decision to close the school. Nonetheless, it is 
unclear whether more cases like this one have occurred in the closings of other DPS schools 
under state control.  
 
Whether school closings have improved Detroit’s market and brought about increased 
performance and efficient resource allocation remains without consensus. This is due to the fact 
that some DPS closings were necessary in order to downsize and cut costs with steeply declining 
revenues, but the actual process of closing schools has been terribly inefficient, costly, and may 
have driven some students out of DPS, forcing sharper cuts in revenue.35 In New Orleans, 
Adamson et al. found that, as result of many school closings and exclusions, many high school 
students became “disconnected” youth – those unable to complete their education and provide 
ongoing education or employment. In Detroit, it is unknown whether students displaced by 
school closings became disconnected.36 However, Beverly Rebel Finlayson, the manager of 
Student Accounting and Auditing at the Wayne Country RESA found reported that “[w]e cannot 
determine where approximately 8,500 Detroit resident (students) are” as of January 2007, 
although many students were probably lost to PSAs outside the city or outside of the state.37 Still, 
it remains unclear whether Detroit has any disconnected youth since this question has not been 





                                                     
30 Thomas C. Pedroni, “DPS Disregards Its Own Data, FOIA Law, and Special Education Rules in Rush 





34 Zak Rosen, “For Kids in Detroit, a Good School May Not Last,” Michigan Radio, June 30, 2015, 
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35 John Grover and Yvette van der Velde, “A School District in Crisis: Detroit’s Public Schools 1842-
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36 Adamson, Cook-Harvey, and Darling-Hammond, “Whose Choice?” 44-46. 
37 “DPS Enrollment Down by Thousands,” Mackinac Center For Public Policy, February 23, 2007, 
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PSA Openings, 1994-2014 
 
Since the passage of Michigan’s charter school law in 1994, 158 charter schools have 
opened in Detroit.38 Figure 4 shows the number of PSA districts opening from 1994 to 2013. 
From fall 2002 to fall 2013, an average of four charter schools opened per year. In the same 
period, PSA market share increased from 7.86 percent in to 29.39 percent.  In January 2007, DPS 
reported an excess of 54,000 vacant seats or 642 vacant classrooms – a utilization of only 50 
percent of the district’s capacity – despite closing thirty buildings since 2004.39 Later, in 2015, 
DPS reported the same problem: an excess of 30,000 seats – a utilization of only 64 percent of 
capacity; again, this overcapacity remained despite the closure of 152 school more schools 
between 2007 and 2014.40 
 




DPS’s market share has declined by 42.46 percent between 2002 and 2013.41 Given the 
exodus of residents out of Detroit, the decline in birthrates and school-age population, and the 
introduction of charter schools and schools of choice, this result is not surprising.42 It’s evident 
that DPS has struggled to downsize in the competitive and complex environment driven by 
competition for diminishing state funding (i.e., declining student population). Hammer contends 
that for DPS, especially, this dynamic exacerbates fiscal stress and is harmful to students who 
remain in DPS. He states that on top of the already-declining enrollment due to demographic 
trends, adding inter-district choice and charter competition is 
akin to adding an accelerant to a fire. To begin with, school choice and 
competition increase the number of departing students, forcing sharper cuts in 
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existing programs and facilities in the traditional public school. These cuts 
decrease the actual and perceived quality of traditional schools and negatively 
impact the education of those students who remain. This, in turn, leads more 
students to leave and future cuts to be even more severe in a self-reinforcing 
downward spiral. Conversely, the charter schools and schools of choice receive a 
bonus payment greater than the marginal cost associated with educating the new 
student and are, therefore, able to spend even more revenue in improving 
educational programs and services.43 
 
Schools inside the city are steadily losing students to schools located outside Detroit, meaning 
that the potential per-pupil revenue is no longer remaining inside Detroit’s schools.44 This 
indicates that some students are exiting Detroit’s education altogether for options outside the 





One charter school leader stated that the “[education] market is saturated but they [charter 
schools] keep on coming, and no one is shutting them down.”45 In addition, DPS reported that a 
“large number of PSAs are now struggling to fill empty seats, and some have closed due to low 
enrollment.”46 Between Fall 2012 and Fall 2013 PSA enrollment declined for the first time. Still, 
it’s unclear what supply and demand looks like in Detroit’s education market. The lack of 
coordination – and excess of competition – between PSAs and DPS makes it difficult to 
determine supply and demand, which is important to the financial viability of any educational 
system if it is to serve all students, especially those who need special education services. In 
addition, the city’s population loss and declining birth-rate add another complex element for 
schools to deal mitigate.  Despite the alleged “oversupply” of schools, there is a high unmet 
demand for accessible schools and special education services in Detroit’s education market. 
Looking at where PSAs have located and who is serving students with special needs paints a 
different picture of supply and demand. 
 
 
Avoiding Need and Inequities in Access 
  
 Location matters in Detroit and can determine whether students are able to access certain 
schools. Some areas in Detroit are facing a school shortage, indicating that PSAs haven’t located 
where schools are really needed. For instance, there are eleven high schools in downtown Detroit 
– an area of recent renovation – while only 1,984 high school age students live in the area. In 
contrast, in northwest Detroit there are 3,742 high school age students and only two high 
                                                     
43 Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools: Governance, Finance and Competition,” 141. 
44 See Appendix A, Table 2: Market Share of Detroit Resident Students Across Different Education 
Provider, 2002-2013.  
45 Lake, Jochim, and DeArmond, “Fixing Detroit’s Broken School System.” 
46 Earley, “10-Point Management Plan Addendum A: Detroit School Supply, School Closures and 
Openings,” 2. 
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schools.47 Even worse is the northeastern part of the city, which has been labeled an “education 
desert,” with only two high schools for 6,018 high school age students.48 Some of Detroit’s 
students must commute long distances to attend some of the best schools in the city. Students 
attending University Preparatory Science and Math High School, a high-performing charter 
school, averaged a commute of 9.3 miles. Similarly, students attending an examination entrance 
DPS school, Cass Technical High School, average an 8.7-mile commute. For some families, 
these commutes can take up to three hours if relying on the bus system.49 One of the neediest 
neighborhoods in Detroit – Brightmoor – has been described as an “educational desert” since 
7,000 students must rely on five schools for K-8 students and a single high school.50 Due to 
school closings, the only high school within a seven-square mile area of the Brightmoor 
neighborhood is Detroit Community Schools. Detroit Community Schools was ranked in the 
seventh percentile statewide for 2012-13 and performed below DPS.51 Yet, despite the high 
number of PSA openings over the years, higher performing PSAs have not come into the area to 
satisfy the demand for better schools.  While PSAs cannot be explicitly selective in admissions, 
they can control where they locate to increase their chances of recruiting and enrolling a certain 
segment of the population. 
 
 Deeper analyses of the locational patterns of charter schools in Detroit conducted by 
Christopher Lubienski demonstrated that profit-oriented charters may be avoiding areas of high 
need and disadvantage. In his analysis of the Detroit education market, Lubienski examines 
where private schools and charter schools have located in relation to the socioeconomic status of 
residents residing in different regions of the city from 1995 to 2003.52 During the period of study, 
there was a massive expansion of charter schools – sixty-four schools opened during this span 
(see Figure 4).53 The study distinguishes between profit-oriented and mission-oriented charter 
schools.54 Schools managed by an independent or non-profit group or chartered by a local charter 
authorizer were designated as mission-oriented. Schools managed by for-profit EMOs were 
designated as profit-oriented.55 Lubienski found that, in general, mission-oriented charter schools 
demonstrated “more attention to high-need areas than . . . profit-oriented charter and private 
schools.”56 Mission-oriented charter schools were located near areas with relatively greater 
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disadvantage; these areas contained the highest percentage of children, contained populations 
with less than high-school education, higher unemployment, public assistance income, and 
single-headed households.57 In contrast, “profit-oriented charter schools as a whole appear to be 
increasingly avoiding areas with more disadvantaged student populations, with several moving to 
more affluent areas.”58 One reason for this might be that more disadvantaged students are more 
expensive to effectively educate and Michigan’s funding for low-income and special needs 
students is inadequate (and increasingly unequal).59 The per-pupil foundation allowance allotted 
to Detroit’s schools, then, may be inadequate to support quality schooling for disadvantaged and 
disabled students.  
 
 Another study by Lubienski found similar results regarding differences between profit-
oriented charter schools and mission oriented charter schools in Detroit.60 Mission-oriented 
charter schools – which make up only 24 percent of the charter school market – “represent over 
62 [percent] of the charter schools in the areas of highest need.”61 Yet, charters managed by for-
profit EMOs make up 76 percent of the charter school market in the Detroit area.62 Drawing on 
these results, of the education market in and around Detroit, Lubienski argues that many options 
are “unequally distributed and shaped by racial issues, geographic distance, and policy 
barriers.”63  
 
 There are serious consequences when schools in areas of need are closed and PSAs fail to 
locate and fill the unmet demand. Recently, the state has threatened to close the lowest-
performing schools in the state, twenty-five of which are in Detroit.64 If these schools are to 
close, many parents will be left with either low-performing options somewhat nearby or high-
performing options as far as forty or fifty miles away.65 This might leave displaced students with 
few choices given that many parents do not own a car or cannot afford the expense of driving 
their students this far. Here, it is the state’s School Reform/Redesign Office (SRO) getting 
involved in the market and threatening schools with closure due to performance, not enrollment. 
In any case, it becomes clear that PSAs have not met demand where needed. It remains unclear 
where these students will go once their schools are closed. Lubienski’s studies, along with the 
absence of schools in under-served areas, raise serious questions about the ability of an education 
market to supply schools where they are needed most. In fact, the number of independent, self-
                                                     
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 619. 
59 Augenblick Palaich and Associates (APA), “Michigan Education Finance Study” (Denver, CO, 2016), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/Michigan_Education_Finance_Study_527806_7.pdf 
60 Christopher Lubienski and Peter Weitzel, “Choice, Integration, and Educational Opportunity: Evidence 
on Competitive Incentives for Student Sorting in Charter Schools,” The Journal of Gender, Race & 
Justice 12, no. 2 (2009): 372, 
http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/869602718?acc ountid=14667. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 373. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Lori Higgins and Kristi Tanner, “This Map Shows How Few Choices Parents Have If Detroit Schools 





managed PSAs in Detroit has been steadily declining over the years, although PSAs managed by 
non-profit EMOs are gaining a larger share of the PSA market.66 Despite the increasing “supply” 
of schools (i.e., number of schools in the market), there is an unmet demand that disparately 
affects students of lower socioeconomic status and special education students.  Given the high 
number of past and oncoming school closings, how the fragmented education system will 
respond to these crises is unclear and quite concerning.  
 
Special Education Students and the Marketplace 
  
Students with disabilities are the most expensive to educate and the most vulnerable in 
the education market. Due to a variety of environmental and health factors, children in poverty 
have a higher risk of developing a learning disability.67 In Detroit, special education students are 
disproportionately dispersed among different education providers. The exact cause of this 
problem is unknown, but may be a function of Michigan’s charter law, the services provided by 
PSAs in the market, and parental choice. By law, PSAs must: “provide special education 
programs and services designed to develop the maximum potential of each handicapped person 
in its district on record.”68 Recent data, however, shows that special education students are 
disproportionately enrolled in DPS compared to PSAs and other TPSs. As a result, DPS bears a 
heavier burden than other school districts given the high costs of special education and the 
continuing loss of revenue from the state. 
 
Despite DPS’s decline in market share of students, its market share of Detroit’s special 
education population has increased and is higher than that of PSAs serving Detroit’s students.69 
In fact, for the 2015-16 school year, its market share of the special education population was 54 
percent, while its share of students without disabilities was only 38 percent.70 In contrast, PSA 
market share of special education students was 38 percent – much lower than that of DPS.71  
What’s more is that the students with disabilities make up a high percentage of DPSs’ total 
enrollment, especially compared to PSAs and the statewide average. Students with disabilities 
account for 18.2 percent of DPS’s enrollment; the statewide average is much lower, at 12.7 
percent. Figure 5 shows DPS’s special education as a percent of its total enrollment, which has 
been increasing over the years. DPS remained below the statewide average from the 1994-95 
school year to the 2005-06 school year. After the 2005-06 school year, DPS’s special education 
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The Citizens Research Council of Michigan reported that students with disabilities are 
“less likely than students without disabilities to leave DPS for alternative education providers in 
the Detroit market.”72 Since Detroit’s parents have plenty of choices in the education market, 
why a greater share of Detroit’s special education students are enrolled in DPS needs 
investigation. A multiplicity of factors may be contributing to the segregation of students with 
disabilities in DPS. First, PSAs may not offer needed specialized services. One parent reports 
having called thirty-five PSAs, all of which said they did not offer the special education services 
her child needed.73 While rejecting students based on their disabilities is prohibited by laws, 
Detroit PSAs are reported to use more informal methods of doing so. For instance, some claim 
they don’t offer the services and recommend another school that might.74 Some PSAs have been 
said to informally sort students through “counseling out” students with disabilities for minor 
behavioral problems, although these instances have only been reported anecdotally. 
Transportation may also be a contributing factor. Since PSAs are not required to provide 
transportation for their students, parents may not be able to access PSAs not providing 
transportation. In contrast, Wayne RESA, the intermediate school district (ISD) that works with 
local districts – including DPS – and the Michigan Department of Education coordinates many 
special education services across the entire ISD. DPS and Wayne RESA provide “center-based 
programs” for students with severe disabilities that require specialists and designated special 
education classrooms.75 About half of disabled students in DPS attend one of six center-based 
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programs.76 Second, given the high number of for-profit EMOs operating PSAs in Detroit, profit-
oriented PSAs may be avoiding students with expensive disabilities in order to cut a larger profit 
and maximize results on standardized tests, although more investigation is needed. Regardless, 
the fiscal crisis faced by DPS due to sharp enrollment decline and subsequent loss of revenue, 
presents a grave challenge for DPS in educating its most vulnerable (and expensive) students.77   
 
 
The Profit-Motive and Efficiency 
 
What Does Efficient Education Provision Look Like? 
 
Market advocates claim that the excessive bureaucracy of traditional public schools 
makes education provision inefficient, although what is meant by ‘efficiency’ and why this is the 
case varies. Chubb and Moe focused on the political reasons as to why democratically controlled 
schools were inefficient; specifically, they argued that competing interests over education forced 
those in power to create bureaucratic institutions to protect their policies. Friedman, in contrast, 
focused on the waste of resources in “bureaucratic systems” such as the traditional public school 
system.78 Friedman, however, did not specifically outline what efficient allocation in schools 
might look like in terms of administration, instruction and other expenses. Some charter school 
advocates argued that charter schools would allocate more resources to instruction and less on 
“bloated public school administrative structures” that inhibited innovation and performance.79 
The origins of Michigan’s charter law reveal that Engler intended to free Michigan’s public 
education system from the inefficiencies of inhibitive bureaucracy and self-interested 
bureaucrats.80 In addition, with the added profit-incentive in Michigan’s charter sector, advocates 
claimed that profits would entice PSAs to reduce costs while increasing performance.81 While 
“bureaucracy” is often used in a broad sense, the idea was that markets would bring innovation 
and efficiency. Not everyone agrees on the bottom line for assessing efficiency, although there is 
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How are Resources Allocated? 
 
Given the focus on student performance and the impetus to cut costs amidst the struggle 
for resources, “efficiency” might be measured by “student outcomes per dollar spent,” as Arsen 
and Ni describe it in the context of Michigan.82 Accordingly, many argued that charter schools 
would devote more sources to instruction rather than other non-instructional functions, like 
administration.  
 
Looking at resource allocation in PSAs in terms of spending on administration and 
instruction, PSAs spend less on instruction than TPSs. Using data from the 2007-08 school year, 
David Arsen and Yongmei Ni analyzed resource allocation for all PSAs and TPSs in Michigan 
and found that, on average, PSAs spend $774 more per-pupil a year on administration and $1141 
less on instruction compared to TPSs; this result held even when controlling for smaller 
enrollments, smaller economies of scale, and the start-up process of opening new schools.83 As a 
percent of total expenditures, PSAs spend 47 percent on instruction while TPSs spend 61 
percent.84 Disparities also remain in terms of spending on special education. Arsen and Ni also 
report that TPS districts spend over $500 more per-pupil annually than PSAs on special 
education.85 Adding to the smaller per-pupil amount allocated to special education, PSAs educate 
a significantly smaller share of Detroit’s special education students compared to DPS.  
 
Broken down by the type of PSA management – EMO or self-managed – Arsen and Ni 
found that PSAs managed by EMOs were found to spend about $312 more per-pupil on 
administration.86 Given the high number of for-profit EMOs and the small number of self-
managed PSAs in Detroit, this result provides some insight into the allocation of scarce per-pupil 
funding in Detroit.87 Furthermore, it raises questions as to why PSAs are spending more on 
administration since a portion of these funds are given to EMOs as service fees.88 Since many 
EMOs are for-profit organizations, some of these funds may be gathered as profits. A 2009 study 
of PSAs in Michigan by Cynthia D. Hill and David M. Welsch found no evidence of a change in 
proficiency for PSAs run by for-profit EMOs and non-profit EMOs; the standard of efficiency 
used by Hill and Welsch was producing the greatest student outcomes at the lowest possible 
cost.89  
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A look at DPS’s general fund expenditure from 2008 to 2015 – years during which the 
district was under emergency management – show that DPS  is also spending less on classroom 
instruction and more on general administration and debt service as a proportion of its general 
fund expenditure.90 After analyzing data from 2008 to 2015, Pedroni reports that classroom 
instruction as a proportion of general fund expenditure decreased from 55.19 percent to 46.8 
percent.91 During the same time period: general administration for the district as a proportion of 
DPS general fund expenditure increased from 0.61 percent to 1.00 percent, while school 
administration as a proportion of total spending decreased from 6.27 percent to 5.17 percent.92 In 
addition, debt service as a proportion of DPS general fund expenditures increased from 1.7 
percent to 7.8 percent.93  
 
The results reported by Pedroni are supported by earlier analyses by Arsen and Ni who 
found that PSA competition with TPSs did not cause TPSs to allocate more resources to 
achievement-oriented activities (i.e., instruction). In fact, DPS’s Emergency Manager has shifted 
a greater proportion of funds to the district’s debt service and general administration and a 
smaller proportion of funds to school administration and instruction. This suggests that both 
suppliers in the market – DPS and PSAs – are devoting fewer resources to instruction and more 
to administration. PSAs appear to have “bloated” administrations and devote less to classroom 
instruction. Competition for profits, then, may not have forced schools to devote more to 
instruction and classrooms. 
 
Marketing for Students and Dollars: Count Day Competition 
 
An obvious indicator of the competition between schools in Detroit for students (and 
their per-pupil funding) is seen on “count day.” There are two count days, one in November, 
which determines 90 percent of the per-pupil funding received from the state, and another in 
February, which determines the rest.94 If students are not present on count day, the school will 
not receive the associated per-pupil funding. Consequently, schools are under immense pressure 
to ensure high attendance on count day. Count day also demonstrates the ways in which schools 
are using marketing schemes to increase their share of the diminishing per-pupil foundation 
allowance available in Detroit.  
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The scene in Detroit’s schools – both PSAs and DPS – on count day has been likened to a 
“political campaign” where schools “buy radio ads and billboards, sponsor count day pizza 
parties and carnivals.”95 Such practices have been occurring since at least 2009, when DPS 
offered a chance to win a laptop, iPod, or flat-screen TV.96 In 2010, DPS gave out a total of 
20,000 dollars in Target gift cards.97 Charter schools are also involved in these practices. One 
mother was given a raffle ticket for a fifty-dollar gift card for enrolling at a charter schools.98 
Recently in 2015, one charter school, Burton International Academy, featured inflatables, 
photograph stations, and even chefs from the MGM Grand casino-hotel to prepare special 
meals.99 In this climate, schools may be pressured to use extravagant marketing practices used by 
other schools to increase enrollment and ensure count day turnout; otherwise, they may risk 
losing their market share of an already-declining student base. While some research shows a lack 
of innovation in PSAs, there is evidence of a high degree of innovation in marketing practices to 
position and promote services through research and development, pricing, and advertising.100 
These marketing practices – a normal part of most business operations – are clearly wasteful. 
More than wasteful, they are problematic. Money spent on marketing operations means that 
money is not being spent on instruction. Given some PSAs’ contentions that they do not have 
resources for special education students, DPSs’ reported supply shortages, and the dismally-low 
performance on the part of both providers, there is no reasonable way to justify this spending on 
marketing.  
 
Innovation and PSAs in Detroit 
 
Both charter school and market-based education provision advocates argued that giving 
charter schools more autonomy in governance would result in experimentation and innovation. 
Some thought that competition would allow innovative schools to thrive and force other schools 
to innovate or close. Others argued that experimentation in charter schools would spread to 
TPSs; both school providers could learn from each other by sharing effective practices, although 
this requires cooperation, making it unlikely that this can occur in a hypercompetitive market.   
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, Michigan’s charter school law gives PSAs a high level of 
autonomy, with the exception that PSAs are required to take standardized tests. As their own 
districts, PSAs have a great degree of fiscal autonomy. This lack of oversight and regulation 
gives PSAs space to operate as they see fit. Detroit’s education market is extremely competitive, 
as PSAs, DPS, and the EAA must compete to gain a greater share of the diminishing student 
population. Advocates of competition in education see this as an important condition for 
allowing education providers to offer unique options not offered in TPSs. Detroit’s market is 
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supposedly ripe for innovation due to the intense competition, at least according to advocates of 
market-based competition; but, have educational innovation and diversification occurred in 
Detroit? 
 
Christopher Lubienski and Jin Lee investigated this question in order to understand how 
schools in the metropolitan Detroit area were engaging with the market and whether competition 
incentivized the creation of diverse educational options.101 Using the goals stated in charter 
school mission statements, they found a “notable level of isomorphism in charter school mission 
statements, indicating a tendency to replicate rather than innovate.”102 70 percent of the mission 
statements focused on “accelerating academic achievement through rigorous core curricula” by 
using words such as: “measurable results” and “core curriculum.”103 Rarely, however, did they 
contain language regarding themes such as: the environment, attitude, lifelong learning, 
diversity, leadership, social skills, and citizenship.104 Generic and homogenous mission 
statements may have serious impacts on how parental choice functions, as Lubienski and Lee 
discuss, “uniform and standardized charter school mission statements inhibit different learners 
and populations from choosing an appropriate charter school.”105 This study indicates that PSAs 
in Detroit and the metropolitan area are providing plenty of choices, but these choices seem to 
lack diversity and innovation, at least in the ways they market themselves.  
 
 




The market theory views exit as an important feature, rather than a flaw, of education 
markets. When schools open and close, students move between them in search of a better option, 
increasing student mobility. For some parents, school closings can disrupt lives and leave them 
searching for a suitable option; Erin Einhorn of The Atlantic tells the story of one Detroit mother: 
The closure of that school kicked off a decade of bouncing her five children 
around to a motley mix of public, charter, and parochial schools that, one by one, 
disappointed Wilson and her kids. One school was too violent, Wilson said. 
Another had five principals in four years. One charter school changed 
management companies in the middle of the school year. Every year, she drives a 
different route, taking kids to different schools, while watching as schools in her 
own neighborhood have emptied out and become vacant and derelict.106 
 
While this piece of anecdotal evidence might not indicate how widespread student 
mobility – or the rate at which students change schools – but evidence demonstrates this 
                                                     
101 Christopher Lubienski and Jin Lee, “Competitive Incentives and the Education Market: How Charter 
Schools Define Themselves in Metropolitan Detroit,” Peabody Journal of Education 91, no. 1 (2016): 
64–80, doi:10.1080/0161956X.2016.1119582., 65-66. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 72. 
104 Ibid., 73. 
105 Ibid., 76. 
106 Einhorn, “The Extreme Sacrifice Detroit Parents Make to Access Better Schools.” 
 70 
mothers’ experience may not be so unique. A 2014 study conducted by Liyang Mao and Bettie 
Landauer-Menchik found that Detroit’s students – in both DPS and PSAs – change schools 
significantly more often compared to students in other Michigan districts.107 They used 
individual student data to track students from 2008 through 2012-13, following elementary, 
middle school, and high school students. The percentage of Detroit’s students who have attended 
more than one school (i.e., the mobility rate) is 48 percent for elementary school students, 42 
percent for middle school students, and 48 percent for high school students.108 These mobility 
rates are much higher than the statewide average of 21 percent.109 Across all grade levels, only 
51 percent of PSA students and 57 percent of DPS students have remained in the same district 
for their schooling in elementary, middle, and high school, while the statewide average is much 
higher, at 79 percent.110  
 
High mobility correlates with poor student achievement in both DPS and PSAs.111  
Mobile students – those who have changed schools more than once – perform less well on state 
achievement tests.112 Additionally, moving schools is very taxing on students because they must 
adjust psychologically, socially, and academically.113 Changing schools often means that 
students lose the relationships they’ve had with peers, teachers, and school administrators. 
Continuity in relationships is important for personal and academic development – something that 
many students may lack due to the high amount of disruption students face. The high mobility in 
Detroit is likely associated with the lack of informed choice in Detroit, little information 
provided by PSAs to differentiate themselves from one another, and the constant flux in the 




Originally, one of the main tenets of the charter school idea was to reduce bureaucratic 
restrictions on teachers by granting them a high degree of professional autonomy.114 As 
previously discussed, charter school boards are largely powerless in some PSAs that are 
controlled by EMOs and some PSAs are reported to give little autonomy to teachers. In addition, 
across the U.S., there is evidence of high teacher turnover in charter schools. In fact, one of the 
main reasons teachers change schools or leave the profession altogether is dissatisfaction with 
working conditions.115 Teacher turnover is found to have negative impacts on student learning 
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and creates a cycle of inexperienced teachers who are unlikely to continue in the profession.116 
Classrooms that undergo a teacher change during the year or rely on long-term substitute 
teachers may be harmful to students with special needs and learning disabilities who may 
perform better when stable and meaningful relationships are formed with their educators. 
Essentially, an environment in constant flux – of schools, teachers, and students – is not 
conducive to stable relationships between teachers and their students. 
 
 The National Center on School Choice examined teacher turnover in charter schools and 
TPSs and found that the rate at which teachers leave the teaching profession and move between 
schools is significantly higher in charter schools compared to TPSs.117 New start-up charter 
schools were found to experience more teacher attrition and mobility than those converted from 
TPSs.118 In 1987-88, most U.S. teachers had fifteen years of experience. Two decades later, most 
teachers have had one year of experience.119 Yet, in Michigan, teacher turnover appears to be a 
problem across both types of schools – PSAs and TPSs, but affects low-income students much 
more than high-income students. Bridge Magazine found that low-income schools were “more 
than twice as likely to have inexperienced teachers than wealthy, suburban schools.”120 PSAs are 
also found to be more likely to employ young and transitory teachers. And, since Michigan’s 
PSAs are concentrated in high-poverty communities, like Detroit, Michigan’s poorest students 
are more likely to be educated by young and inexperienced teachers.  
 
In Detroit, many PSAs have suffered from high teacher turnover and inexperienced 
teachers. Allen Academy, a PSA in Detroit, was reported to have a teacher turnover rate of 70 
percent due to a change in EMOs in 2015; in addition, the school had ten full-time substitutes 
teaching at the school.121 Lack of teacher experience and high teacher turnover plagued Detroit 
Community Schools, a charter school located in the Brightmoor neighborhood.122 While the 
uncertified administrators of the school received six-figure salaries, only 6.1 percent of the 
students were proficient in math and English language arts and teachers received modest pay.123  
 
Some trends in charter schools – such as, higher funding allocations to administration 
rather than instruction, profit-incentives, and the fact that young and inexperienced teachers are 
cheaper to employ – suggest that aspects of the charter industry may not be helping this problem. 
The high numbers of school openings and closings every year surely accelerate teacher turnover 
and student mobility, creating an environment where classrooms may be filled with a different 
student composition month-to-month. This kind of environment places incredible obstacles in 
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front of educators, while the cyclic nature of teacher turnover places low-income students 
frequently under the instruction of unexperienced teachers; neither of these factors are conducive 
to quality learning experiences. Thus, high student and teacher mobility make for an obviously 
unstable education market.  
 
 
Performance in Detroit: Examining Student Outcomes Twenty Years Later 
 
The education market has been described as one with “lots of choice” but “no good 
choice.”124 Parents have experienced many barriers when exercising choice; this is especially the 
case for students with special needs and disabilities. These barriers may be due to the complexity 
of Detroit’s fragmented education system, confusing paperwork, and lack of accessibility in 
terms of location and transportation. But what information do we have about the quality of 
choices available? Unfortunately, this question cannot be fully answered because school quality 
is multi-faceted and complex. One way to analyze the choices available is through student 
performance on standardized test scores. It should be recognized that test scores do not measure 
many aspects of education that are important. Standardized tests are not, by any means, a 
definitive measure of instructional or school quality.125 For instance, schools struggling on 
standardized tests may be offering unique services to students with disabilities or bilingual 
students. Nevertheless, standardized tests are a quantitative measure that can be used to compare 
the performance of different populations over time and understand how policies might influence 
student achievement.  
 
In addition, standardized test scores are extremely important to the State of Michigan, 
especially after the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and the “extreme testing culture of 
the 2000s” where schools were required to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) on state-
administered standardized tests or face punishment.126 The importance of performance on 
standardized tests is highlighted in the state’s takeover of the lowest performing schools, all of 
which were DPS schools. To this day, the state still takes performance seriously; recently, the 
state reform office (SRO) has threatened to shut down schools in ranked in the lowest 5 percent 
of schools statewide, twenty-five of which are in Detroit.127  
 
Prior to comparing the performance of students attending PSAs and DPS, the current 
literature is reviewed. Two studies related to performance in Detroit’s PSAs and DPS are 
discussed. The first, Stanford’s CREDO study, focuses on comparing the learning gains of 
students in traditional public schools and charter schools. The second, Liyang Mao and 
Landauer-Menchik’s Top-to-Bottom assessment of PSAs, DPS, and the EAA compares the 
performance of Detroit’s schools compared to statewide rankings. Lastly, using grade four 
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reading scores on the MEAP from 2002-03 to 2013-14, the performance of different education 
providers – DPS, PSAs, and the EAA – is analyzed.  
 
The following aspects of Detroit’s education market are explored: the performance gap 
between Detroit’s students and students statewide; the performance of PSAs compared to other 
market options; and the for-profit industry in Detroit.  In all cases, comparisons made between 
DPS and PSA students are limited by the fact that charter schools are not assigned students and 
may use informal methods to sort their student populations.128 No doubt, DPS and TPS alike 
serve high proportions of socioeconomically disadvantaged students; but, sorting may still occur 
through informal processes such as location, transportation, and recruiting methods. This 
analysis is not framed by the charter versus traditional public school debate; instead, it looks at 
all Detroit’s students and education providers and asks the question: are all students being 
served?  Competition was meant to improve outcomes for all students. If some students are left 
behind – regardless of the education provider – then, the education market has failed.   
 
Growth in Detroit’s Schools 
 
Stanford University’s Center for Research on Educational Outcomes (CREDO) has 
published many charter school studies since 2009 examining charter schools at national, state, 
and regional levels. The 2013 CREDO study, “Charter School Performance in Michigan,” 
examines the growth of Michigan’s charter school students from 2005-06 to 2010-11. First, the 
study looks at the results in terms of the “academic progress that a typical charter school student 
in Michigan would realize from a year of enrollment in a charter school.”129 Second, the study 
compared charter school performance to the local traditional public school (TPS) alternative, 
namely Detroit Public Schools (DPS). The 2013 study concluded that “[c]ompared to the 
educational gains that charter students would have had in a traditional public school (TPS), . . . 
on average, students in Michigan charter schools make larger educational gains in reading in 
mathematics.130  
 
A closer look at the report reveals interesting results on the improvements of different 
students based on demographics in Detroit. Black students in Detroit charter schools are 
demonstrating “significantly larger growth” compared to Black students in TPSs.131 
Nevertheless, racial disparities remain with the report adding that Black students, regardless of 
attendance at a charter or TPS school show smaller gains in reading and math compared to White 
students in TPSs.132 The result was similar for students in poverty, who make up 78 percent of 
Detroit’s charter school population. Students in poverty enrolled in charter schools made 
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significant learning gains compared to those attending TPSs, although this result is less 
impressive when compared to the statewide results; students in poverty were found to grow at a 
rate “significantly worse than their non-poverty peers statewide.”133 Special education students in 
PSAs were also found to progress significantly less than those attending TPS.134 This may be one 
of factors explaining the disparity between DPS and PSAs in terms of special education 
enrollment. The CREDO report provides evidence that, regardless of the school attended, Black 
students and students in poverty are growing at rates significantly worse than their White and 
non-poor peers statewide. This is one reason why debates framed between PSAs and DPS are 
unhelpful when assessing Detroit’s education market. As it turns out, disadvantaged students and 
students of color are ill-served by both providers of schools.  
 
Despite the dismal results for impoverished, Black, and special education students, the 
CREDO study has been met with some praise. Dan Quisenberry, president of a charter advocacy 
group - the Michigan Association of Public School Academies (MAPSA) – commented on the 
study, stating the survey provides evidence “that charter schools are working” and that “[o]n 
average, these charters are providing quality choices.”135 An editorial published on the Detroit 
News cited the 2015 urban charter school study, arguing that “overall, the charter sector is 
making a real contribution.”136 While many charter advocacy groups praise the CREDO study as 
sign of success, the study has come under attack for the methods used, since improvement on test 
scores as calculated learning gains is used instead of proficiency rates.137 Some charge that the 
CREDO results – that roughly half of the charters in Detroit are performing better than DPS – 
                                                     
133 Ibid., 39. 
134 Ibid., 41. 
135 Lori Higgins, “Detroit Charter Schools Show Gains, but Lag Behind State,” Detroit Free Press, March 
26, 2015. http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/03/25/detroit-charters-credo-
research-improving-better/70467120/ 
136 “Editorial: Charter Schools Aren’t a Big Joke,” The Detroit News, August 30, 2016. 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/08/30/editorial-charter-schools-big-
joke/89572522/ 
The 2015 urban charter school study by CREDO included findings similar to those found in their study of 
Michigan and other states. 
137 Higgins, “Detroit Charter Schools Show Gains, but Lag Behind State.” 
Given controversy over the CREDO study, it’s important to acknowledge these criticisms. The CREDO 
studies use a virtual control record (VCR), which matches each charter student to seven TPS students 
based on prior test scores and student demographics.137 The VCR method has been criticized by Caroline 
Hoxby, a Professor of Economics at Stanford focused on issues in education. Hoxby argues that the 
achievement of charter students is measured with much more error than the achievement of controls 
(group averages of TPS students). In his review of the 2015 Urban Charter School Study, Andrew Maul 
critiques CREDO’s methods as well. Maul charged that the VCR method is not well documented or 
justified. Further, he argued that the methods used involved “systematic exclusion of many lower-scoring 
students.” Maul also points to the CREDO findings expressed in terms of “growth,” which are estimated 
using “average year-to-year gains on state standardized tests” are translated into “days of learning.” This 
procedure, he argues, is not explained and, thus, “cannot be regarded as credible.”137  Andrea Gabor, a 
Bloomberg Professor of Business Journalism at Baruch College, voiced a similar criticism, claiming that 
the CREDO study includes high quality charter schools while excluding high quality traditional public 
schools. 
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are not an indicator of the success of charter schools given the “very low bar” set by DPS.138 In 
fact, DPS has been ranked the lowest among large-city districts in both math and reading on the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) for four consecutive assessments, ranging 
from 2009 to 2015.139 
 
 Additionally, The Education Trust-Midwest, an education policy and advocacy 
organization, argued that measures of school performance shouldn’t focus too much on growth: 
While growth is important and should be considered, ultimately children are held 
accountable for their overall achievement in society. College admissions, 
scholarship committees, employers and others make decisions based on whether a 
young person performs – not simply if he or she has grown in learning.140 
 
On the one hand, growth reveals the progress students have made and this is important. On the 
other hand, the creation of a market-based education system was intended to raise the 
performance of all students in Detroit, since they were far behind the state (and nation). Even on 
measures of growth, students of color and students in poverty remain far behind students 
statewide. This indicates that both types of schools are doing little to close the achievement gap 




 Another way to measure performance is using state Top-to-Bottom (TTB) School 
Rankings, one of Michigan’s accountability systems that ranks schools on student performance 
in math, English Language Arts, science, and social studies.141 Schools are ranked based on 
“performance components of student achievement and student improvement.”142 The TTB 
system accounts, then, for both measures: growth and achievement. In their study of student 
mobility, Liyang Mao and Landauer-Menchik found that most of the schools Detroit students 
                                                     
138 Robin Lake, Ashley Jochim, and Michael DeArmond, “Fixing Detroit’s Broken School System: 
Improve Accountability and Oversight for District and Charter Schools,” Education Next (2015), 23, 
http://educationnext.org/fixing-detroits-broken-school-system/.  
The 2013 CREDO study also compares Detroit PSAs to their local markets (i.e., traditional public school 
market). They found that the majority (52 percent) of PSAs show no significant differences in reading 
performance compared to their local markets. 47 percent of PSAs were found to perform significantly 
better than the TPS market. The report does not document the criteria used for selecting schools as part of 
the “local market” and, for this reason, is not included in this discussion.  
139 Shawn D. Lewis, “Detroit Worst in Math, Reading Scores Among Big Cities,” Detroit News, 2016, 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2015/10/28/national-assessment-educational-
progress-detroit-math-reading-results/74718372/ 
The NAEP was administered in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. Each time DPS has performed lower than 
other large cities. 
140 Sunil Joy and Amber Arellano, “Accountability for All: 2016, The Broken Promise of Michigan’s 
Charter Sector,” (Royal Oak, MI: The Education Trust Midwest, 2016), 9, http://midwest.edtrust.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2013/10/The-Education-Trust- Midwest_Accountability-for-All-2016_February-
11-2016.pdf. 




attended were in the bottom 50 percent of the state’s Top-to-Bottom School Rankings in 2012.143 
The percentages of students attending schools in the bottom 50 percent of schools is 71 percent 
for DPS students and 72 percent for PSA students.144 In this manner, PSAs and DPS seem to be 
somewhat on par with each other since a significant percentage of charter school and DPS 
students are attending schools that perform worse than half of schools statewide. Yet, there is an 
incredibly large disparity between the number of students attending PSAs and DPS schools in the 
fifth percentile of schools statewide; 40 percent of Detroit’s students (20,508 students) attended a 
DPS school ranked in the fifth percentile compared to 8 percent of PSA students (3,856 
students).  
 
Based on performance, students attending schools in the EAA are attending some of the 
worst schools in the state. In fact, 93 percent of Detroit’s students enrolled in an EAA school are 
attending a school ranked in the fifth percentile of school statewide. The rest, or 7 percent of 
Detroit’s students enrolled in the EAA are attending a school in the twenty-fifth percentile of 
schools.145 EAA students seem to be faring far worse than the rest of Detroit’s students. Yet, 
options appear to be restricted to lower-performing schools, even for students leaving DPS for 
other TPS districts, options appear to be limited to lower-performing schools; 55 percent of 
Detroit’s students attending TPSs outside Detroit attend a school in the bottom 50 percent of 
school statewide; and, the other 45 percent of students attend schools that are unranked.146 Thus, 




Performance in Detroit: PSAs, DPS, and the EAA 
 
 These analyses clearly demonstrate that high-performing schools are in short supply both 
inside and outside Detroit. Is competition driving all schools in the market to perform better? Are 
poor-performing schools being pushed out of the market due to low enrollment or low 
performance? Do for-profit EMOs manage high-performing PSAs? In order to answer these 
questions, I rely on grade four reading proficiencies for Detroit PSAs and DPS.147 Research 
shows that reading level by the end of third grade is extremely important for future academic 
success. As the saying goes, prior to and during third grade students are “learning to read” and 
after students are “reading to learn.”148 Subsequently, students reading below grade level by 
third grade face greater risks for reading difficulties later in their academic careers.149 This has 
                                                     
143 Liyang Mao and Landauer-Menchik, “Mobility in Detroit’s Charter Schools,” Michigan State 





147 The MEAP tests students based on the previous years’ content and skills, so fourth graders are 
assessed based on content and skills they should have mastered in third grade.  
148 Joy Lesnick et al., “Reading on Grade Level in Third Grade: How Is It Related to High School 
Performance and College Enrollment?” (Chicago, IL, 2010), 1, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.715.5162&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
149 Ibid., 5.  
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been described as “double jeopardy” for students in poverty; poor children who are not proficient 
in reading in third grade are six times more likely to drop out of high school than all proficient 
readers.150 How Detroit’s education market is serving its grade four students in each year may be 
an indicator of how well (or poorly) these students will perform in later years. Hence, the 
question: are Detroit’s schools setting students up for long-term academic success?  
 
The Performance Gap Between Detroit Students and Michigan Students 
 
 Looking at performance over the years, from 2002-03 to 2006-07 and 2007-08 to 2013-
14, Detroit PSAs and DPS are showing slight improvements, although there is a large 
performance gap between Detroit’s students – attending PSAs and DPS – and students 
statewide.151 Figures 6 and 7 show student performance (in terms of the percent of grade four 
students proficient in reading) for both time periods. In 2002-03 to 2006-07, PSAs remained 
slightly below DPS students and begin to catch up during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school year. 
Both groups of students remain far below students statewide. In 2007-08 to 2013-14, PSA 
students rise slightly above DPS students, but remain roughly on par with each other.  
 















                                                     
150 Donald J. Hernandez, “Double Jeopardy: How Reading Skills and Poverty Influence High School 
Graduation,” Annie E. Casey Foundation (2011), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED518818. 
151 These periods – 2002-03 to 2006-07 and 2007-08 to 2013-14 – cannot be compared in terms of percent 
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Figure 7. Grade Four Reading Proficiency, 2007-08 to 2013-14 
 
 
Some may view the slight increase in performance in Figures 6 and 7 as improvement in 
DPS and PSAs. However, relative to students statewide, Detroit’s students are not improving and 
remain far behind. Between 2002-03 and 2006-07, the average proficiency gap between all 
Detroit’s students – including those in DPS, PSAs, and the EAA – and students statewide was 
17.4 percentage points.152 During this time, there was significant improvement in the proficiency 
gap; it decreased from 20.6 percentage points to 14.4 percentage points. A different trend 
appears in 2007-08 to 2013-14. The average performance gap was 27.2 percentage points. In 
2007-08, the proficiency gap was 29.7; this gap is reduced by about 6 percentage by 2011-12, 
but it increased again to 28.3 percentage points by 2013-14.153 Overall, there is little evidence to 
demonstrate that the introduction of competition and choice led to a substantial improvement 
(i.e., decrease) in the performance gap between Detroit students and students statewide. In fact, 
grade four students in DPS, PSAs and the EAA remain far behind; this may have very serious 
and harmful consequences for their future academic success. If Detroit’s education market leaves 
students behind as early as the fourth grade how are they to catch up later?154  
 
Dominance of Low-Performing Schools 
 
Given the overall low performance of all students in DPS and PSAs, is there any 
evidence demonstrating that the market is weeding out low-performing schools, whether via 
school closures or parental choice? The previous section looks at the Detroit PSA student 
population in terms of the percent of students proficient in reading in grade four. But, how are 
PSAs (schools) doing relative to each other, DPS, and students statewide? Trying to answer this 
question provides insight into whether competition drives low-performing PSAs out of the 
                                                     
152 See Appendix B, Table 10: Proficiency Gap Between Detroit’s Students and Students Statewide, 2002-
03 to 2006-07.  
153 Ibid. 
154 My discussion of the performance gap is analyzing inequality in outcomes. While I do not endorse an 
equality standard, I argue that this large of a disparity between Detroit’s students and students statewide 
early on (in fourth grade when critical and basic reading skills must be mastered for future academic 
success) may fail to bring them to a level of competitiveness that is necessary to join the elite. Thus, this 
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market.155 In order to remain open, PSAs rely on student enrollment (i.e., per-pupil foundation 
allowance) and oversight by their authorizer, although there is plenty of evidence that authorizers 




One way to view the highest performing PSAs in Detroit is to compare all Detroit PSAs 
to students statewide. Given that most PSA and DPS students are out-performed by the state, 
schools with proficiency levels above that of the state could be considered high-performers. To 
get a better picture of the highest and lowest performing PSAs, PSA (school) proficiencies were 
compared with students statewide to see how many PSAs were performing above, within five 
percent of, and below students statewide. Figures 8 and 9 show the results. For each year in both 
periods, the number of schools performing below students statewide makes up an overwhelming 
majority of the market. For 2002-03 to 2006-07, PSAs performing below students statewide, on 
average, made up 79.2 percent of the PSA market. For 2007-08 to 2013-14, PSAs performing 
below students statewide, on average, made up 89.9 percent of the market. 
 
But, from 2002-03 to 2006-07 there is some improvement in the proportion of schools 
performing above, within 5 percent of, and below students statewide. By 2006-07, the number 
and percent of schools performing above or within 5 percent of students statewide increased 
from five schools (16.1 percent) to eight schools (24.2 percent); the number and percentage of 
schools performing below students statewide decreased from twenty-five schools (80.6 percent) 
to twenty-three schools (69.7 percent), a small but, perhaps, significant improvement.  On the 
other hand, a different trend appears in 2007-08 to 2013-14; the number of high-performing 
PSAs – those performing above or within five percent of students statewide – does not increase 
over time. As shown in Figure 9, the number of PSAs in the market increases over time, but the 
number of high-performing PSAs (those performing above students statewide) does not increase. 
Even worse, the percent of high-performing PSAs decreases from 5.9 percent to 0.0%. Market 
theory predicts an increase in the number and percentage of high-performing schools in the 
market. Instead, the data shows a decrease. Detroit’s PSA sector, which is dominated by low-
performing schools, shows trends indicating that the market theory is not working as theorized, 











                                                     
155 Individual DPS school data is not provided in this analysis because DPS schools are not operating in 
the same manner as PSAs in terms of school closings. DPS schools have been closed under emergency 
management and mayoral takeover – here, a wholly different dynamic is in place that is beyond the scope 
of this work.  
156 See Chapter IV for a discussion of accountability and Michigan’s charter school law. 
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Figure 8. Comparing Detroit’s PSAs to Students Statewide, Grade Four Reading Proficiency 
 
 
Figure 9. Comparing Detroit’s PSAs to Students Statewide, Grade Four Reading Proficiency 
 
 
A Look at the Lowest Performing PSAs in Detroit 
 
For each year between 2002-03 and 2013-14, all PSAs serving grade four students were split 
into percentiles to identify PSAs performing in the 25th percentile or lower (compared to other 
PSAs in Detroit). All PSAs in the first quartile performed well below DPS (district) every year. 
The lowest performing PSAs (those in the 25th percentile) were tracked across this period to 
answer the following questions:  
1. On average, how many years had these schools been in operation?  
2. How many PSAs remained in the 25th percentile or lower for more than one year? 
3. How many PSAs performing in the 25th percentile for more than three consecutive 
years closed?157  
                                                     
157 Three years was picked as a cut-off because the SRO tracks schools remaining in the bottom five 
percent. Schools in the bottom percent of schools statewide face potential closure after three years. 
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It’s important to ask how long schools in the 25th percentile had been in operation 
because newly-opened PSAs may need some time to adjust. If newly-opened PSAs 
predominantly comprise the first quartile of schools, then this might suggest that PSAs need time 
to improve. If not, this might suggest that low-performing schools are remaining in operation; 
that is, if the first quartile of schools are predominantly composed of schools that have long been 
in operation, this might suggest that low-performing schools are not closing, going against the 
market theory. For 2002-03 to 2006-07, on average, schools in the first quartile were in operation 
for about five years.158 Some of the lowest performing PSAs were as open for as long as nine 
years during this period. Additionally, for each year, only one or two schools (out of about ten) 
were in their first or second year of operation; this suggests that the lowest-performing schools 
are not newly-opened schools, but schools that have been in operation for about five years. For 
2007-08 to 2013-14, on average, schools in the first quartile were in operation for about eight 
years. Some of the lowest performing PSAs were open as long as 18 years. On average, the 
number of newly-opened districts in the first quartile was about two per year. However, in 2011-
12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 there were higher numbers of newly-opened PSAs in the first quartile. 
At the same time, some of the PSAs remaining in the market had been open for up to fourteen to 
eighteen years.  
 
 Out of all the schools ranked in the first quartile of PSAs, only sixteen schools appeared 
once, while twenty-six schools appeared in the first quartile more than once over twelve years. 
The twenty-six PSAs performing in the first quartile more than once were tracked from 2002-03 
to 2013-14 to find the number of schools performing in the first quartile for consecutive years. 
The majority (17 schools, 65.3 percent) of schools appeared in the first quartile more than three 
times in the twelve-year span; only three of these schools closed during 2013-14. Additional 
findings are highlighted below:159  
I. Five schools remained in the first quartile for more than five consecutive years; none of 
these schools were closed during the period in which they were tracked. All five schools 
remaining in the first quartile for five consecutive years had been in operation for at least 
fifteen years by the end of 2013-14; only one of these schools was recently closed in 
2016. 
II. On average these schools remained in operation for almost twelve years (11.7) before 
2013-14 or before closing.  
III. Five schools performed in the first quartile for more than seven years (total), four of these 
remained in the first quartile for more than seven consecutive years. Only one of these 
closed.  
                                                     
January 20, 2017, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/01/20/michigan-
schools/96830684/. 
158 See Appendix B, Table 12: Years in Operation: Detroit’s Lowest Performing Public School Academies 
(PSAs) 
159 See Appendix B, Table 12: Years in Operation: Detroit’s Lowest Performing Public School Academies 
(PSAs). Also, see Appendix C, Table 16: Detroit Public School Academies in the 25th Percentile or Lower 
for More than One Year, 2002-03 to 2013-14. 
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IV. Eighteen (69.2 percent) of the schools were managed by for-profit EMOs; two (7.7 
percent) were managed by non-profit EMOs; three (11.5 percent) were self-managed.160 
 
These findings suggest that low-performing PSAs (all of which perform below the state and 
DPS) are remaining in operation for many years. As aforementioned, authorizers have come 
under attack for the lack of oversight on their charters; evidence here demonstrates that 
authorizers are providing little oversight of low-performing PSAs, especially those who have 
performed in the first quartile (compared to other Detroit PSAs, most of which perform far below 
the state) for more than three years.  
 
The For-Profit Charter School Industry in Detroit 
 
Schools managed by for-profit EMOs make up a large percentage of Detroit’s education 
market. From 2002-03 to 2013-14, on average, the percent of PSAs serving grade four students 
managed by for-profit EMOs is 64.0 percent.161 Figure 10 shows the percent of schools 
according to management type: self-managed (no EMO), non-profit EMO, or for-profit EMO. 
As shown: the percent of PSAs managed by non-profit EMOs increases; the percent of self-
managing PSAs significantly decreases; and, the percent of PSAs managed by for-profit EMOs 
slightly decreases, but still remains the predominant management type. The decrease in self-
managed PSAs may be a function of the intense competition in the market and the financial 
restrictions that bar many independent groups from opening charters.162  
 




For-profit EMOs have set up shop in Detroit, but has the industry improved outcomes? Do 
profits incentivize EMOs to raise test scores as cheaply as possible while cutting a profit for 
themselves? In Detroit, there is little evidence to show that profits have incentivized EMOs to 
raise student performance. As discussed in Chapter IV, there is plenty of self-dealing, scandals, 
                                                     
160 Three schools were managed by EMOs that could not be classified as for-profit or non-profit due to 
insufficient information.  
161 See Appendix C, Table 13: Detroit Public School Academies (PSA) by Management Type (Grade 
Four), 2002-03 to 2013-14. 






































and high rent charging in PSAs; these problems have not come to light through state oversight, 
but rather through investigative journalism, predominantly by the Detroit Free Press. Overall, 
there has been little achievement in the education market overall, despite the influx of for-profit 
management companies. 
 
Is the For-Profit Sector Making a (Positive) Contribution? 
  
To determine whether the drive for profits incentivizes PSAs to increase performance, the 
highest- and lowest-performing PSAs were categorized by management type to identify trends. 
Naturally, as predicted by market theory, PSAs run for profit should show better performance 
than other PSAs in the market; some advocates argued that allowing schools to compete for 
profits would increase the performance and the efficiency with which educational services are 
provided. However, this analysis shows that this connection is weak and what follows is a data 
presentation of PSA performance. In this analysis, PSAs are split into quartiles of the highest and 
lowest PSAs (relative to other Detroit PSAs). Then, PSAs within the 25th (lowest performing) 
and 75th (highest performing) percentiles were classified as for-profit, non-profit, or self-
managed to discern any differences in the representation of for-profits in the lowest and highest 
performing PSAs compared to their representation in the overall market.  
 
If the profit-incentive was working to increase the performance of for-profit PSAs, we would 
expect that, compared to their overall representation in the market, there is a higher percentage of 
for-profit PSAs in the 75th percentile. Similarly, we would expect that, compared to their overall 
representation in the market, there is a lower percentage of for-profit PSAs in the 25th percentile. 
In Detroit’s education market this is not the case. Compared to the overall representation of for-
profit PSAs in the market there is a higher representation of for-profit PSAs among the lowest 
performing PSAs; in eight of the twelve years, the percent of for-profit EMOs performing in the 
25th percentile was greater than the percent of for-profit PSAs overall.163 Similarly, compared to 
the overall representation of for-profit PSAs, there is a lower representation of for-profit PSAs 
among the highest performing PSAs; in nine of the twelve years, the percent of for-profit PSAs 
performing in the 75th percentile was less than the percent of for-profit PSAs overall.164 
 
Yet, what are the odds that for-profit PSAs are overrepresented in the 25th percentile or 
underrepresented in the 75th percentile for most of the twelve-year span? If such an occurrence 
were purely random, then for-profit PSAs would likely be distributed among the highest and 
lowest performing PSAs proportionately. For instance, if 75 percent of the PSAs in the overall 
market are for-profit, it is highly likely that about 75 percent of the PSAs in the 75th and 25th 
percentiles would be for-profit PSAs. To test whether the overrepresentation and 
underrepresentation in the 25th and 75th percentiles is random, the probability of seeing 
frequencies over many years was calculated. This can be thought of as a coin-flip, where there is 
a 50 percent chance of the coin landing heads or tails up.165 Imagine flipping a coin twelve times; 
                                                     
163 See Appendix C, Table 14: Highest Performing PSAs in Detroit by Management Type, 2002-03 to 
2013-14 
164 See Appendix C, Table 15: Lowest Performing PSAs in Detroit by Management Type, 2002-03 to 
2013-14 
165 John Walker, “Introduction to Probability and Statistics,” Fourmilab, accessed April 14, 2017, 
https://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/experiments/statistics.html. 
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with each flip, it is entirely random whether the coin lands on heads or tails. But, it is unlikely 
that the coin will land on heads many more than six times (out of twelve); as such, there is an 
even smaller likelihood of the coin landing on heads eight times, and so on.  
 
Over twelve years, what is the probability of for-profit PSAs being underrepresented in the 
75th percentile for nine years and overrepresented in the 25th percentile for eight years? These 
probabilities were calculated by using the following formula, where x is the number of years in 
which PSAs were overrepresented or underrepresented (eight or nine, respectively) and n is the 
total number of years:166 
 
The probability that the frequent underrepresentation of for-profit PSAs is random is low, at 5.3 
percent. The probability that the frequent overrepresentation of for-profit PSAs is random is also 
low, at 12.1 percent. These results indicate that it is unlikely that for-profits are randomly 
underperforming. If anything, for-profit PSAs are certainly not over performing. This goes to 
show that the profit-incentive has little influence on the performance of PSAs in Detroit. 
                                                     
166 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VI:  LEARNING FROM DETROIT’S EDUCATION MARKET 
 




Competition was supposed to help all Detroit’s students obtain access to quality schools. 
Instead, it exacerbated chaos for everyone involved, while allowing many outside EMOs to enter 
the market, reap profits, and make lucrative deals, all the while Detroit’s students remain far 
behind students statewide. By definition, charter schools were supposed to be held to higher 
standards due to the academic, fiscal, and governing autonomy they are given. Indeed, that was 
the point of being chartered in the first place, as Miron describes it as a “bargain”: charters 
receive autonomy in return for performance and innovation.1 Clearly, the charter schools in 
Detroit are not being held accountable for performance and show little innovation with regard to 
learning and school organization; yet, we do see innovation and high spending in rapacious 
marketing practices, which is unlikely to (and has not) improved student outcomes. In what 
follows I describe the lessons learned from twenty years of competition, parental choice, charter 
schools, and state control, and how these features and outcomes create a dysfunctional education 
system that systematically leaves Detroit’s students behind, especially the most vulnerable. 
 
Parental choice has produced the outcomes theorized by Chubb and Moe, Friedman, and 
Governor Engler. Originally, choice was supposed to improve the overall market, whether in 
terms of performance, quality, or parental satisfaction; the use of parental choice over two 
decades demonstrates that the intended results have not been achieved. In terms of the utility of 
choice, no exact measure can be taken of the harm and good it has achieved for Detroit’s 
students, but a large body of evidence on student mobility suggests it has created more disruption 
than improved results. Detroit parents face many barriers to exercising informed and meaningful 
choice: lack of information on charter schools, inaccessibility due to locational patterns and 
transportation, and lack of services for special education students. Given the influx of charter 
schools (increasing supply) and the high unmet demand in Detroit, parental choice seems 
relatively powerless in enacting positive change in Detroit’s education system with regard to 
location disparities, transportation gaps, and the lack of special education services. Instead, 
authorizers located outside Detroit – some as far as four-hundred miles away – have greater 
voice and authority in the provision, management, and oversight of schools.  
 
On the other hand, choice has been extremely powerful in enacting destructive change 
due to what Hammer labels, the “zero-sum game incentives of Proposal A.”2 When a large 
number of parents exercise choice in the local education market – alongside population decline – 
the effect on traditional public school systems like Detroit Public Schools is powerful and 
destructive.3 The massive exodus from Detroit Public Schools – alongside population decline – 
                                                     
1 Gary Miron and Christopher Nelson, What’s Public About Charter Schools? Lessons Learned About 
Choice and Accountability (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2002), 3. 
2 Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools,” 145.   
3 Ibid.  
As aforementioned, the fiscal pressures created by competition and choice have been well-documented by 
Hammer (2011), Arsen and Ni (2012), and the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (2016).  
 86 
demonstrates the power of parental choice as reflected in its falling enrollments and, thus, 
decreasing revenues and remaining fixed costs. The exacerbation of fiscal stress in DPS 
undoubtedly harms its remaining students; hence, parental choice and Proposal A make for a 
zero-sum game in Detroit. With each student that leaves the district, the pool of revenue shrinks 
more and more while fixed costs remain essentially the same.4 This is problematic, given that a 
relatively high percentage of the students remaining in DPS are special education students; if the 
district fails to remain fiscally viable, how are these students going to receive the services they 
need? While DPS has been heavily affected by the fiscal stresses of competition, some PSAs 
may face problems soon enough if there is an oversupply of schools and substantial PSA 
enrollment decline.  
 
In terms of the supply or provision of schools, the process is vastly uncoordinated and the 
rules are not the same for DPS, PSAs, and the EAA. As discussed, many DPS schools were 
closed under emergency management; as with the closing of Oakman Elementary, we lack 
evidence that the closing process has accounted for the needs of students, enrollment patterns, 
and parental satisfaction.5 In addition, low-performing PSAs have remained in the market and 
been subject to little oversight. Charter authorizers have exercised little accountability for PSAs, 
especially those that are low-performing or involved in illegalities, self-dealing, and scandals. 
Given the unmet demand for quality and higher performing schools, how will the uncoordinated 
education market fulfill this demand? The market theory prescribes more school closings and 
openings, which would likely bring more entropy and disruption into an already-chaotic school 
system.6  
 
As for the profit-incentive, Detroit demonstrates that profits and choice are no panacea. 
There is a high representation of for-profit charter schools in the lowest-performing charter 
schools and a low representation of for-profit charter schools in the highest-performing charter 
schools, demonstrating two things. First, the profit incentive does not increase the performance 
of schools. Second, many for-profit companies are making a profit off low-performing schools 
serving disadvantaged students. Ultimately, this may be likened to scamming or taking 
advantage of impoverished and disadvantaged students and parents. EMOs may be taking 
advantage of information asymmetry and the fact that some parents may have no other accessible 
options. Even worse, the exact level of self-dealing and potential illegalities occurring in PSAs is 
unknown, since many for-profit EMOs refuse to provide information on how they spend public 
funds.7 DPS, as a public institution, must be transparent in how it spends funds and is subject to 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In contrast, since EMOs are considered “private 
                                                     
4 Ibid. 
5 See Chapter V for a discussion of the closing of Oakman Elementary. This is only one case so this does 
not imply that closings did not account for the needs of students. More investigation is needed into the 
school closings occurring under emergency management since Pedroni uncovered the unsubstantiated 
claims used to close the school. The concern is that the district may have used unsubstantiated claims to 
close other schools.  
6 We could envision a conversion of low-performing schools into different management types (self-
managed) or a transfer back into Detroit Public Schools; arguably, this could bring more quality-control 
into the system and ensure that schools are located where they are actually needed.   
7 Education researcher Gary Miron (2002, 2009, 2013) and the Detroit Free Press have had trouble 
accessing information detailing how for-profit EMOs have spent public funds.  
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companies or organizations” they are not subject to the FOIA and are not required to respond to 
requests for information.8 The use of private, for-profit EMOs raises questions about the 
publicness of PSAs that are entirely run by EMOs. 9  PSAs entirely by for-profit EMOs make it 
incredibly more difficult to obtain information compared to public institutions such as the EAA 
or DPS. How can for-profit PSAs – which often have multiple conflicts of interests between 
EMOs and the so-called “independent” charter boards – remain accountable if the public lacks 
the right to access information about the use of public money?  
 
On the other hand, public institutions such as the EAA and DPS have had their role in the 
corrupt use of funds intended for Detroit’s students. The Education Achievement Authority 
(EAA), ran by the state, has been involved in profit-seeking by deciding to try out a completely 
new software system that was developed by a for-profit corporation and marketed by another 
called “Buzz,” which has been described as a “badly flawed product being pitched as cutting-
edge technology.”10 The introduction of Buzz, however, involved multiple conflicts of interests 
and potential self-dealing between Governor Snyder, the EAA’s Chief Officer of Accountability 
Equity, and Innovation, and Agilix (the company offering Buzz).11 This conflict of interest was 
uncovered by Pedroni through the strategic use of FOIA requests. Furthermore, DPS, under 
emergency management, has also been involved in many corrupt deals as well. Many principals 
were involved in kickback schemes using fake invoices to receive money from vendors.12 In any 
case, regardless of the institution making profits off of Detroit’s students, and using public funds 
to do so, is an unjustifiable and unjust practice. 
 
Overall, is Detroit’s education market providing equitable and accessible schools for all 
students? Over the past two decades, it’s clear that the market has failed to equitably provide 
schools that are accessible. After a flood of reforms in Detroit – the introduction of charter 
schools, the establishment of the EAA, and the emergency management of DPS – the education 
market is largely dysfunctional. Tooley argues that the unpredictability of markets does not stop 
consumers from going to grocery stores or buying everyday commodities and, thus, should not 
stop us from creating markets for education. Detroit, however, throws doubt on this argument; 
student mobility, school closings, scandals, and the lack of accessible and quality schools, 
demonstrate that the unpredictability of education markets may be a very good reason to, at the 
very least, regulate markets. All Detroit’s schools must – and eventually will – face the realities 
of allocating scarce and declining resources to educate impoverished students. Given the steady 
                                                     
8 Gary Miron and Charisse Gulosino, “Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education Management 
Organizations: Fourteenth Edition 2011-2012,” (Boulder, CO: National Center for Education Policy, 
2013): 3, http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-10-11. 
9 Miron and Nelson explore this question in What’s Public About Charter Schools? Lessons Learned 
about Choice and Accountability. As they argue, PSAs in Michigan are not reflective of traditional 
understandings of public institutions. PSAs are more reflective of functionalist definitions of publicness, 
where a public school is not public by virtue of lines of authority and chains of influence, but by whether 
it performs important public functions” (195).   
10 Curt Guyette, “The EAA Exposed: An Investigative Report,” Detroit Metro Times, September 24, 
2014, http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/the-eaa-exposed-an-investigative-report/Content?oid=2249513. 
11 Ibid. 




“dismantling” of DPS, Hammer questions: “[w]ho will take responsibility when the last [Detroit] 
public school in the city is closed?”13 This raises the question of who is responsible for providing 
equitable education? Charter schools have not demonstrated the ability to serve all students. At 
this rate, it’s unlikely, and maybe impossible, that DPS alone will prop the system up. 
Responsibility for providing, managing, and regulation public education has been scattered with 
few effective safeguards in place. Thus, the question stands: who is responsible and who will 
take responsibility for providing adequate educational opportunities to Detroit’s students? 
 
Is Detroit’s Education Market Noxious? 
 
Recall Satz’ criteria for a noxious market; Satz argues that markets with the following 
outcomes and characteristics are noxious: (i) harmful outcomes for some individuals; (ii) harmful 
outcomes for society; (iii) weak agency of participants and/or asymmetric knowledge; (iv) 
vulnerable agents. In terms of conditions (i) and (ii), Detroit’s education market has produced 
harmful outcomes for Detroit’s parents and students and harmful outcomes for society. In terms 
of conditions (iii) and (iv), Detroit’s education market is characterized by very weak agency with 
regard to Detroit’s parents and students given their limited ability to make decisions in the 
market and information asymmetries. What follows is a discussion of the extent to which 
Detroit’s education market reflects these characteristics and has produced these outcomes.  
 
Harmful Outcomes for Individuals and Society  
 
Any educational system that fails to provide adequate opportunities for the most 
disadvantaged students is, in turn, undermining the ways in which individuals may relate to one 
another as equals. Education is a good that ought to be adequately provided to all students, 
regardless of race or socioeconomic status. Many African American and Hispanic students in 
Detroit have been effectively denied this prior to and after the influx of charter schools, mayoral 
control, and emergency management. Frequent school closings and openings, teacher turnover, 
high mobility rates, and the low performance of the schools demonstrate that the market has not 
been conducive to a stable and effective learning environment. As such, this produces harmful 
outcomes for Detroit’s students. Given that Detroit’s students are not afforded a good necessary 
for full participation and equal standing in society, the education market undermines the 
framework necessary for people to interact as equals. In addition, poorly-educated citizens are 
harmful to democratic governance. As Satz’ notes, education is necessary to turn students into 
“citizen[s] who can participate competently and meaningfully in democratic self-governance.” 
 If the system fails to provide students with adequate opportunities, it is unlikely that they will be 
able to join the elites of society and act as “co-deliberants and co-participants in making the laws 
that apply to themselves.”14 Thus, the inadequate distribution of educational opportunities to 




                                                     
13 Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools,” 153. 
Kang, “The Dismantling of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1980-2014.” 
14 Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale, 95. 
Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective.” 
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Weak Agency and Vulnerability 
 
Many parents have a very limited ability to exit due to transportation problems, lack of 
information about charter schools, and the highly-complex market composed of over fifty 
different school districts. Regardless of the education status of parents, it’s difficult for education 
researchers to navigate this system and understand the many different school providers available. 
In addition, the lengthy application of many charter schools and the different deadlines may be 
functioning as a barrier. For parents dealing with poverty, navigating the system is presumably 
even more difficult, given the stressors involved with poverty.15 Many parents left DPS with the 
hope that charter schools would provide better educational opportunities; but, until parents enroll 
their child in a school, they cannot find out the quality of that school.  
 
As aforementioned, the high representation of for-profit charter schools in the 25th 
percentile indicates that some charter schools might be taking advantage of the fact that: some 
parents have no other accessible school options, do not know about the low performance of the 
school, and/or do not know the charter school is managed by a for-profit company. In this 
manner, charter schools may be taking advantage of the information asymmetries and 
vulnerabilities of students and their parents.16 Here, it’s clear that parents and students desperate 
for a better school are at a much greater risk of being exploited. Indeed, some parents have 
reported that charter schools enticed them with gift cards and raffle tickets for enrolling their 
child.17 In effect, Detroit’s parents have poor information about the PSAs they may enrolling 
their child in. Furthermore, their decision-making is very limited with respect to the market, due 
to transportation gaps and the inaccessibility of schools. These conditions indicate that many 
parents have weak agency in the education market and suffer from information asymmetry. 
 
 
Regulation or Abolition? 
 
Do the dismal results of education markets in New Orleans and Detroit entail that 
markets are inherently flawed as vehicles for the provision of educational opportunities? Not 
necessarily. Market structures and outcomes may widely vary across different contexts. In 
principle markets may be great tools for advancing adequate educational opportunities to all 
students. Yet, this is where the arguments on both sides of the debate are not constructive in 
producing solutions that will end the educational injustice faced by too many children. Using 
ideal conceptions of democracy to prove that either real or ideal markets are bad fails to provide 
us with constructive solutions. Instead, we must look at real education markets and real 
democratic education systems to see what works and what doesn’t. 
 
                                                     
15 This is not to say that parents in poverty are not resourceful. To the contrary, many of the parents in 
Detroit I’ve met are very resourceful and do their best to find a quality school. The system is complicated 
and takes a while to figure out. When your child’s education is at stake, finding a good school is an urgent 
matter; many parents struggle with the school system because of the lack of information and other 
barriers.  
16 Alternatively, parents may like the school administration or the unique services offered and not place 
great emphasis on performance (measured by standardized tests).  
17 Zernike, “A Sea of Charter Schools in Detroit Leaves Students Adrift.” 
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As for real education markets, the data does not lie: those operating in segregated and 
unequal contexts demonstrate that markets are no “panacea.” Inferior educational opportunities – 
like those offered in Detroit’s and New Orleans’ education markets – fail to prepare students 
with the potential to succeed in higher education. If students are not afforded ample 
opportunities, the organization of education must be altered accordingly. This is especially the 
case for groups that have experienced historical segregation and disadvantage over time; inferior 
educational opportunities only perpetuate – and, perhaps, intensify – this disadvantage. The 
education market in Detroit demonstrates that, at a minimum, regulation is necessary for 
adequate provision of educational opportunities. At the very minimum, regulation would need to 
address the following issues: a lack of oversight on the activities of for-profit EMOs and charter 
school boards; fragmentation of governance and provision; accessibility barriers for parents; 
accountability for charter school performance; investigation into special education services in 
charter schools. More ambitious reforms might include adjusting the way schools are funding to 
protect students left in schools with falling enrollments.  
 
Revisiting Arguments for Market-Based Education 
 
Chubb and Moe’s argument for market-based education provision in Politics, Markets 
and America’s Schools was largely an abstract account of the way in which government 
provision works and failed to account for the vast socioeconomic disparities that exist across 
school districts in the United States. Chubb and Moe blamed bureaucracy – broadly defined – as 
the root of all ills in America’s education system. Yet, it’s clear that democratic control and 
bureaucracy are not the causes of ineffective, low-performing schools. Ironically enough, the 
charter school industry in Michigan is overwhelmingly composed of EMOs that do, in fact, have 
organizational structures, or bureaucracies.  
 
A Last Word on the Neoliberal Argument 
 
Recall that the neoliberal argument held that efficiency was the main justification for the 
use of markets in education. Since markets are more efficient in the delivery of services and 
commodities, they ought to be applied to education. As it turns out, “market forces” are 
complicated and depend on the rules in place and the social context in which they are applied.  
As argued in Chapter V, the way in which Detroit’s education market was structured is 
inefficient, according to a few different bottom-lines: performance, parental satisfaction, and 
directing resources to the classroom. Furthermore, the profit-incentive played little role in 
driving innovation and performance. Not only is Detroit’s education market inefficient, but it is 
largely dysfunctional due to the way it is structured.  
 
The neoliberal argument, especially, misses the fact that markets for schools are different 
from markets for apples in important ways. Switching suppliers for apples in no way imposes as 
great a cost as switching schools. Student mobility is harmful to the mobile student and students 
already enrolled; these effects are amplified in systems with high mobility rates across the 
student population. In addition, it’s easy to judge the quality of an apple, but remains vastly 
difficult and controversial to judge the quality of a school. Schools are complex and ought to 
serve many purposes, not just a single bottom line (i.e., test scores or parental satisfaction). Any 
system that seeks to achieve a single bottom line as efficiently as possible may succeed in 
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efficiency but will fail to provide important services for students with unique needs and neglect 
other important aspects of education such as physical education, social and emotion 
development, arts and music classes, and establishing relationships with teachers. It’s clear that 
neither bureaucracy nor over-regulation is the source of the problem in Detroit. In addition, 
democratic control cannot be the source of the ills in DPS during this time since DPS was under 
intense state control from 1999-2005 and 2009-2017.18 
 
A Last Word on the Libertarian Argument 
 
The libertarian argument’s justification for education markets rests on negative freedom, 
or the absence of coercion. Parental choice was meant to give parents greater control over their 
education by offering more choices in the schools their child could attend. As I have argued in 
Chapter V, parental choice does not guarantee that quality choices are accessible; many parents 
in Detroit cannot access high-performing schools to begin with. The libertarian might respond 
that, regardless of the consequences, choices have been provided to Detroit’s students. It may be 
conceded that a small proportion of Detroit’s students have obtained access to higher-performing 
schools or schools providing educational services not offered prior to the entry of charter 
schools.19 As discussed in Chapter V, there are a few high-performing charter schools, so some 
students attending these schools may be better off than they previously were. In addition, some 
mission-oriented charter schools may be providing unique, community-based education, 
although to claim that DPS has not offered unique education services in the past is false.20 While 
there are some high-performing and community-based schools, the education market is largely 
dysfunctional with regard to providing accessible options to the overwhelming majority of 
Detroit’s students. Detroit’s students have many choices, indeed, but the sheer number of choices 
fails to reflect the actual choices that are accessible to Detroit’s students. Both the accessibility 
and quality of choices matters. Parents and students do not benefit from access to a wide range of 
poor options; instead, they need access to high quality options. Hence, negative liberty, or the 
freedom to choose does not translate into meaningful and accessible choices. Furthermore, 
negative liberty is not sufficient in guaranteeing that students are afforded adequate educational 
opportunities, a consequence of which has serious implications. Focus on enlarging negative 
liberty fails to account for the fact that market structures may afford people “a minimal and 
degenerate form of freedom” or independence.21 As evidenced, parents have little control over 
the choices they have been presented with and, if trapped in an education desert, have even fewer 
choices. Poor educational opportunities are unlikely to grant students an equal status in a 
democratic society. Why set up students to fail for the sake of “freedom” or choice? 
 
                                                     
18 A publicly-elected school board regained control of Detroit Public Schools in the beginning of January 
2017.  
19 For instance, the James and Grace Lee Boggs School was founded with the help and inspiration of 
Detroit-based activists James and Grace Lee Boggs; the school’s mission is to “nurture creative, critical 
thinkers who contribute to the well-being of their communities”  
“Mission & Core Ideology,” The James and Grace Lee Boggs School, accessed April 17, 2017, 
http://www.boggsschool.org/mission-core-ideology. 
20 See Chapter II. DPS established dual-language programs and afro-centric education programs for its 
Hispanic and African American communities prior to the influx of charter schools.  
21 Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale, 26. 
 92 
The Big Picture: Education Inequity in Michigan  
 
Michigan’s “Solution” For High-Poverty Communities: Charter Schools and Choice 
 
One fact that cannot be ignored is that not all districts across Michigan have been subject 
to the chaos of market-oriented reforms. Many of Michigan’s high-performing districts are 
traditional public school districts, governed by a democratically-elected school board. Some even 
opt out of school choice. Meanwhile, charter schools have been sold as a “panacea” to low-
income communities in Michigan, including: Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, Pontiac, and Lansing. 
In fact, charter schools educate 47 percent of Flint’s students and 31 percent of Grand Rapids’ 
students; nationally, Flint ranked third and Grand Rapids ranked ninth in the nation for highest 
enrollment share.22  
 
In Detroit, the rules are not fair; Detroit’s citizens have been stripped of their right to 
democratically control their schools as a result of mayoral control, emergency management, the 
state-controlled Education Achievement Authority, and an unaccountable charter sector.23 They 
exercise little control over these institutions with few channels for redress. Further to claim that 
Detroiters “cannot manage” their schools is a falsehood, as Pedroni and Twomey explain:  
Detroiters remember that before the succession of state interventions started in 
1999 DPS had a $93 million dollar operating surplus, enrollment over 173,000, 
and academic gains. Six years of emergency management from Lansing since 
2009 has widened the performance gap between Detroit’s students and their 
Michigan counterparts; enrollment has plummeted; and the district’s operating 
deficit and long term debt have smashed all previous records24 
 
As discussed, state intervention has done little to help DPS. Charter schools haven’t helped 
either. Creating a fragmented system in the midst of population decline is a clear recipe for 
disaster. Detroiters are not to blame for such an occurrence, for they have had little say in the 
matter due to state control and little charter school accountability.  So, it stands: why do citizens 
in Grosse Pointe, Ann Arbor, Birmingham, and other affluent locales have the right to 
democratically control their schools while Detroit does not? Why haven’t other districts been 
subject to an influx of charter schools and intense competition?25 When competition creates 
“winning” and “losing” schools, we must not forget that we also create students who are 
“winners” and “losers,” and perpetuate unequal social relations between citizens. Such a 
                                                     
22 “A Growing Movement: America’s Largest Charter School Communities, Tenth Annual Edition,” 
(Washington D.C.: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015): 3, 
http://www.publiccharters.org/publications/enrollment-share-10/ 
23 I credit Leanne Kang for her work on these reforms and the resulting breakdown of local, democratic 
control of Detroit’s schools  
Kang, “The Dismantling of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1980-2014.” 
24 Thomas C. Pedroni and Karen D. Twomey, “Detroit Schools Plan Shows Lack of Faith in Democracy,” 
Detroit Free Press, October 31, 2015, 
http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2015/10/31/detroit-schools-plan-shows-lack-faith-
democracy/74878932/. 
25 Some high-performing districts do have charter schools but the number and proportion of charter 
schools is nowhere near the number and proportion in Detroit or other low-income communities.  
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dynamic has no place in the just provision of educational opportunities in a truly-democratic 
society. Subjecting our most disadvantaged students to competition, while shielding our more 
advantaged students from its effects is clearly unfair and unacceptable.26 
 
Voice and Coalition-Building: A Proposed Solution 
 
More recently, Detroiters have tried to address some of these problem via coalition-
building.27 In 2015, the Coalition for the Future of Detroit Schoolchildren made 
recommendations for the improvement of education. The Coalition included representatives from 
various groups involved in education in Detroit, including: the Skillman Foundation, the 
NAACP, the AFT, charter school board members, Wayne RESA, state legislators, teachers, 
church leaders, principals, Excellent Schools Detroit, a former Emergency Manager, General 
Motors, and community organizations.28 Some of the recommendations provided by the 
Coalition are listed below:29  
i. State assumption of the DPS debt 
ii. Returning DPS to the governance of a publicly-elected school board 
iii. Charter authorizer adoption of best practices for authorization as suggested by 
the National Charter School Authorizers 
iv. Authorizer safeguards for charter school board independence 
v. State provided three-year budget projections to school districts “accounting 
for demographic trends, and provide step-down funding to shrinking districts 
as they manage fixed cost reductions”  
vi. Imposition of the same financial transparency standards to all school districts 
and educational management companies (EMOs) 
vii. The creation of a nonpartisan legislative body – the Detroit Education 
Commission (DEC) to “coordinate and rationalize citywide education 
functions for all Detroit schoolchildren” and “set and hold all schools to the 
same standard.” In addition, the DEC would identify low-performing 
authorizers and prevent them from opening new schools in Detroit   
viii. Participation of all schools in a citywide data and enrollment system to track 
chronic absenteeism and suspension and expulsion data 
ix. The creation of neighborhood transportation systems 
                                                     
26 This is not to say that choice and competition ought to be applied to all districts. The point is that 
Detroit residents have been stripped of local control of their schools, while other districts have not.  
Hammer argues that high-spending wealthy districts were “held harmless” with the passage of Proposal: 
“The gap has been narrowed by placing a soft cap on the allowance of higher spending school districts, 
while seeking to raise the floor on the lower spending districts. As a result, the gap in the foundation 
allowance has been reduced from $2,300 in FY1995 to $1,277 in FY2007. The actual disparity is greater 
when one considers that the highest spending districts in 1994 were ‘held harmless’ and are able to spend 
greater amounts than the state allowance, financed through local property taxes”  
Hammer, “The Fate of the Detroit Public Schools: Governance, Finance and Competition,” 127.  
27 Thank you to Professor Hammer for discussing the coalition with me. I credit Hammer with describing 
this as an instance of “coalition-building.”  
28 Coalition for the Future of Detroit Schoolchildren, “The Choice Is Ours,” 2015, 
http://choiceisoursdetroit.tumblr.com/report. 
29 Coalition for the Future of Detroit Schoolchildren, “Official Recommendations,” 2015, 
http://choiceisoursdetroit.tumblr.com/recommendations. 
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x. Citywide coordination and consolidation of special education and bilingual 
services 
 
In 2016, a bipartisan Senate plan included a centralized commission like the one proposed by the 
Coalition that would have authority over where charters open and operate.30 But, House and 
Senate Republicans and charter school advocates were opposed to the Senate plan. In fact, 
former Governor John Engler – the governor who crafted Michigan’s charter school policy – 
criticized the creation of an education commission claiming that any attempts to limit charter 
schools were “morally wrong.”31 Here, Engler’s claim that it is morally wrong to regulate charter 
schools undeniably links back to his faith in the ability of free markets to bring about efficiency 
and high performance in low-performing schools.32 In response, I would contend that it’s 
morally wrong to provide students with vastly inferior educational opportunities and allow 
companies to profit off this injustice.  
 
Despite the support of Detroit’s parents, a wide array of community groups in Detroit, 
Mayor Duggan, Detroit legislators, and some charter schools the proposed DEC did not make it 
through the House. In June 2016 Governor Rick Snyder signed a bill from the House including a 
$617 million bailout for Detroit Public Schools without the proposed commission.33 A bailout is 
unlikely to improve the dysfunction created by Michigan’s charter school law, Proposal A, and 
the rules governing the market. When the House bill was passed, there were no Detroit 
legislators in the room.34 Yet again, the voices of Detroiters were ignored by lawmakers. 
                                                     
30 Ann Zanwieski, “Education Coalition: Centralize Detroit’s Public School System,” Detroit Free Press, 
August 15, 2016, http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/08/15/education-
coalition-calls-for-sweeping-changes-in-detroits-education-system/14146829/. 
Jonathan Oosting, “Detroit School Rescue Hinges on Charter School Rules,” The Detroit News, 2016, 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/08/split-gop-senate-chief-talks-dps/85603004/. 
31 Richard Burr and Chad Livengood, “Engler: ‘Morally Wrong’ to Limit Charter Schools,” The Detroit 
News, October 4, 2016, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/02/engler-detroit-
school-group/85319898/. 
32 Goenner’s account of the origins of Michigan’s charter school law describes how Engler “came to see 
charter schools as a way he could leverage his faith in choice and competition as a means for dealing with 
the problems and inequalities he saw in Michigan’s educational system” (Goenner, “The Origination of 
Michigan’s Charter School Policy,” 146-47). 
33 David Eggert, “Michigan Governor Rick Snyder Signs $617M Detroit Schools Bailout,” Detroit Free 
Press, June 21, 2016, http://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2016/06/21/michigan-governor-rick-
snyder-signs-617m-detroit-schools-bailout/86202378/.  
In March 2016, Excellent Schools Detroit launched a common enrollment system for Detroit’s charter 
schools  
Ann Zanwieski, “Common Enrollment System Launches in Detroit Today,” Detroit Free Press, March 
30, 2016, http://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2016/03/30/detroit-common-
enrollment/82337646/. 
34 Stephen Henderson, “DeVos Family Showers GOP with Contributions After DPS Vote,” Detroit Free 
Press, November 23 2016, http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/stephen-
henderson/2016/09/03/charter-devos-money-michigan/89774760/. 
Kathleen Gray, “Legislature OKs $617M Detroit Public Schools Rescue Plan,” Detroit Free Press, June 
2016. 
Kim Russel, “Detroit Senators Say They Are Locked Out of DPS Legislation Negotiations,” WXYZ 
Detroit, June 2016. 
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Is Democracy the Problem or the Solution? 
 
Two of largest education markets in the U.S. – New Orleans and Detroit – teach us some 
important lessons about the use of markets as a solution to low-performing school systems. In 
theory, markets were supposed to work as the “panacea” for disadvantaged students. In practice, 
they have created a largely-dysfunctional school system that has failed to increase educational 
opportunities for all Detroit students. Are these failures a function of faulty theory or policy? To 
a great extent Michigan’s charter school law and Proposal A reflected the theories put forward 
by Chubb and Moe and other charter school advocates. Governor Engler aimed to create an 
educational marketplace and he succeeded in doing this in Detroit. Yet, he failed in bringing 
about a “renaissance of public education” in the city where charters and Proposal A have had the 
greatest impact.35 Meanwhile, many of the highest-performing districts in the state remain under 
the control of locally-elected school boards.36 Detroiters have been stripped of this right after 
mayoral control and emergency management.  
 
 It’s clear that the dysfunction and chaos Detroit students have been subjected to is 
largely a function of policy based on idealistic theories (i.e., the theory of the free market). 
While it might not hammer the final nail into the coffin of “free” market theory, it demonstrates 
the danger of prescribing policies based on ideal principles: these policies have serious 
consequences for some of the most disadvantaged students. Anderson describes a consequence 
of using ideal theory to assess problems in the real world: “we risk leaping to the conclusion that 
any gaps we see between our ideal and reality must be the cause of the problem in our actual 
world, and that the solution must therefore be to adopt policies aimed at directly closing the 
gaps.”37 Indeed, looking forward, policies cannot be designed to close the gap between Detroit’s 
education market and the idealized (and nonexistent) free market, nor can they be designed based 
on naïvely-conceived democratic ideals. Looking at idealized versions of democracy, or voice, 
also fails to tell us how we might go about improving Detroit’s education system and alleviating 
present injustices. Instead of focusing on the merits of democracy, we ought to explore the ways 
in which democracy is undermined and the ways it might be strengthened. John Dewey famously 
wrote that the “cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy.”38 The ideals of 
democracy may seem promising, but that is all they will be – unfulfilled promises – unless we 
can explore how democracy can be made to work for disadvantaged students in segregated 
communities. 
 
                                                     
35 John Engler, “To Strengthen the Family of Michigan,” State of the State Address ( January 18, 1994), 
http://www.michigan.gov/formergovernors/0,4584,7-212-31303_31317-1987--,00.html. 
36 Michigan Department of Education, “2013-14 Top to Bottom List,” (August 6, 2014), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mde/2013-14_TTB_Rankings_465183_7.pdf. 
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38 John Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” in The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political 
Inquiry, ed. Melvin L. Rogers (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 121. 
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APPENDIX A: Enrollment and Supply in Detroit’s Education Market 
 



























Fall 2002 196,638 166,498 30,140 15,453 7,753 6,874 60 * 
Fall 2003 187,873 153,034 34,839 17,551 8,558 8,613 117 * 
Fall 2004 180,750 141,406 39,344 18,831 9,107 11,270 136 * 
Fall 2005 175,826 131,568 44,258 22,020 8,789 13,311 138 * 
Fall 2006 163,761 114,401 49,360 23,678 10,559 14,987 136 * 
Fall 2007 153,189 102,494 50,695 24,011 12,326 14,247 111 * 
Fall 2008 143,182 91,827 51,355 24,766 12,100 14,370 119 * 
Fall 2009 142,182 87,877 55,054 26,680 12,923 15,178 273 * 
Fall 2010 131,952 75,263 56,689 28,448 11,873 16,120 248 * 
Fall 2011 124,612 66,132 58,480 31,024 10,407 16,827 222 * 
Fall 2012 124,014 51,217 72,797 35,462 10,111 17,149 1,055 9,020 
Fall 2013 119,658 50,511 69,147 35,163 8,718 17,678 1,180 6,408 
 
Table 2. Market Share of Detroit Resident Students Across Education Providers, 2002-132, 
Compares different education providers’ market share of students living in Detroit. Market share is the percent of 
Detroit’s student population enrolled at a certain education provider, such as DPS, TPS, or PSAs. Market share is 
found by dividing the number of students enrolled at certain education provider (e.g., DPS, Detroit PSAs) by the 































Fall 2002 84.67% 7.86% * 
 
 
3.94% 3.50% 7.44% 0.03% 
Fall 2003 81.46% 9.34% *  
 
4.56% 4.58% 9.14% 0.06% 
Fall 2004 78.23% 10.42% *  
 
5.04% 6.24% 11.27% 0.08% 
Fall 2005 74.83% 12.52% *  5.00% 7.57% 12.57% 0.08% 
Fall 2006 69.86% 14.46% *  6.45% 9.15% 15.60% 0.08% 
Fall 2007 66.91% 15.67% *  8.05% 9.30% 17.35% 0.07% 
Fall 2008 64.13% 17.30% *  8.45% 10.04% 18.49% 0.08% 
Fall 2009 61.81% 18.76% *  9.09% 10.68% 19.76% 0.19% 
Fall 2010 57.04% 21.56% *  9.00% 12.22% 21.21% 0.19% 
Fall 2011 53.07% 24.90% *  8.35% 13.50% 21.86% 0.18% 
Fall 2012 41.30% 28.60% 7.27% 8.15% 13.83% 21.98% 0.85% 
Fall 2013 42.21% 29.39% 5.36% 7.29% 14.77% 22.06% 0.99% 
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1994 0 0 2 
1995 7 0 1 
1996 6 0 0 
1997 8 0 0 
1998 16 1 3 
1999 8 0 1 
2000 3 0 1 
2001 5 2 11 
2002 7 2 7 
2003 4 1 15 
2004 8 4 8 
2005 11 3 24 
2006 6 2 4 
2007 4 5 40 
2008 6 5 4 
2009 6 1 36 
2010 5 3 26 
2011 11 4 15 
2012 14 5 19 
2013 11 10 5 
2014 6 5 1 
2015 2 5 0 



















APPENDIX B: School Performance in Detroit 
 
Tables 4 through 18 involve data for grade four students in Detroit Public Schools (DPS), Public School 
Academies (PSAs) in Detroit, and the Education Achievement Authority. All reported performance is based on 
the grade four Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP).  
 
The data was retrieved from two main sources. For years 2002-03 to 2006-07, performance was retrieved 
from the Michigan Department of Education’s (MDE) website, where statewide MEAP performance is available 
(and, also broken by districts and schools) in downloadable data files dating back to Winter 1999.7 For years 
2007-08 to 2013-14, performance was retrieved from MI School Data, the State of Michigan’s public portal for 
education data. Performance data was pulled from the MDE’s website for the years prior to 2007-08 since there is 
no data available for years prior on MI School Data. Performance data for these two periods (2002-03 to 2006-07 
and 2007-08 to 2013-14) cannot be compared because the data in the downloadable data files on MDE’s website 
(which includes years prior to and after 2007-08) does not match the data on MI School Data for unknown 
reasons.8 While these time periods cannot be compared due to the use of different sources (and possible 
differences in reporting methods, inclusion or exclusion of students, use of averages, etc.), the data within the two 
periods remains insightful and important.  
 
Proficiency is broken down into four different levels:9 
Level 1 (L1): Advanced 
Level 2 (L2): Proficient 
Level 3 (L3): Partially Proficient 
Level 4 (L4): Not Proficient 
 
Some schools were excluded from this analysis. Reasons for exclusion include: insufficient data, 
authorized to serve grade four students but did not for a given year, or no reported test scores on the MDE 
website or MI School Data. In addition, some Educational Management Organizations (EMOs) could not be 
classified as for-profit or non-profit due to the lack of information. Tables 15, 16 and 17 indicate the number of 
EMOs that could not be classified in each year.  
 
A note on the inaccessibility of data for public school academies. It has been very difficult to gather data on 
public school academies (PSAs) due to the way MI School Data organizes the database. PSAs are listed as their 
own districts under the Intermediate School District (ISD) in which they are located. However, if looking for 
PSAs located in Detroit, the data cannot be broken down by location. Instead, this information must be retrieved 
from Educational Entity Master (EEM) datasets. Then, using information from the EEM datasets, the 
performance of each PSA must be looked up on MI School Data; this involves manually looking up each PSA 
district individually to retrieve its performance data. In addition, the MDE does not designate which EMOs are 
for-profit or non-profit. To categorize EMOs, I relied on previous work by Gary Miron. This lengthy and 
complicated process makes it difficult for the public to check the performance of PSAs in Detroit that are 
































2002-0310 74.6 16.6 58.0 18.2 7.2 123,022 
2003-0411 79.7 18.3 61.4 16.1 4.2 119,945 
2004-0512 82.4 21.9 60.5 14.2 3.4 118,345 
2005-0613 83.2 21.9 61.3 14.5 2.2 117,477 
2006-0714 84.8 33.1 51.7 13.0 2.1 116,377 
 



















2007-0815 59.6 17.6 42.0 19.2 21.2 115,371 
2008-0916 58.6 10.3 48.3 23.0 18.4 114,363 
2009-1017 65.3 14.2 51.1 19.9 14.8 112,508 
2010-1118 65.3 11.9 53.4 19.8 14.9 113,922 
2011-1219 69.0 13.0 56.0 19.0 12.0 110,366 
2012-1320 70.4 12.6 57.8 18.0 11.6 106,211 
2013-1421 71.7 18.1 53.6 19.2 9.1 105,302 
 



















2002-200322 54.9 9.9 45.0 27.6 17.6 12,923 
2003-200423 60.4 9.3 51.1 28.5 11.1 11,759 
2004-200524 66.7 10.6 56.1 25.1 8.2 10,001 
2005-200625 67.7 12.9 54.8 26.8 5.5 8,881 
2006-200726 70.2 15.9 54.3 24.7 5.1 8,162 
 



















2007-200827 29.0 5.6 23.4 23.4 47.5 7,316 
2008-200928 28.2 2.8 25.4 29.0 42.8 6,622 
2009-201029 36.8 5.0 31.8 28.3 34.9 5,946 
2010-201130 40.4 4.3 36.1 24.9 34.6 5,449 
2011-201231 41.0 4.0 37.0 29.0 31.0 4,621 
2012-201332 44.5 3.4 41.1 27.4 28.1 3,453 



























2002-200334 47.9 4.3 43.7 31.4 20.7 1,852 
2003-200435 58.2 6.1 52.1 30.6 11.2 1,786 
2004-200536 62.3 8.9 53.5 29.7 8.0 1,783 
2005-200637 65.2 9.3 55.9 29.0 5.8 2,020 
2006-200738 72.6 15.5 57.1 24.5 3.0 2,033 
 




















2007-2008 33.1 5.4 27.7 25.3 41.6 2,033 
2008-2009 29.7 2.0 27.7 33.2 37.1 2,172 
2009-2010 42.6 5.2 37.3 28.9 28.5 2,338 
2010-2011 45.6 4.7 40.9 29.1 25.3 2,607 
2011-2012 48.1 5.5 42.6 27.6 24.4 2,850 
2012-2013 43.1 2.4 40.7 29.2 27.7 3,061 
2013-2014 45.7 4.9 40.7 32.5 21.8 2,975 
 
Tables 10. Proficiency Gap Between Detroit’s Students and Students Statewide, 2002-03 to 2006-07 and 
2007-08 to 2013-14 
Compares the difference in percent of students proficient (L1+L2) between all Detroit students (PSA students, 
DPS students, and EAA students) and students statewide. The percentage gap is expressed in percentage points; 
negative values indicate that Detroit’s students are behind students statewide.  
School 
Year 
Difference in Percent Proficient: Detroit's 


















Table 11. Detroit Public School Academies (PSAs) Performing Above, Within 5%, and Below Students 
Statewide, Grade 4, MEAP Reading, 2002-03 to 2006-07 and 2007-08 to 2013-14 
Compares the performance of Detroit PSAs (schools) to students statewide in terms of percent of students 
















2002-2003 5 16.1% 1 3.2% 25 80.6% 31 
2003-2004 5 16.7% 2 6.7% 23 76.7% 30 
2004-2005 3 9.1% 2 6.1% 28 84.8% 33 
2005-2006 3 9.4% 2 6.3% 27 84.4% 32 
2006-2007 8 24.2% 2 6.1% 23 69.7% 33 
Average 5 15.1% 2 5.7% 25 79.2% 32 
2007-2008 2 5.9% 1 2.9% 31 91.2% 34 
2008-2009 3 8.8% 0 0.0% 31 91.2% 34 
2009-2010 2 5.4% 4 10.8% 31 83.8% 37 
2010-2011 2 5.3% 2 5.3% 34 89.5% 38 
2011-2012 2 4.7% 4 9.3% 37 86.0% 43 
2012-2013 2 4.3% 2 4.3% 43 91.5% 47 
2013-2014 0 0.0% 2 4.1% 47 95.9% 49 
Average 2 4.9% 2 3.8% 36 89.9% 40 
 
Table 12. Years in Operation: Detroit’s Lowest-Performing Public School Academies (PSAs) 
Using grade four reading proficiencies, Detroit PSAs were split into quartiles. This table involves schools 
performing in the 25th percentile or lower in each year. All PSAs in the 25th percentile or lower were 
outperformed by DPS every year. Using the Educational Entity Master (EEM) PSA District Dataset, the number 
of years each school had been in operation was determined.40 Years in operation represents the highest, lowest, 
and average number of years schools in the first quartile (25th percentile or lower) had been in operation at each 
year. For example, in 2006: at least one school had been in operation for nine years (high); at least one school had 






Low: Years in 
Operation 
Average: Years in 
Operation 
Number of Districts in First 
or Second Year of 
Operation 
2002 3 0 2.3 2 
2003 7 4 5.3 0 
2004 6 0 4.7 1 
2005 8 1 5.5 1 
2006 9 2 6.8 0 
Average 6.6 1.4 4.9 0.8 
2007 11 0 6.8 1 
2008 12 1 7.8 1 
2009 11 4 9.5 0 
2010 14 5 11.5 0 
2011 14 0 5.7 6 
2012 14 0 6.9 5 
2013 18 0 7.2 3 
Average 13.4 1.4 7.9 2.3 
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PSAs were divided into quartiles by performance (using grade four MEAP proficiency, including levels 1 
and 2) for years 2002-03 to 2013-14. PSAs were then classified by management type. Management types include: 
for-profit EMO, non-profit EMO, and self-managed. In order to classify EMOs as for-profit or non-profit, two 
reports published by the National Education Policy Center (NECP) profiling for-profit and non-profit EMOs were 
used.41  
 
Table 13. Detroit Public School Academies (PSA) by Management Type (Grade Four), 2002-03 to 2013-1442 
Compares the management type of all PSAs in the market (grade four only).  
School 
Year 
Percent of Detroit 
PSAs Managed by 
For-Profit EMOs 
Percent of Detroit 
PSAs Managed by 
Non-Profit EMOs 









2002-03 61.3% 12.9% 16.1% 31 9.7% 
2003-04 60.0% 13.3% 16.7% 30 10.0% 
2004-05 63.6% 12.1% 12.1% 33 12.1% 
2005-06 62.5% 12.5% 21.9% 32 3.1% 
2006-07 63.6% 12.1% 21.2% 33 3.1% 
2007-08 64.7% 11.8% 20.6% 34 2.9% 
2008-09 67.6% 11.8% 17.6% 34 2.9% 
2009-10 67.6% 13.5% 16.2% 37 2.7% 
2010-11 68.4% 15.8% 13.2% 38 2.6% 
2011-12 65.1% 18.6% 11.6% 43 4.7% 
2012-13 63.8% 21.3% 10.6% 47 4.3% 
2013-14 59.2% 26.5% 10.2% 49 4.1% 
 
Tables 14 and 15 include Detroit PSAs ranked into quartiles based on performance compared to other Detroit 
PSAs and organized according to management type. These are not comparisons of Detroit’s PSAs to other 
schools in the state, only to other PSAs in Detroit. Table 14 involves the highest performing Detroit PSAs, which 
includes PSAs given percentile rank 75 or higher (meaning the PSAs included are those performing above at least 
75 percent of all other PSAs in Detroit). The number of PSAs performing above students statewide is added for 
comparison. Table 15 includes the lowest performing Detroit PSAs, which includes PSAs in the 25th percentile 
(meaning the PSAs included are those performing below at least 75 percent of all other PSAs in Detroit). The 
number of PSAs performing below DPS students (according to district-wide results) is added for comparison.  
 
For Tables 14 and 15 there is either a (+) or () symbol next to each percentage in the second column. The (+) 
symbol indicates that the percent of PSAs managed by for-profit EMOs is greater than the percent of PSAs 
managed by for-profit EMOs in the market overall (the overall percent is reported in Table 13). The () symbol 
indicates that the percent of PSAs managed by for-profit EMOs is less than the percent of PSAs managed by for-

































2002-03 75.0% (+) 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 8 7 
2003-04 50.0% () 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 8 5 
2004-05 44.4% () 33.3% 22.2% 0.0% 9 3 
2005-06 75.0% (+) 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 8 6 
2006-07 66.7% (+) 11.1% 22.2% 0.0% 9 9 
2007-08 55.6% () 22.2% 22.2% 0.0% 9 2 
2008-09 66.7% () 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 9 3 
2009-10 50.0% () 20.0% 30.0% 0.0% 10 2 
2010-11 62.5% () 25.0% 12.5% 0.0% 8 2 
2011-12 63.6% () 27.3% 9.1% 0.0% 11 2 
2012-13 54.5% () 27.3% 18.2% 0.0% 11 2 
2013-14 53.8% () 23.1% 15.4% 7.7% 13 0 
 
























2002-03 50.0% () 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 8 8 
2003-04 75.0% (+) 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 8 8 
2004-05 88.9% (+) 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 9 9 
2005-06 75.0% (+) 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 8 8 
2006-07 77.8% (+) 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 9 9 
2007-08 66.7% (+) 11.1% 22.2% 0.0% 9 9 
2008-09 55.6% () 22.2% 22.2% 0.0% 9 9 
2009-10 80.0% (+) 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10 10 
2010-11 60.0% () 10.0% 20.0% 10.0% 10 10 
2011-12 66.7% (+) 16.7% 8.3% 8.3% 12 12 
2012-13 75.0% (+) 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 12 12 







Table 16. Detroit Public School Academies (PSAs) in the 25th Percentile for More Than One Year, 2002-03 
to 2013-14 
Includes PSAs in Detroit performing ranked in the 25th percentile (first quartile or “Q1”) relative to other PSAs in 
Detroit (see Table 13 for an explanation). The education service provider (i.e., the educational management 
organization) providing services for the school is indicated along with its designation as for-profit (P), non-profit 
(NP), unknown (U), or self-managed (no EMO). In addition, if the school closed, the year it closed is indicated in 
the sixth column.   
 
Authorizer abbreviations are listed as follows: 
BMCC: Bay Mills Community College 
CMU: Central Michigan University  
DPS: Detroit Public Schools 
EAA: Education Achievement Authority  
EMU: Eastern Michigan University  
FSU: Ferris State University  
GVSU: Grand Valley State University 
LSSU: Lake Superior State University  
OU: Oakland University  






























































Academies (P) 2012 - 2 2 
82914 
Colin Powell 





Services (U) 1998 - 0 3 
82913 
Woodward 










































Academies (P) 2004 - 3 4 
82955 
Allen 
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3 The EAA was formed in July 2011 by Governor Rick Snyder to turnaround the lowest 5 
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